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ABSTRACT

This book looks at the evolution of 16 school-to-work transition projects initiated through the Exemplary In-School Grant Program of Youthwork, Inc., funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). The study addresses issues raised by the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977, which sought to produce changes that would: 1) provide more comprehensive and higher quality services; and 2) establish linkages, patterns of collaboration, and incentives for cooperation between education and employment/training sectors and between education agencies and prime sponsors. The linkages made between individual projects and other organizations and agencies are identified, and their ability to enhance services for young people is assessed. The report describes the research plan of the study, which was based on the ethnographic approach. The projects are classified in four substantive categories: 1) Academic Credit for Work Experience; 2) Expanded Private Sector Involvement; 3) Career Awareness; and 4) Job Creation Through Youth Operated Projects. Within those areas, the report describes the projects in terms of program characteristics, the specific linkages created during project implementation, and aspects of program operations. The report discusses individual programs of particular interest as case studies. Findings of the study across all four approaches are summarized. (Author/MJL)

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Earning and Learning

Youth Employment Policies and Programs

Ray C. Rist

with Mary Agnes Hamilton, Wilfred B. Holloway, Steven D. Johnson, and Heather E. Wiltberger

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For Corinne Rieder and Lois-ellin Datta –
Whose vision and sense of how to address old problems in new ways made our study possible.

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CONTENTS

Foreword by Robert Taggart 7

Preface 13

Opening Quote 21

1 Collaboration: The Option to Going It Alone 23

2 On the Study of School-to-Work Linkages 37

3 Strategy One: Academic Credit for Work Experience 53

4 Strategy Two: Expanded Private Sector Involvement 89

5 Strategy Three: Career Awareness 123

6 Strategy Four: Job Creation Through Youth-Operated Projects 155

7 Linking Earning and Learning 187

Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations 201

Appendix B: Analysis Packet 203

References 211

Index 217

About the Author 221

FOREWORD

The transition from full-time school to full-time work over the teen years and early twenties is a tortuous road for many young people. The school-to-work transition process — finding the first summer and part-time school-year jobs, learning about the world of work and making career decisions, leaving school and entering bridge jobs or first career steps — is complicated by the extended education required in our society, by the separation between classrooms and workplaces, by the focus of pedagogy on continued schooling rather than preparation for employment, by the failure to provide basic skills to many graduates and dropouts, and by the excess supply of young jobseekers created by the postwar baby boom. A variety of interventions have been implemented to ease the transition process. They seek to improve the labor market awareness and occupational choices of students, to develop the basic employability skills demanded in the labor market, to remediate where severe educational and behavioral problems act as barriers to employment, to provide help in securing and successfully navigating labor market entry, and, in some cases, to offer first work experiences as aging vats or stepping stones.

The help comes in many forms under many different names — testing and individualized career planning, counseling, basic life skills training, vocational exploration in the

classroom or through job site rotation, remedial education, occupational skills training, motivation and job search assistance, part-time work experience in the public sector or subsidized on-the-job training in the private sector, supportive services placement assistance and follow-up. The mix and intensity of such services may vary. School-to-work transition efforts may be limited to a few hours weekly during the school year; they may provide a school year/summer continuum; they may intervene only after youth leave school; or they may be organized to deal with youth for a multiyear developmental period. The transition services may be a component in a comprehensive alternative education curriculum or an after-school add-on. They may be combined with, or limited to, work experience.

Such are provided by schools under career, cooperative, and vocational education and by locally funded school counselors. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, or CETA, provides federal funds to support efforts targeted to youth with the most limited employability. CETA provided transition services and part-time jobs to an average of 250,000 students during the 1980 school year, with summer programs employing over 800,000 students. The former represented expenditures in excess of $300 million in fiscal 1980 and the latter over $800 million. An additional $3 billion was spent to provide work experience and training for out-of-school youth. CETA efforts focus on the economically disadvantaged and minorities much more so than school-sponsored activities, but there is enormous variance in the needs and prospects of the young people who receive assistance even under the targeted CETA programs. Participants range from the mentally handicapped with no job prospects to youth who need only information and a helping hand, from 14- and 15-year-olds who will not enter the full-time labor market for several years to those who have left school and are looking for a career start.

Because of the multifaceted nature of the school-to-work transition process, the multiplicity of possible intervention strategies and the diversity of involved institutions, it is a major challenge to understand, much less alleviate, the school-to-work transition problem. A massive array of research and demonstration activity has been directed to this issue under the War on Poverty and in the early 1970s under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Despite hundreds of experimental projects testing alternative approaches, and volumes of statistical studies exploring the causes and consequences of the problem, it was the congressional and public perception that fundamental questions remained unanswered which needed to be addressed before designing youth policies for the 1980s. In response, the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA) authorized and provided more than 200 million dollars annually to support a range of research, evaluation, and demonstration activities addressed to youth problems — perhaps the most ambitious effort at social experimentation in our nation's history.

Major emphasis was placed on structured demonstration efforts testing different targeting, delivery, and service approaches. The Exemplary In-School Grant demonstration supported local school-to-work transition projects administered through a national nonprofit entity, Youthwork, Inc., which was specially created to coordinate education and manpower interests. The projects were selected under a national competition among proposals submitted through CETA prime sponsors by a range of local delivery agents. The aim of the competition was to promote cooperation between the CETA and education systems and to identify and reward exemplary projects and local delivery agents of demonstrated effectiveness.

Earning and Learning: Youth Employment Policies and Programs is a detailed look at the evolution of a stratified

sample of school-to-work transition projects funded under the Exemplary In-School Grant Program initiated through Youthwork, Inc. It is based on longitudinal case studies conducted by on-site observers focusing particularly on the institutional linkages and start-up processes which determined the success or failure of those local efforts.

The projects which were studied varied widely, since the Youthwork-funded school-to-work transition efforts were intended "to let many flowers blossom." However, the typical program provided a range of employability development activities including work experience to an average enrollment of over a hundred students, mostly minorities (66%) from poor families (80%). Activities were typically offered year-round, full-time in the summer and 10-15 hours during the school year at a cost of $3800 per person year of service. Some of the salient demographic characteristics of Youthwork projects follow.

The average annual enrollee figure per project varied from 25 or fewer participants (20%) to over 100 participants (20%), with 33 percent in the 51-100 participant range.

The duration of the projects ranged, for the most part, from 20 to 40 or more planned weeks of participation; and 85 percent of the enrolled students spent more than 11 hours a week engaged in project activities.

The average age of the participants was 16 to 19 years old, and 81 percent were in high school during the program.

Most of these projects were operated by regular or alternative schools, or by community-based organizations working within the schools. They were funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, mostly through the CETA local decisionmaking and administrative bodies called "prime sponsors." Their aim was to prepare youth for and place them in unsubsidized jobs in the private sector. To succeed, the projects therefore had to establish cooperative working relationships between the schools, the employment and training system, and the employer community. The projects were in most cases either new or significant adaptations

of existing activities, so that all encountered start-up and learning curve problems. By design, they were intended as innovations which would foster change at the local level, so they offered examples of the innovation and institutional change processes. It is these qualitative aspects which Dr. Ray Rist and associates explore in depth through ethnographic on-site observation and analysis techniques.

Earning and Learning: Youth Employment Policies and Programs offers a number of insights into the nature of linkages at the local level and into the complexities of start-up, innovation, and institutional change. If social programs are to be improved, these operational level realities must be carefully considered.

Robert Taggart
National Commission on
Employment Policy
Washington, D.C.

PREFACE

The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) became law on August 5, 1977. It amended the 1973 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) so as to provide the initiative for an expanded effort to address the problems of youth unemployment. YEDPA added several new programs to improve employment and training opportunities for young people in their late teens and early twenties, particularly those from low-income families. It has sought to emphasize more experimentation and innovation on the part of the local CETA prime sponsor than has been the case with programs developed for unemployed adults.

The Act is particularly concerned with overcoming the barriers between school and work by more closely linking education, employment, and training institutions. It seeks to forge new relationships. One of the four programs authorized by YEDPA was the Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP). This program was designed to provide a full range of work experiences and skills necessary for future employment, especially for those low-income youth, 16 to 21 years of age, who are in school or out of school and unemployed or underemployed. Certain YETP provisions also allow designated forms of participation by youth 14 and 15 years old, as well as by youth who are not economically disadvantaged.

What provides a sense of urgency to this effort is that there is a desperate need both to improve the education of low-income minority youth and to find the means by which to create more employment for them. The evidence on this point is both conclusive and sobering: the situation for poor minority youth, as compared with white middle-class youth, has steadily deteriorated over the past 15 years. Whether one measures employment rates or labor force participation rates, the disparities have grown and continue to do so. This is in spite of all the education, employment, and training programs initiated since the mid-1960s and carried on to the present (Adams and Mangum, 1978: 19-34).

The spending level for YEDPA for both fiscal years 1979 and 1980 was approximately $1.1 billion. The first priority for these funds was to generate in the vicinity of 300,000 employment opportunities for youth. As such, they became an integral component of efforts by the Carter Administration to reduce the high levels of unemployment. Nevertheless, and in recognition that present approaches to reduce youth unemployment are imperfect both in design and implementation, the Act has authorized the Secretary of Labor to allocate up to one-fifth of YEDPA funds on demonstration projects to support knowledge development. The mandate from the Congress was clear:

> Sec. 321. It is the purpose of this part to establish a variety of employment, training, and demonstration programs to explore methods of dealing with the structural unemployment problems of the nation's youth. The basic purpose of the demonstration programs shall be to test the relative efficacy of the different ways of dealing with these problems in different local contexts.
>
> Sec. 348. . . . to carry out innovative and experimental programs, to test new approaches for dealing with the unemployment problems of youth, and to enable eligible participants to prepare for, enhance their prospects for, or

> secure employment in occupations through which they may reasonably be expected to advance to productive working lives. Such programs shall include, where appropriate, cooperative arrangements with educational agencies to provide special programs and services.

The monies that were to be distributed according to formula among the local sponsors of programs for youth would alleviate some unemployment and "buy time." Yet there was little confidence that, in the end, these projects would either address the long-term needs of the youth or provide new insights into how programs might be more effectively organized and implemented so as to have a greater impact. New ideas, new approaches, and new actors would have to be on the scene if innovative and path-breaking approaches were to be found.[1] And while it was not explicit in the legislation, it can be surmised that it was the hope of the authors that if successful projects could be located where jobs were created and the youth were prepared to assume them, then perhaps cities and states would be encouraged to redirect portions of the 80 percent formula funds toward projects of this kind. Thus, the discretionary funds projects could achieve a ripple effect throughout the infrastructure of youth employment and training programs.

To learn more about one aspect of the complex set of relations between education and present/future employment opportunities, the Department of Labor set aside in Fiscal Year (FY) 1979 and again in FY 1980 from the discretionary funds approximately $15 million for "Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects." These grants were to explore the dynamics of in-school projects and their effectiveness. They also would be awarded to promote cooperation between the education and employment and training systems.

To assist the Department of Labor and its regional offices in undertaking this effort, Youthwork, Inc., an intermediary nonprofit corporation, was established in January 1978. It

was created with financial and administrative support from the Field Foundation, the Public Welfare Foundation, the Southern Education Foundation, the Taconic Foundation, and the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. Youthwork's responsibilities were to include: developing guidelines for the competition to select the Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, reviewing submitted proposals, making recommendations for funding, providing guidance and technical assistance for those projects selected in the competition, developing and implementing a knowledge development plan so as to increase understanding of different approaches and their effectiveness, and forwarding research reports and policy recommendations to the Department of Labor.

As a result of a five-tier evaluation process designed to select from among the more than 520 submitted proposals, Youthwork made its recommendations to the Department of Labor. In all, 48 projects were chosen. The first contracts were signed and projects began operation in September 1978. Of the original 48 projects, 47 did become operational.[2] Programs were funded in one of four substantive areas: Academic Credit for Work Experience, Expanded Private Sector Involvement, Career Awareness, and Job Creation Through Youth-Operated Projects. The present analysis concerns 16 of these projects. They represent the sum total of those projects funded for a full two academic years and which retained an on-site observer for the duration.

To assess these projects and their efficacy in achieving the twin goals of program effectiveness and interinstitutional collaboration, Youthwork undertook a number of knowledge development efforts. These were to include the use of analytic ethnographic material collected by a trained observer placed at each project, third-party evaluations, MIS systems, and self-study reports from the individual projects.

For the first of these efforts, that of developing a cross-site comparative framework employing qualitative data collection strategies, Youthwork, Inc., contracted in Sep-

tember 1978 with a group of researchers at the College of Human Ecology, Cornell University. The Cornell project, entitled Youthwork National Policy Study, undertook a longitudinal qualitative research program. Trained observers at each of the project sites gathered data on selected key policy issues. These data were, in turn, analyzed and used by the Cornell staff as the basis for analytic reports and for the development of national policy recommendations.

Data for this present study were originally gathered by trained on-site observers employing a variety of ethnographic research techniques. These included intensive and in-depth interviews, participant observations, the use of written materials, and statistics gathered by each site for the purpose of reporting to the Department of Labor and to Youthwork, Inc. A more detailed discussion of the methodology is to be found in Chapter Two. The book contains seven chapters: the introduction, a chapter discussing the methodology, four substantive chapters (one for each of the four program strategies being analyzed), and a final chapter summarizing the findings and suggesting the cross-site implications of the efforts to bridge the gap between learning and earning.

A note of caution is in order here. That we have learned so little from our efforts in the area of youth job development over the past two decades ought not now to press us into seeking instantaneous results. The set of projects reported on here and others sponsored by the YEDPA legislation will need careful scrutiny, not to provide premature "outcome" data, but to learn what we can of the processes of implementation, of the trials of program start-up, and of how to slowly but confidently build the interinstitutional linkages necessary for viable program operation. *The task for the 1980s is one of learning how to weave together the social net to be placed below youth as they make their way into adulthood and the world of work.* This view is consistent with that of the National Commission for Manpower Policy which recom-

mended that the focus of study on CETA funded programs be on that of the strengths of the various strategies. As was noted in their report to the President (1978: 107-108):

> In view of the rapid and continuing growth of federal manpower programs, together with the deliberate shifts in programmatic emphasis, it would seem reasonable to assume that the efficacy of manpower programs, in their various forms, was well established. This is not the case, however. Not only is the efficacy of any single program more an article of faith than documented evidence, but also there are very few clues regarding the relative efficacy of alternative programmatic approaches.

Youth need to start somewhere in building their experience with work. It is inappropriate to measure program performance and outcomes when youth have barely left the starting blocks. To assist youth in making choices as a result of exposure and experience in an in-school project ought to be acknowledged for what it is.

Finally, appreciation must be expressed to the many on-site observers associated with this effort. They consistently performed with a level of interest and competence during their many months in the field. Likewise, mention must be given to the local project personnel who were generous with their time and candid in their responses. As a means to protect those persons at the local sites who were part of this sizeable knowledge development effort, anonymity was promised from the beginning. Those who have participated will know who they are. Perhaps they will recognize themselves amidst the descriptive and interview data.

Ray C. Rist
Washington, D.C.

NOTES

1. As but one indication of the disenchantment with current approaches, witness the efforts of the Carter Administration to cut by almost $200 million the funding during FY 1979-1980 for vocational educational programs. Then-Secretary Califano called vocational education one of HEW's "least effective" programs (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies, 1979: 146).

2. An additional nine projects were also funded during Fiscal Year 1979 on a noncompetitive basis.

The need to bring the classroom closer to the workplace for disadvantaged youth is widely recognized. The challenge for the 1980s comes in putting substance into the rhetoric. Many approaches, such as career education and cooperative education, have been tried, but there is no easy solution. One obstacle to which federal policymakers need to pay more attention is that political rivalries between the school board and the prime sponsor (often the mayor's office) on local issues can provide disincentives for cooperating in federal training programs for youth. This consideration and other experiences to date suggest that even within the public sector, exhortation will not produce coordination when it conflicts with the self-interest of organizations. Consequently, concrete inducements — either in the form of requirements or incentives — for schools to work with employers must be included in any program where such cooperation is desired.

David W. Breneman and
Susan C. Nelson (1980: 233)
The Brookings Institution

CHAPTER ONE

COLLABORATION: THE OPTION TO GOING IT ALONE

Consider the following:

> YEDPA is not maintenance legislation designed to sustain existing policies and service levels. More than anything else, it is legislation intended to produce change. The purpose of these changes has been to rationalize service systems and better articulate the relationships between institutions that are in a position to improve the abilities of youth to function in job markets for the purpose of providing more comprehensive and higher quality services than have been provided in the past [Wurzburg, 1980: 1].

It is to an assessment of the issues raised in this quote that this present study is directed. Succinctly, the issues of how and whether CETA and local LEAs have been able to "better articulate the relationships" between them, of whether there have been "more comprehensive and higher quality services" than in the past, and, indeed, whether there is evidence of "change" are central to the analysis that follows.

Patterns of Collaboration: Defining the Issues

Even before the present economic recession made all the more vogue such buzz words as "interinstitutional interface" and "institutional linkages," there was a growing recognition that any attempt realistically to address the nation's un-

employment problems would necessitate the collaborative efforts of multiple sectors and institutions in the society. To provide training without cognizance of labor market demands and projections (Berg, 1971), to seek economic development in a community without recognition of established businesses and how they might be affected (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979), or to assume that work experience can be gained vicariously through classroom instruction (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies, 1979) are but three documented examples of unsuccessful efforts "to go it alone." The alternative approach would be to seek linkages, patterns of collaboration, and incentives for cooperation in order, as Wurzburg noted, to provide "more comprehensive and high quality services than have been provided in the past."

Such an approach was at the very heart of the policy guidelines established with the YEDPA legislation of 1977. As Taggart and Ganzglass (1980: 46) have noted:

> YEDPA was not just "more of the same." It sought to change ways of doing business particularly in the relationship between the education and employment and training activities, and between local education agencies and prime sponsors.
>
> The provision most directly aimed at bringing this change was the requirement that 22% of the Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP) funds provided to State and local prime sponsors be spent on in-school programs under agreement between the prime sponsors and local education agencies.

Though not stated explicitly, the assumptions of policy makers evident from the approach taken in the YEDPA legislation are several: (1) that in the past the education and employment/training sectors had not effectively collaborated, (2) that each was less than fully successful in its

mandate as a result of its practices, and (3) that the complexity and growing enormity of the youth unemployment problem necessitated new approaches that bridged the schism between these two delivery systems. Each of these can be briefly discussed in turn.

It is neither new nor startling to note that the education and employment/training systems have not worked cooperatively to address youth unemployment problems. A long list of studies, ranging from those of Presidential Commissions and national evaluations to those of academics and social critics, have first noted and then judged (positively or negatively) the presence of this hiatus. As far back as the work of John Dewey (1938), there have been calls for closing the gap between education and preparation for the world of work. Increasingly, the assumption (and, at present, it is only an assumption) has been accepted that an important means by which to address youth unemployment is by bringing these two systems into an ongoing relation. We take much of the current research sponsored by the YEDPA legislation as a test — not of whether this assumption proves correct, but only of the best means by which to operationalize it.

The second assumption, that each of the two systems is less than successful in its efforts to accomplish its objectives, is also one that is widely held. Whether one examines the illiteracy and dropout rates among minority youth from the nation's schools or the declining labor force participation rates for these same youth, the outcomes are highly similar: sizeable numbers of minority youth are increasingly distanced from the institutions of the society. The consequences are known. The unemployment rates for all youth are approximately 20 percent, and those for minority youth are nearly double that figure. What gives particular saliency to these findings is that they are indicative, particularly for black youth, of a downward trend in labor force participation that dates back more than a decade. Figure 1.1 provides graphic evidence of these trends.



Figure 1.1 Who's Losing Ground? Employment/Population Ratios Over 25 Years, 1954-1978

SOURCE: Testimony of Shirley M. Hufstedler, Secretary of Education, before the Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Education and Labor Committee. February 25, 1980.

Finally, the juxtaposition of these two sets of assumptions suggested to those who drew up the YEDPA legislation that new initiatives could not take a "business as usual" approach to the matter of youth unemployment. New initiatives, new actors, and new relations would have to be forged

if anything other than "more of the same" was to be done. Both the enormity and complexity of the current situation made it apparent that the consolidation and collaboration of several institutional sectors would be necessary if any new initiative was to have even a remote opportunity to succeed.

There is a fourth, and perhaps no less obvious, justification for the bringing together of the education and employment/training systems to address the matter of school-to-work transition and the future employability of American youth. If one examines the data available from the federal budget for the Fiscal Year 1979, it is evident that the federal government spent considerably less on secondary school/poor youth in comparison to poor youth in either elementary or post-secondary education. The data are in several forms: $3.2 billion was spent for poor children in grades K-6, while $1.2 billion was spent on poor youth in grades 7-12. For those low-income young persons who went on to higher education, the federal government spent, on an average, $3046 per student, but only $231 on each low-income high school student. For those low-income students who did graduate from high school, but did not go to college, the average expenditure on additional education and training was $161. The data are portrayed in Figure 1.2.

The point can be simply made: so long as a substitution of dollars does not take place, any collaboration between institutions ought to increase the total amount spent on low-income youth in grades 7-12. Given the extremely low level from which current support begins (as evidenced above for the education sector), the concentration of resources to better assist these youth is highly desirable. The evidence is building that the rather sizeable expenditure of funds on low-income youth in the elementary grades has had a positive effect on their academic achievement (Hufstedler, 1980). It is too early to tell whether the same effect will occur for secondary school youth, as such funds have not been expended. Yet collaboration between the education and



Figure 1.2 Federal Education Expenditures for Young People with Special Needs—FY 1979

SOURCE: Testimony of Shirley M. Hufstedler, Secretary of Education, before the Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Education and Labor Committee. February 25, 1980.

employment/training sectors appears necessary to generate the "critical mass" of funds necessary for making any change in the current condition of low-income youth, whether in their academic performance on basic skills, or on their knowledge, interest, and motivation to participate in the world of work.

Parenthetically, this approach appeared to have been institutionalized within the proposed Youth Act of 1980. Additional funds for youth education and employment training, above the $825 million allocated during FY 1980 to Title IV of CETA (the youth programs title), were to be split evenly between the Department of Education and the Department of Labor for their respective programs. While such a stipulation was written only into the version of the legislation passed by the House Labor and Education Committee, the precedent of establishing fiscal incentives that encourage cooperation seemed set; especially given that the bill proposed a 22 percent set-aside for both education and CETA efforts. Thus, 44 percent of the monies available each for prime sponsors and LEAs were earmarked for collaborative efforts. With increased appropriations, the impact of this set-aside would grow proportionately. The sum total of funds that were to be spent according to an agreement between a CETA prime sponsor and the LEA approximated one-third of all monies authorized in the proposed act (Byrne, 1980: 14).

The Issue of Implementation

If the general consensus is that collaboration *ought* to exist between the education and employment/training sectors so as to enhance the opportunities of American youth, then the matter of *how* this is to be accomplished must be addressed. In short, what is necessary is an understanding of the mechanisms by which one moves from establishing goals to achieving them. What has been documented time and again is that little systematic study or attention has been paid to the process of implementation. Indeed, Hargrove (1975)

sees it as the "missing link" between policy formation and program operation.

What further complicates the goals of planners is that seldom are programs implemented as they were designed. As the recent (and massive) Rand Corporation study of implementation of federal programs has made clear, the implementation process must itself be treated as an independent variable that profoundly affects what kind of program ultimately emerges (Berman and McLaughlin, 1978). Because so little is known about the processes of implementation and about the strategies that are most appropriate to achieve successful program operation, each of the projects reported upon in this study essentially had to rely on previous experience or "best guesses" as to how to proceed. The development of linkages in these projects was essential to the goals the projects had stated for themselves. The route to developing these linkages, however, was difficult and uncharted, and this is part of the story to be told in this book.

A critical difficulty in effecting viable linkages between the education and employment/training sectors is due to neither one having an articulated understanding of the nature of these linkages. The goal for the Exemplary In-School Projects was linkages, but the rationale and methodology were not clear. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1979: xxi) have stated in this regard:

> Policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequences. If X, then Y. Policies become programs when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions are created. X now exists. Programs make the theories operational by forging the first link in the causal chain connecting actions to objectives. Given X, we act to obtain Y. Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results.

Given that the projects were to be "demonstration projects," that is, trying new and different ways of addressing the needs

of in-school youth, it is perhaps not surprising that prior to the beginnings of the programs, there was little sense of how to "forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results." The consequence was an ongoing set of improvisations — some of which were successful, but more of which were not.

But again, this is to be expected. Failure, rather than success, is the more likely outcome of individual and isolated stabs at social change. Quoting from Pressman and Wildavsky (1979: 109):

> Our normal expectation should be that new programs will fail to get off the ground and that, at best, they will take considerable time to get started. The cards in this world are stacked against things happening, as so much effort is required to make them move. The remarkable thing is that new programs work at all.

One key to our understanding of when these new programs "do work at all" in terms of forging new relations is that the *linkages are made between institutions with comparable organizational features*. The work of Elmore (1978) has been particularly informative in this regard. Elmore (1978: 185) suggests that "understanding organizations is essential to the analysis of implementation." He posits that there is not one model, but rather four distinct models of organizational life and that within each, the matter of implementation is understood differently. His four analytic models are systems management, bureaucratic process, organizational development, and, finally, conflict and bargaining. What is critical about these differentiations, as Elmore (1978: 188) notes, is that:

> Viewing the implementation process through a number of different organizational models allows us to be specific about the organizational assumptions we make when we offer prescriptions for improving implementation. Different models, we will see, lead to quite different perceptions and conclusions.

While not elaborating upon each of these four in detail, suffice it to say that neither the prime sponsors nor the LEAs involved in the Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects exhibited the organization structure that Elmore would categorize as "systems management." More appropriate to our present analysis is the fact that among the 24 sites represented in this study, examples of all three remaining organizational models were present. Elmore describes the *bureaucratic process model* as one that represents the sociological model of organizations. It takes as its point of departure that "the essential feature of organizations is the interaction between routine and discretion." The *organizational development model*, blending sociological and psychological theory, focuses "on the conflict between the needs of individuals and the demands of organizational life." Finally, the *conflict and bargaining model* "addresses the problem of how people with divergent interests coalesce around a common task. It starts from the assumption that conflict, arising out of the pursuit of relative advantage in a bargaining relationship, is the dominant feature of organizational life."

Each of these models stresses a different aspect and vantage point from which to study the process of implementation. Comparing the manner in which different exemplary projects operationalized their implementation strategies should lead to a better understanding of why many linkages failed, and why others existed in only the most tenuous of terms. Conversely, those linkages that grew stronger during the two years of program implementation (1978-1980) existed in those instances where there were similar organizational structures.

The theoretical work of Elmore leads to an examination of different organizational models and the modes of their implementation. The findings suggest that a mismatch between organizational types made exceedingly difficult the establishment of successful linkages. As but one example, when a LEA functioned on the bureaucratic process model

and the project saw itself as a change agent in constant conflict with the larger system (that is, functioning within the conflict and bargaining model), successful linkages were few and far between. The project termed the LEA obstructionist while the school system saw the project as refusing to follow established guidelines, constantly interested in procedural shortcuts, and generally unwilling to accept the present routine as the way in which business was to be accomplished. The instances could be multiplied, but the point is made: implementation across organizational types presents significant obstacles in achieving interinstitutional collaboration. This finding is central to several of the policy recommendations made in the Summary section of this study.

The Research Agenda

YEDPA AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

Although the direct support for youth employment programs has commanded the bulk of YEDPA appropriations, improved knowledge development is of high priority. Indeed, the Congress authorized in the legislation that up to a full 20 percent of the YEDPA funding could be used for demonstration projects seeking innovative means by which to address the problem of youth employment. The first general principle of the YEDPA Planning Charter of August 1977 stated on page 5:

> Knowledge development is a primary aim of the new youth programs. At every decision-making level, an effort must be made to try out promising ideas, to support on-going innovation and to assess performance as rigorously as possible. Resources should be concentrated and structured so that the underlying ideas can be given a reasonable test. Hypotheses and questions should be determined at the outset, with an evaluation methodology built in.

This emphasis upon new approaches and new strategies for addressing the persistence of youth unemployment came

none too soon. As Mangum and Walsh (1978) have cogently stated, little or no systematic effort has been made over the past years to learn from previous efforts, either positive or negative. The decisions on what programs to instigate, what policies to pursue, and what objectives to seek have heretofore not been made. Their rather somber assessment includes much of what they understand to be in the YEDPA initiatives as well. Mangum and Walsh (1978: 11) note:

> It is ironic that after 17 years of experimentation with employment and training programs for youth, Congress found it necessary to legislate activities and programs aimed at discovering the causes of youth unemployment and its potential solutions. It seems fair to ask whether the assumptions upon which past youth programs were based were faulty, or whether the programs themselves were poorly designed or mismanaged. Yet, aside from the research provisions of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA), the programs authorized by the Act are the same as those which have been implemented over the past 17 years — work experience on community improvement and conservation projects, institutional and on-the-job training, counseling, placement and other kinds of supportive services. . . . Congress undoubtedly hoped that programs initiated under YEDPA would be innovative and would unearth heretofore untried techniques, but one of the criticisms of past programs has been that they have been almost exclusively experimental. Experiment has been piled upon experiment, but a concerted, overall policy for treating youth unemployment and transitional problems has never emerged.

If Mangum and Walsh are correct in their assessment that "aside from the research provisions," little new or innovative could be anticipated from the YEDPA effort, then, of necessity, attention should focus on what the research sponsored by YEDPA might yield in the way of new insights or programmatic initiatives.

With the first phase of YEDPA funding in FY 1978, an ambitious agenda of demonstration, research, and assess-

ment activities was implemented. The *Knowledge Development Plan* structured an array of discretionary efforts to address a number of the most pressing questions facing national policy makers (DOL, 1978). Within this 1978 plan were eight "first order" questions which needed to be answered to both design and implement the national priorities regarding youth unemployment. Of the eight questions posed, two areas are relevant to the present analysis:

(1) Can the school-to-work transition process be improved? Are new institutional arrangements feasible and warranted? Can new transition routes be created?

(2) Are there better approaches and delivery mechanisms for the types of career development, employment and training services which are currently being offered?

It became apparent as YEDPA moved into its second fiscal year (1979) that a number of "second order" questions also deserved attention. For the most part, these questions were refinements and further clarifications of the original eight. They focused more specifically, for example, on targeting for subpopulations of youth, isolating the effects of specific service components, and comparing alternative delivery approaches. For the Fiscal Year 1979 effort, seven such second-order questions were posed. Of these seven, three areas can also be addressed here. They are as follows (DOL, 1979: 4-5):

(1) What approaches and procedures can be used to involve the private sector in employment and training efforts and to increase the placement of the participants in private sector jobs? How effective are these approaches in accessing new jobs and providing better career tracks for youth?

(2) How can youth programs be better integrated to improve administration and to provide more comprehensive services to youth? To what extent are the programs already integrated at the local level?

(3) How can the lessons from knowledge development activities best be transferred to improve existing youth programs? How can the institutional change process be promoted?

The individual local programs selected for this demonstration project were slated to operate from between nine and eighteen months, specifically, between September 1978 and March 1980. Programs did include summer activities in 1979 if those activities were shown to be a logical extension of the school-year program. They were funded each year from $15 million set aside by the Department of Labor for discretionary projects under the authority of the YETP legislation. The projected size of the youth populations to be served in the programs varied from a low of 35 to a high of 10,000. Sites were located across the nation in 31 states and in locations that ranged from rural to metropolitan areas. Individual grants ranged from approximately $175,000 to $400,000, with the average being near $300,000.

This study focuses on the form and content of the linkages that were made between seventeen individual projects and other organizations and agencies. It seeks not only to identify these linkages, but to assess their utility in enhancing services to young people. It is important here to stress that the existence of linkages ought not to be taken as an end in and of itself. The linkages are a means by which to try more successfully to provide assistance to youth. Further, it should be stressed that we have not sought to examine the linkages as simply a "one-way" relationship. We have been concerned about interdependencies and interrelationships between organizations. The task has been one of attempting to sort out the reciprocities created by collaborative effort.

CHAPTER TWO

ON THE STUDY OF SCHOOL-TO-WORK LINKAGES

Introduction

A significant departure from traditional ethnographic research was instigated with this study. Rather than send the observers into the field and wait for the "emergent issues" to become apparent, time constraints as well as specific policy questions of concern to the Congress, the Department of Labor, and to Youthwork, Inc., necessitated the predefinition of the areas of investigation. Six "analysis packets" were written, each focusing on a particular area of study.[1] The analysis packets did not specify *how* the data relevant to the various policy issues should be collected, only *what* were the areas of concern. Throughout the study, observers remained responsible for determining the important events and activities at their respective project sites and for insuring that these events were faithfully reported in their field notes.

Perhaps more important to stress than the changes made within the methodology is the fact that qualitative research was used at all. The application of this method to the study of the Exemplary In-School Projects represents a break from traditional approaches to the study of education and employment training. Rather than rely exclusively on the models of "input-output" evaluations, or those which stress

summative approaches, this research based its analysis on the study of social processes and day-to-day realities not amenable to quantification. Critical aspects of these projects could not be studied through the application of mathematical formulas or standardized testing. An in-depth familiarity, a closeness to the staff and students, a longitudinal perspective that permitted the observer to study changes and reactions to changes over time — in other words, to study the process of program development and implementation — were key benefits from the application of an ethnographic approach.

There is a growing consensus among those involved in large-scale policy evaluations that there is an important, indeed critical, role to be played by qualitative research. Too often in the past, the assumption has been made that statistical realities coincide with cultural realities. The fact that this is not so has been the Achilles heel of many efforts at evaluating employment and training programs. Succinctly, to build from the ground up, one needs to know what is going on at the ground level. As Weiss (1970: 62-63) had already noted:

> One hopeful direction is to place less stress on evaluation of over-all impact, studies that come out with all-or-nothing, go/no-go conclusions. More resources should be allocated to evaluations that compare the effectiveness of variant conditions within programs (different emphases and components of programs, attributes of sponsoring agency structure and operation, characteristics of participants) and begin to explain which elements and sub-elements are associated with more or less success. Such an approach produces data of interest across a wide range of programs and has high utility in pointing direction for further program development.

In reviewing a large number of studies of the utilization (or lack thereof) of program evaluations, Alkin and Daillak (1979) have concluded that the utilization of process evaluations is hindered by the attempt to translate complex and

multidimensional variables into linear and discrete variables. Program persons themselves know this process can fundamentally distort any assessment of their program. Thus they increasingly tend not to place much reliance on such material. In the end, it is of little benefit to program operators and policy makers to have to rely on artificially created "clean" data in a complex and messy world. Alkin and Daillak (1979: 49) also conclude;

> In a very real sense, there is another major finding of the study; an enhanced conviction on our part that naturalistic methods are the most powerful and appropriate methodology for the study of utilization.

We would concur and suggest that the same would hold true for studies of program implementation and interinstitutional linkages as well (Rist, 1981a).

What follows in this chapter is a discussion of the methodology used in this research. The key points to be reviewed are the theoretical and empirical rationale for qualitative research, the various techniques employed, the manner in which the data were coded and analyzed, and the strengths and limitations of the overall approach.

Theoretical and Empirical Rationale

Many labels have been attached to the research strategy in which researchers directly observe human activity and interaction in a naturalistic environment. The earliest use of this technique was by anthropologists in their field studies of preliterate peoples. Malinowski (1922) labeled his technique of observing and participating in the various activities of a Trobriand village "ethnography." He described his goal in utilizing this technique as follows:

> The field ethnographer has seriously and soberly to cover the full extent of the phenomena in each aspect of tribal culture studies, making no difference between what is

> commonplace or drab, or ordinary, and what strikes him as astonishing and out of the way. At the same time, the whole area of tribal culture, in all its aspects, has to be gone over in research. The consistency, the law and order which obtain within each aspect make also for joining them into one coherent whole.

More recently, Valentine (1968) has called for new ethnographic research to be conducted among various groups of North American urban poor. He stated that only through direct participation in the life of those being studied will there emerge an understanding of the structure of the society in which they live. Valentine contended that just as provincial judgments were made by colonialists concerning the peoples they encountered, so also provincial judgments were presently being made about the poor by middle-class social scientists. The provincialism must be overcome by sustained contact, which leads to acceptance and understanding of the internal logic of the group being studied. Valentine (1968: 8-9) noted:

> From the time of pioneer field workers onward, it has been recognized that prolonged, intensive, direct exposure to the actual conditions of life is needed to understand a previously unknown culture. This involves direct observation of social behavior and participation in community life as well as systematic questioning and discussion with informants. Only by this immersion in on-going group existence can the anthropologist probe thoroughly beneath the surface of a culture and replace superficial impressions with more accurate insights.

Dating back at least a half century, American social scientists have utilized ethnographic research. They have completed such diverse studies as those of industrial strikes (Gouldner, 1954); patterns of community organization (Hatch, 1948; Lynd and Lynd, 1928; Warner et al., 1944); behavior in public places (Goffman, 1963); psychiatric inter-

viewing (Scheff, 1966); clientele in stores with pornographic material (Polsky, 1967); development of racial identification (Goodman, 1952); street corner society (Whyte, 1943); cab drivers (Henslin, 1967); and the means to measure "success" in a poverty program (Bogdan, 1975).

In the employment field, Wurzburg (1978, 1979) adopted a case study approach to provide an on-going picture of how prime sponsors were implementing YCCIP and YETP programs. The Work Institute of America (1979) used short case studies to describe private sector initiatives for the hard-to-employ, and the National Institute of Education (1978) recently funded intensive ethnographic evaluations of implementation efforts at four replications of the Philadelphia based OIC/A model of school-to-work transition.

The General Research Plan

The Youthwork National Policy Study chose the ethnographic approach because of its flexibility in design and execution and, most importantly, because qualitative data are most useful in capturing the processes and ongoing problems and successes of program development and implementation (Rist, 1981b). In addition, these types of data easily lend themselves to a formative feedback design essential to the improvement of employment and educational programs for low-income in-school youth. The field work has drawn heavily from the methodologies traditionally associated with anthropology, sociology, and social psychology.

Throughout the period of the field work, the field researchers, one at each of the sites, functioned as ethnographers. Their overriding concern was with describing and analyzing various critical dimensions of the project as these were detailed in the analysis packet. The task was one of gaining an in-depth understanding, not the generation of illusory "hard data" by means of "hit and run" social science techniques.

The complexities of implementing multitask youth education and training programs are difficult to capture with straight interview data and/or survey questionnaires. The field researchers were trained in the application of the traditional emic approach to field work. This approach dictates that the observer should ascertain the criteria that informants use to interpret and describe their own experiences. Variously described by other researchers as "folk system analysis," or studies of the "social construction of reality," the importance of the approach has been described by Ogbu (1974: 16):

> From this perspective the behaviors of any group of people in schools, churches, or political rallies are not governed by an "objective reality out there," but by the "reality" they experience and interpret. Most studies document the middle class interpretations of the universe of these people. Although the theories that emerge may be self consistent, they do not represent accurately the "realities" they attempt to explain.

Data Sources

Field researchers used multiple data sources for their description and analysis of the in-school exemplary program with which they were affiliated. The basic strategy of data collection was that of a triangulation of data sources (Denzin, 1970). Data from diverse sources tend to be complementary because of their reciprocal strengths and weaknesses (Rist, 1977). The basic research activities of on-site observers were those which simultaneously combined document analysis, respondent and informant interviewing, direct participation, and extensive observation of the various facets of the local project. There was also the occasional opportunity to use data gathered by others at the site, such as third party evaluators.

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

The first of the pivots necessary for the triangularization noted by Denzin is participant observation. It should be stressed immediately that observational research is not of a single mode. Rather, what is available to the researcher is a continuum of options ranging from, as Patton (1980: 127) notes,

> complete immersion in the program as a full participant to complete separation from the program as a spectator; there is a great deal of variation along the continuum between these two extremes. Nor is it a matter of deciding once and for all in a study how much the observer will participate. The extent of participation can change over time. In some cases the evaluator may begin as an onlooker and gradually become a participant as the study progresses. In other cases the evaluation may begin as a complete participant in order to experience what it is like to be initially immersed in the program and then gradually withdraw participation over the period of the study until finally taking the role of occasional observer from an onlooker stance.

The goal of all this is to come as close as is possible to understanding the meanings and interpretations that the participants themselves give to their behaviors and environments. The key, embedded in the German term *verstehen*, is an empathic understanding and experiencing of the setting.

To achieve such an understanding necessitated countless hours of observation/participation by the on-site observers. To move "backstage," as it were, to learn how CETA and the public schools each viewed the other, how each sought to maximize its own self-interests, and how compromises and accommodations were (or were not) achieved could only be done through an extensive period of close-in familiarity gained from observations and participation in multiple facets of each of the two systems.

What has lent additional credibility and validity to the findings in this study was that the observers who were in the field were not "outsiders" introduced in a peripheral fashion to the program. They were, almost without exception, local persons familiar with their community. Their residence in the community, their availability for participation in programs both during the day and in the evening, their ability to change schedules to accommodate important events and occurrences at the site, and their longevity as observers were all important contributions to the rich and detailed observational notes produced at site after site.

THE INTERVIEW

The second pivot in building a comprehensive and in-depth understanding through qualitative research is the use of interviews. As with observational research, there is no single mode, but a number of strategies. They, too, fall along a continuum. At one end, there is the option of asking the same questions in the same manner and same sequence to multiple individuals. This is the most standardized and structured of the interviewing techniques available. Toward the center of the continuum are those interview strategies where one has the option of either asking the same set of questions, but in a sequence deemed appropriate to that particular instance, or alternatively, posing the questions in the same sequence, but in varying terminology appropriate to the respondent at hand. This "mixed mode" of interviewing allows considerably more flexibility to the interviewer to ensure that the interview (which in qualitative research ought to be considered as but one of multiple conversations to be held with the respondent) succeeds. At the other end of the spectrum are those interviews/conversations that are neither structured nor standardized. These tend to be situation/incident specific, exploratory, or most often used when the respondents vary considerably by education, experience, and interest.

A further consideration when involved in interviews was the relation of the interviewer and respondent. If the relation was a long-term one where the respondent was serving much as a "key informant" to the observer, it was likely that less standardized and scheduled interviewing would be necessary or appropriate. The key informant became a person against which interpretations, assumptions, hunches, and only vaguely formulated analyses could be checked. The key informant often provided a "reality check," as it were, for the researcher in the field. Alternatively, if the relation was less developed, if there existed more social distance between the interviewer and respondent, then a more standardized and scheduled interview was appropriate. The "rush to informality" that often occurs in interviewing — a rush which is frequently not reciprocated by the respondent — was an item cautioned against several times in the training of the on-site observers. Finally, for those members of the organization who were only vaguely or not at all known to the observer, a formalized questionnaire was considered most appropriate. This approach was suggested as a means of making contact and beginning in a tentative and neutral way the basis for further conversation.

WRITTEN DOCUMENTS

Field researchers obtained copies or made abstracts of all written records pertinent to the areas of study within the exemplary program. Such records, the third pivot, included evaluation reports, memoranda, announcements, internal communications, nonconfidential assessments of student performance, formal contracts of association, newspaper clippings, and the like. Also, the actual learning packets, textbooks, supplementary reading materials, assignments, and performance contracts used in the various projects contributed to an understanding of the system. They were also used to document the instructional practices at the different sites.

MIS DATA

The Department of Labor required that each of the Exemplary In-School Programs collect certain standardized data. This was done through the use of a Management Information System (MIS). Data collected from each site in this system included number of students enrolled, number of students who successfully completed the program, the percentage of predicted student population served to date, the size of staff, and a host of demographic variables about the individual students. These data were made available to the YNPS and were incorporated where appropriate and known to be accurate.

DATA TRANSMISSION

Three forms of data were produced and subsequently transmitted by the on-site observers. The first was a copy of each and every protocol generated by the observer during any data collection endeavor, whether interviewing, observing, or the collection of written materials. These were gathered together so as to maintain a continuous monitoring system of field-produced material. During the study, approximately 2500 such protocols were produced.

The second form of data transmitted from the on-site observers were brief (3 to 5 pages) analytic narratives written in response to specific questions. The questions were generated as a result of new areas of study and analysis opened up by the field work. They were also generated to address rapidly specific dimensions of key policy questions posed by Congressional staff or by DOL policy makers.

Periodically, the on-site observers were also asked to provide an "analytic summary protocol." This protocol was essentially an effort by the observers to summarize their own reactions, understandings, and interpretations of the various key areas outlined for investigation in one or another of the analysis packets. Moving through the packet item by item,

the observers provided an integrated summary of their own data collection efforts over the past months. Considerable material from these summaries has been incorporated into the chapters that follow.

Organization and Analysis of Field Notes

Systematic and analytical observations depend upon the recording of complete, accurate, and detailed field notes. On-site observers were charged with recording their observations as soon after witnessing an event or an interview as possible. Unless otherwise agreed upon with the individual site observer, no mechanical devices were used during on-site observations. Prior to the research, training sessions were held at which observers were instructed in styles of note taking and the manner in which the field notes were to be converted into protocols. These protocols were the key data source for the subsequent analysis. One copy of each protocol remained with the field observer and one copy was sent to the YNPS analysis staff. All protocols were read promptly by YNPS staff. There was close contact between YNPS staff and on-site observers. The YNPS staff would request additional data to correct omissions, resolve contradictions, and seek clarification on ambiguous statements. Additionally, other activities to be observed were periodically suggested so as to provide needed additional data. A sample protocol page from one on-site observer is provided in the appendix to this chapter. (Certain identifying information has been deleted from the protocol page in order to maximize anonymity and confidentiality.)

Distilling these voluminous files of protocols required a series of coding and editing steps. Code sheets were developed to coincide with each of the analysis packets. Reading the protocols and coding the data by topic according to a framework necessary to answer the key policy questions was undertaken by the YNPS staff. Further, this effort al-

lowed for a standard analytic framework to be applied across all field sites. In the past, multiple frameworks applied to multiple sites have often detracted from the ability to generalize and develop recommendations (Wirt, 1981). This standardized analytic procedure allowed for inter- as well as intra-strategy comparisons.

The strength and credibility of the data reported here was derived from the longitudinal nature of the research design. The single most apparent weakness in most research efforts attempting to document and analyze program implementation is that they lack a sufficient longitudinal perspective (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979). The conventional means of studying youth employment programs could aptly be described as a cross-sectional approach, in contrast to studying the programs in question over time (Rossi and Wright, 1977).

Another strength was that long-term participation in the programs allowed the observers to become sensitive to the subtle nuances that had meaning only to those within the systems. A weakness of many quantitative designs is that they assume that behavior, regardless of motivation or context, can be abstracted and measured accurately. The abstraction from various scores and test results provides approximations of behavioral outcomes, but seldom of the processes involved. Long-term participation in a social system provides the observer with the opportunity to understand the processes that occur from the point of view of the participants themselves.

A basic epistomological assumption guided the selection of direct observation as the primary research strategy employed in this endeavor: that the study of individuals and groups in natural settings is a powerful and parsimonious means by which to understand and explain the human condition. The approach seeks to bypass the "fallacy of objectivity" and move directly to an experiential involvement in the setting. What we individually or collectively believe to be reality is "socially constructed." The study of how such

construction takes place is critical to knowing the basis through which individuals respond to their world. The implications for the study of youth and their ties to the world of work should be evident.

The observations at the sites were necessarily selective. However, observers were instructed to focus their efforts so as to contribute data to an analysis of the key policy issues. They were encouraged to vary both the day of the week and the times of day when they visited sites. This strategy was designed to collect data over a spectrum of events and interactions. A necessary limitation of this approach was that not all events and activities could be covered. Thus, there was an imperative for continuous visits to the site in order to gain over time a perspective of what constituted the "typical" or "normal" patterns of training, instruction, and work experience for the participants.

A self-imposed constraint during the study was the blanket promise of anonymity to those observed and interviewed. Each method of data collection had to be evaluated in light of whether it would insure protection to those involved. In promising all site personnel they would remain unidentified, they were assured that statements made by them would not be reported to their superiors. This consideration resulted in the decision that data could not be reported if they would have given strong clues as to the identity of the site or respondent involved.

With this description of both the policy agenda and the research methodology underlying the study, we can now turn to the task at hand — a description and assessment of the manner in which two large and complex bureaucracies sought a *rapprochement*. Each system had its own logic, its own way of doing business, and its own reward structure. Yet the incentives from the YETP legislation were such that a sizeable portion of the funding (22%) would be made available only to those school systems and CETA organizations who could come together to develop collaborative and cooperative programs.

What follows is the analysis of the manner in which linkages were formed — some enduring, others fragile and quickly broken. It is a study of some success and failure. Whether one takes heart from the success or is cynical from the failure, the fact that these systems sought to develop the relations, sought to bridge the gap for young people between their earning and learning, is worthy of attention.

APPENDIX

SAMPLE PROTOCOL PAGE

page 2 of 8

Name of Researcher:
Date of Observation: 10/25/80
Subject of Observation: Staff Discussion
Site of Observation: Lunchroom
Protocol # 78

I was on my way back down the hall to the director's office when Susan, one of the learning coordinators for the Community College program, asked if I was free for lunch. I indicated that I was and so we walked back towards her office to get her purse. In the hall, we met Audry, another of the learning coordinators who asked if she might come along as well. Susan, showing obvious hesitancy, finally said yes. While Audry quickly went into her own office to get her purse, Susan turned to me and said that now we would have to watch what we talked about at lunch as Audry was constantly "slipping everything to Joyce." (Joyce was the program director.)

Over lunch I asked both of them a number of questions in an informal and unstructured manner. When I queried them about the retention of students, they said that three had left the program this semester. One quit because the hospital where the student was working as part of the program experience hired him full-time. Another quit, according to Susan, "I think it was because she was not prepared for the academic

work. When she dropped out of school, she automatically had to leave the program. And besides, she is getting married at the end of next month." The third student left the area, though neither Susan nor Audry knew specifically why. Susan said she had heard it was to go back to her ex-husband.

When I asked them what they thought were the attractions of the program for the students, there was agreement by both Susan and Audry that the money and placements were primary. The money was good and the placements were better, Audry said, than what many of the youth could have arranged for themselves. She also said that "no other program in town can provide the opportunities for these kids that we can arrange through our contacts." Susan added that this also helped explain the very low drop-out rate that they had in the program, i.e., three out of eighty students.

NOTE

1. The analysis packet which served as the basis for much of the collected data relevant to the present study is included as Appendix B of this volume.

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGY ONE: ACADEMIC CREDIT FOR WORK EXPERIENCE

The Academic Credit for Work Experience (ACWE) projects were both formally and informally linked to other organizations over their two years of operation. Funded as new YETP in-school demonstration projects by Youthwork, Inc., in the fall of 1978, these social intervention programs underwent a process of program stabilization through the establishment and integration of interinstitutional linkages over their period of program operation. Discussing the evolution and integration of new social intervention programs into the preexisting institutional structure, Spencer (1970: 121) explains:

> It is unrealistic to assume that such a system will be integrated from the outset; but, rather, one can expect that the new organization will develop within the environment of social conflict where in power becomes defined, ideological differences are accommodated and a viable process can be developed.

The processes developed by the ACWE projects to become operational and stable social intervention programs involved the development and sustenance of two different types of interinstitutional linkages. The linkages were developed by or for the projects to accomplish their goal of

addressing one aspect of the national youth employment problem: the lack of coordination of services between the institutions of education and labor. The two sets of linkages developed to sustain and stabilize the ACWE projects were: (1) funding source compliance linkages, and (2) program operation linkages.

The first set, funding source compliance linkages, was developed for the ACWE projects to monitor their program expenditures for their funding source, the U.S. Department of Labor. As explained by Eklen and Lauffer (1972: 5):

> The practitioner is rarely a free agent. Regardless of value or ideological commitments, or skill or expertise, much of his work is determined by the *contexts* within which he practices. Conceptual components include: (1) the auspices under which he operates — the legitimating and sponsoring body, (2) the source of financial and other support, (3) the purpose of the organization for whom or on whose behalf he acts, (4) the target of his intervention, whether a population group, organization or service network, (5) the internal structure of the organization within which he works, and finally (6) the locus at which his intervention is pitched — the neighborhood, the local community, the state, and the like. Together, these components constrain and limit the *scope* of his activities, and give him the *mandate* for his actions [italics theirs].

The compliance monitoring linkages were developed for the ACWE projects to serve the first three purposes outlined above by Eklen and Lauffer (1972).

The second set of linkages was developed by the ACWE projects to fulfill the last three of the program activities listed above, all of which related to the actual delivery of services. But before the ACWE projects could deliver services to youth, the programs had to identify the locus of their intervention, which included the identification of the target population, work sites, and other community resources. For each

TABLE 3.1 Program Goals and Implementation Linkages

Goals	*Program Operations*	*Program Compliance Monitoring*
1. Enrollment of target population	• Identification of target population	• Certification of youth eligibility
		• Correct enrollment/ terminations
2. Provision of work experience	• Identification of work sites	• Fiscal expenditures
		• Legality of sector placement
		• Legality of wages
		• Legality of hours
		• Compliance with child labor laws
3. Provision of learning experience	• Identification of youth academic credit needs	• Client's academic record
4. Career exploration	• Identification of community resource persons	
5. Coordination of community and social services	• Identification of other services needed by youth	
6. Flexibility for ongoing program modifications	• Identification of project service modifications	• Legality of proposed changes

of these activities a set of institutional linkages was created by the projects. In this capacity, the ACWE projects operated as community organizers and local change agents (Wiltberger, 1980). In Table 3.1 are shown the implementation linkages as they evolved from the program goals.

The institutional linkages established to implement and sustain program operations and their corresponding funding source compliance monitoring activities involved a number



Figure 3.1 ACWE Projects Interinstitutional Linkage Model

of different organizations. The organizations with which the ACWE projects formally or informally interacted are diagrammed in Figure 3.1. This interinstitutional linkage model represents the basic organization contacts the ACWE projects developed or sustained.

Different sets of organizations were involved with the projects depending on the purpose of the linkage and the phase of operation of the projects. The compliance monitoring linkages will be first discussed as these were continuous throughout the life of the projects. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the linkages the ACWE projects created to operate their programs and deliver services to youth. Before these findings are presented and discussed, a short aside is necessary to describe the background information on the ACWE projects.

Description of the ACWE Projects

Academic Credit for Work Experience was selected by Youthwork, Inc., as one of four programmatic areas designed to implement innovative approaches to the problems of youth unemployment. As a national policy concern, providing academic credit for work experience was chosen as a primary focus area because

> some students are so discouraged by past schooling experiences that they find it difficult to learn skills through traditional academic routes. Providing credit for work experience can be the key to encourage some of these youth to continue their education. In general, it is believed that work-education linkages can improve both the work and learning experiences. Although a number of schools in the country have programs that award credit for work, few programs successfully interrelate the education and work experiences. Schools need to take advantage of the fact that many jobs offer opportunities to stimulate learning [DOL Application Guidelines, Exemplary Program, 1978: 14-15].

The academic credit projects were designed to help economically disadvantaged youth make the transition to the work world by providing youth with work exploration and placement in the public and private job sector. As an incentive to participate, to help them economically, and to simulate real work experiences, they receive minimum wage payment for their job placements. Additionally, the participating youth were awarded academic credit for their participation. This second dimension was an inducement for the target population, potential dropouts or dropouts to remain in/return to school and to graduate. The ACWE projects

offered a gamut of services to youth: psychological, educational, and vocational testing; career education guidance counseling; remedial education; job readiness skills classes, career exploration; and job placement.

Program Characteristics

Five of the Youthwork, Inc., ACWE projects were used as the means to examine various approaches to awarding academic credit for work experience and interinstitutional linkages. The projects were located in five different states in the North Central (n = 2), North East (n = 2) and South Central (n = 1) regions of the continental United States. Three of the programs were newly created with Youthwork, Inc., funds whereas the remainder of the programs were modified continuations of previously existing programs. The two expanded programs were operated by nonprofit organizations located in alternative school settings. The other three programs were operated by Local Education Agencies (LEAs), and two were located in public schools. The third LEA-sponsored program had offices located away from the affiliated school's facilities. All five programs served a secondary-aged population, and one project in addition served a post-secondary aged population. Over 550 youth were served by the ACWE projects The ACWE projects' characteristics are summarized in Table 3.2.

There was variation among the ACWE projects, although they had in common the feature of awarding credit and wages for work experience or exploration activities. A brief description of the projects' characteristics follows:

Site 1: A project located in a public school that provided career exploration and work experience placements to youth in the public job sector. An in-class program component existed to prepare for and to reinforce youth's work placements. The majority of youth received both wages and credit for participation.

Site 2: An alternative school-sponsored program that rotated youth through two-month intervals of work placement (public and private sector) and basic skills in-class instruction. Weekly individual counseling sessions were also a program component. Youth were paid for their work placement, and received credit upon satisfactory completion of in-class and job-related activities.

Site 3: An integrated job readiness, work placement, and basic skills instruction program sponsored by an alternative school. The project was recently changed to allow placement into either the private or public sector, where youth earn both wages and credit.

Site 4: A project located off school grounds but sponsored by an LEA. Youth were placed in both private and public job slots. Job readiness, career exploration, and basic skills sessions were provided in-class by the project staff. Youth were paid for both work placement and instruction activities, and received credit.

Site 5: A project located in a public school that provided a public sector work placement and in-class remediation sessions. Youth received wages for their work and credit for satisfactory completion of classwork.

TABLE 3.2 Academic Credit for Work Experience Program Characteristics

Program	*Operator*	*Area Population Range (in thousands)*	*Where Conducted*	*Actual/Planned No. of Students to be Served*	*Program Status*
Site 1	LEA	500+	Public School	251/727 (34.5%)	New Program
Site 2	NPR	500+	Alternative School	108/102 (105.9%)	Expansion
Site 3	NPR	500+	Alternative School	100/87 (114.9%)	Expansion
Site 4	LEA	rural	Separate project grounds	64/56 (114.3%)	New Program
Site 5	LEA	rural	Public School	45/57 (78.9%)	New Program

NOTE: LEA = Local Education Agency; NPR = Nonprofit Organization



Figure 3.2 ACWE Project Funding Source Monitoring Linkages

Implementation Linkages

COMPLIANCE MONITORING LINKAGE DESCRIPTION

Program monitoring of the ACWE projects was the responsibility of three organizations: the regional DOL representative, the CETA prime sponsor, and Youthwork, Inc. It was a formal linkage between the projects and these organizations and served as the means to assure compliance with funding source and federal regulations. The schematic diagram of the linkage from the ACWE project perspective is shown in Figure 3.2.

The purpose of these linkages was to monitor the project's fiscal expenditures, client population CETA eligibility, and project enrollment levels. It functioned to assure compliance with YETP federal rules and regulations, project proposal specifications (which included client termination projections and services), and budget expendutures or modifications.

The project fiscal monitoring linkage was closest between the CETA prime sponsor and the project. From the project's perspective, the regional and federal DOL rarely, if

ever, had any direct contact with the ACWE projects. An observer at one project reported:

> In line with our focus on interagency cooperation or lack thereof, I asked the project director about his relations with the federal DOL representative. He said there really is no contact. The relationship between the federal rep and the prime sponsor was so good that there was no need for the DOL federal representative to get involved in specific local programs [February 1980].

The fiscal accountability linkage for the various projects was often vague. It involved a number of different interest groups, and it was often unclear who had final authority over the ACWE projects. As stated in a summation of a third party final evaluation report verbally presented to ACWE project and CETA personnel,

> the third party evaluator offered some ideas about the overall administration of the projects nationally and raised some questions about who really is in charge. All of the projects seem to have the expected school system and CETA political considerations to contend with which happens when a couple of bureaucracies get together. The question of where Youthwork fits into all this, however, arises. The city can be answerable in terms of either clout or loyalty to the regional labor representative and then on to the Department of Labor in Washington or it can be answerable as prime sponsors to Youthwork for the business of knowledge development and project administration. There are many examples of directives from Youthwork which were later withdrawn because the Department of Labor did not want them for some reason. The whole question comes down to who really calls the shots [January 1980].

COMPLIANCE MONITORING LINKAGE FUNCTIONING

The relationship between the prime sponsor's office and the ACWE project was critical to project administration. At all ACWE projects, the linkage between the prime sponsor's office was continuous throughout their 18 months of operation and entailed paperwork flow and feedback on fiscal and project operations. On this primary level of communication between the two parties, three of the ACWE sample projects experienced difficulty maintaining the prescribed level and quality of project reporting to the prime sponsor's and Youthwork, Inc.'s offices. The amount of reporting required, the constant change in forms (particularly at Youthwork, Inc.) and project staff frustration over duplication of information and the amount of time spent on reporting all contributed to the problem of difficulty with required reporting. This was a persistent problem for projects since their initial efforts at implementation. An on-line ACWE staff person said in fall 1978:

> There is too much time spent on paperwork. The program is losing its focus as we spend hours on forms. When can we see the kids?

After two years of operation, one CETA prime sponsor expressed the same frustration that projects had expressed over the required paperwork. From this prime sponsor's perspective, the amount of required paperwork detracted from his potential learning from the project's service delivery experiences. He expressed his disappointment with his linkage with the local ACWE project as follows:

> There has just been so much involvement in nitty-gritty detail. Just in counting pennies. We have never even cleared up all the reporting problems. We could have at least worked on that.

> The observer continues, "We talked about the complexities of the reporting process, how much time is still spent on reporting and how much of this time is spent on useless duplication."

The solutions to the reporting problems worked out by, or for, the projects was important in easing paperwork flow and administration. One ACWE project, after a year and a half of problems with the required forms, reported:

> When all those people were here for the new grant negotiations one of the staff from the local manpower office said to me 'How do you do all these forms alone? Why don't you get some help?' She suggested I write another person into the grant for part-time to help me, and I did [February 1980].

The two projects which were not experiencing problems, but which expressed frustration with the reporting procedures and complexities, had alleviated the problem by having a person assigned to this job and allotting enough time to the task. Both of the projects which had begun to "creatively" work with their reporting requirements did so after initial frustration. All five of the ACWE projects stated that what they were asked to report was not what they thought important about the project. The differences between the project's, Youthwork's, and CETA's ACWE program goals and concerns were perceived to be quite large by the projects.

From the perspective of the CETA offices, three prime sponsors interviewed on this subject were also unhappy with the project monitoring process. All felt they had expended more staff time on these projects than their other youth programs and for fewer information returns. Similar to the projects complaints, these prime sponsors had expected more reciprocality and sharing of information for their extra expenditure of time on the projects. Speaking to the

project-CETA liaison person, the on-site observer summarized:

> She emphasized again the point that had been made in an earlier meeting with the project director, that there had been much more paperwork for this project than any of their other projects, although the ACWE project represents only a small percentage of their total funds [February 1980].

Although the CETA prime sponsors were provided administrative overhead costs for project monitoring, they had also expected knowledge development information. Two prime sponsors specifically were unhappy that they did not receive any usable information to guide their planning for future funding of projects. One prime sponsor noted in a discussion with the ethnographer:

> The project is doing things and getting responses and reactions all of which seems natural to the project and so they think there are no reasons to record what is happening. But we would be better off if we had some documentation of all of this so we could all understand what is going on out there. Like how they have worked out the academic credit arrangements. There is just nothing in writing [April, 1980].

Beyond the different perceptions of project goals, and as a consequence different perceptions of the aspects for which projects should be held accountable, there was little feedback to the projects from the CETA and Youthwork offices. This was perceived as a problem by the projects. With the amount of time the ACWE projects spent on reporting, they resented what they saw as a lack of reciprocity from the prime sponsor. One project director said:

> The amount of time spent on filling out forms has been overwhelming. Our main contact with the CETA office has

> usually been in regard to paperwork. We would like more direction and feedback from the county, but the CETA liaison person always seems to be too busy with the administration and monitoring of other grants [March 1980].

At another site, the observer reported:

> The project staff person in charge of reporting went into a lengthy discussion of the business of plan vs. actual for the reporting process. He said in the first place, the local CETA office had decided on the numbers without consulting them and now they find themselves stuck with those numbers. Worse than that, he found it difficult to understand why they considered it bad if they went over the numbers in the plan, if it meant doing something better for the kids, like finding more kids jobs in the private sector than they had expected to find. He got called down to a meeting in Washington and was called on the carpet for diverging from the project's plan so much. He said he finally came to understand that the concern was not at all with what this meant for the project, but rather what it meant for the economic planners at CETA who had set those figures. It was really an evaluation of their predictive abilities and not what was going on with the project. So although he thought it crazy, what he had to do was change the numbers in their plan so that the actual numbers would not diverge more than 10-15 percent. (Then of course, he became much more astute about playing with the numbers so it would look like they were right on target.) [April 1980]

After two years of a formal linkage between the local prime sponsor and the ACWE projects, there was concurrence by both parties that there should have been more reciprocation and sharing of information. The contact between the offices necessitated by the project reporting requirements affected program administration in terms of the amount of time spent on these tasks. Still, program services were not disrupted by this process. Summarizing the project's compliance monitoring process, one observer noted:

"stabilization of the project occurred despite the enforced (and consequently artificial) linkages the project was 'stuck' with." Accountability had first to be based on the parties agreeing to the same objectives for the projects. As it was, different interest groups had different definitions of what objectives the project should address (Farrar, Desanctis, and Cohen, 1980). Difficulty in stating a consensus on objectives resulted in persistent questions regarding appropriate monitoring of various program activities.

ENROLLMENT OF TARGET POPULATION LINKAGE DESCRIPTION

The linkages developed for the identification and enrollment of the target population (CETA income eligible youth 14 to 21 years old) depended on the length of time the ACWE projects had been in existence and on where the projects were located. Of the five projects, three were newly created through Youthwork funds, and two had been in existence under other funding sources for a number of years. Both the new and old projects came to rely on similar sources for youth referral, but older projects initially had many more local contacts and sources of student referral than did the new projects. During the first year of operation (fall 1978), the older projects did not engage in as many outreach activities as did the newly created projects.

Project location also affected program enrollment activities. Projects located adjacent to or in an LEA school building (n = 3) engaged in more outreach activities than did projects located within an alternative school. The effects of project location on enrollment activities were difficult to analyze as the two alternative school projects were also the older programs. With these differences in mind, a flow chart (Figure 3.3) summarizes all five projects' client referral linkages.

Overall, the LEA school system was the largest source of ACWE client referrals. Initially, for the three new projects, contact was initiated by project staff, who approached LEA



Figure 3.3 ACWE Project Target Population Enrollment Linkages

guidance counselors for potential youth clients. By the projects' second year of operation, the referral process was reciprocal, the LEA guidance counselors initiating contact to discuss a potential client they had identified.

At the two ACWE projects in alternative schools, the referral process relied on fewer project outreach activities. Referrals to the older as well as second year projects came from a diverse number of sources, including local social service agencies, the courts, friends of enrollees, and the LEA. The CETA offices responsible for these programs rarely referred youth to the projects, although they did help determine eligibility. Infrequently, another local CETA youth project would refer youth applicants to the ACWE program.

ENROLLMENT OF TARGET POPULATION LINKAGE FUNCTIONING

To identify and enroll the target population, ACWE projects relied on both the LEA and CETA institutions. The CETA linkage was created for and maintained by the projects for certification and processing of youth participants. This was CETA central office activity. As described by an ACWE director:

> We have a close working relationship with the local manpower office. They certify all our students. We give the

> students an application to fill out and then the student and parent must appear at Manpower. Then Manpower hand-carries the form back to us. We fill it out and mail it back to the Manpower office [April 1980].

This project's CETA office contract was not usual in that the other four projects determined eligibility themselves and then mailed in the forms. Manpower then either signed off on the forms, helped the project correct them, or denied certification.

For referrals of potential youth clients, other local youth manpower programs began referring youth to the ACWE projects when they had too many applicants or felt the services offered by the ACWE project would better serve a particular youth. For the three new ACWE projects, the first referral linkage established was with the respective LEAs. Identification of potential enrollees was sought initially through contacting the LEA guidance counselors and asking for referrals through obtaining names of potential clients. School guidance counselors were the first LEA persons contacted by ACWE personnel to find potential participants. These LEA personnel were the ones responsible for and in possession of complete records on LEA youth. LEA teachers were not contacted, nor were the school principals. The school principals were involved only to give permission for the ACWE projects to contact the guidance counselors. One staff person, responding to a request by the ethnographer to have names of teachers so as to discuss the project, stated:

> Why would you want to see the teacher? I really do not have any contact with the teachers as the guidance counselors take care of everything. They work out which courses the students will be released from and make arrangements with the teachers [March 1980].

The contact and support of the LEA guidance counselors was important as a referral source. According to the observer, for one ACWE staff person,

> her contact at the school is with the guidance counselor. The school did not participate last year in the project and this year they have a new guidance counselor who is really supportive of the project. There was just a project vacancy and there were fifteen applicants this time. Last September we only had three apply from this school and we had to take them all [March 1980].

The reaction of the LEAs and their guidance counselor staff was different at each of the three projects. At one project, the ACWE director was well known in the school district and had the power and authority to get quick compliance and help from LEAs. At another project, the director of the ACWE project was also a well-known LEA affiliate, who solicited school support from principals, but referrals were made by project staff initiating contact with the LEA guidance counselors. The ACWE director at this project did not engage in as much LEA public relations as did the first ACWE project's director. Possibly as a consequence of this, the latter project had more difficulty in getting help and referrals from the LEA guidance counselors. The on-site observer explained:

> Another major barrier to cooperation with schools was the lack of commitment from those who were to implement the program. When the grant was awarded, the director solicited commitment from the principals, and expected that the rest of their staff would fall in line [April 1980].

Enrollment levels were obtained differently at the second project than at the first, as local conditions were different.

This second project was able to find participants relatively quickly because of the extreme poverty in the area. Through word of mouth and community contacts, this project located more eligible youth than they could serve. Consequently, although this project initially tried to get referrals mainly through the schools without getting much entry support, they were able to identify potential clients through the community. This project, like the third new ACWE project, had difficulty gaining the support of the LEA guidance counselors during the first year of operation. An on-site observer summarized a director's comments on the referral process:

> In the beginning when the project was hurting for kids to recruit, some of the agencies under CETA had drawers full of names of kids who needed help. Similarly, the school personnel and guidance counselors knew of potential youth. Yet no one went out of their way to introduce the director and the program so that others could refer students to her. Consequently, any connections the director made were made by herself. The principal of the school could have taken her around and introduced her to the faculty but he did not. This year she is on the school's mailing list and attends school meetings and this had helped because new people who did not know about the ACWE project last year are now referring kids. She also contacted the local coalition of youth programs and made good connections there. Now she is getting referrals through people she met. [February, March, 1980].

While community visibility through the ACWE directors' personal contacts and program advertising helped the three projects obtain full enrollment levels, at two projects an additional referral incentive was program "success." Again, referrals were from the LEA guidance counselors after the projects' first year of operation. As one ACWE staff member discussed feedback to her from the LEAs:

> The single thing I hear most from teachers and guidance counselors is how much the students have blossomed and they really have, too. It is just amazing (April 1980).

Given that the three projects created in the fall of 1978 had by spring 1980 been operating for almost two years, their referral linkages became highly similar to those of the two programs that had been in existence much longer. Outreach activities and work-of-mouth advertising put all projects in the position where they received referrals from a number of sources. As one ACWE staff member described the sources of their enrollees:

> We just took a youth referred by the police chief. He has been so fantastic that we took his recommendation on a student. And some of the job sites recommend people too. And occasionally we get a walk-in [March 1980].

IDENTIFICATION OF WORK SITES LINKAGE DESCRIPTION

The interinstitutional linkages established by the ACWE projects to identify and place youth participants at a work site were similar, in spite of differences as to where the projects were allowed to place youth. Two projects were restricted by CETA regulations to placement in the public sector, whereas the remaining three projects could place participants in either the public or private sector job market. (Originally a third project was not allowed to place youth in the private sector but before start-up, the project contacted the State Department of Education and obtained a waiver from the state restrictions on private sector placements. They were granted this waiver based on their experimental status.)

The linkages created by the projects to develop job slots for work placement of youth were established by project outreach and public relations activities. The CETA prime

sponsor's office operated to monitor the placement of youths in the appropriate job sector and make sure the projects were following their proposed plans. (ACWE plans specified what percentage of youth placements would be in the private or public job sector.) Conformance to federal child labor laws was also monitored for one project by the State Department of Vocational Education. The other ACWE projects were not monitored to assure compliance with child labor laws, although project directors were cognizant of the laws and regulations.

Two ACWE projects created a youth advisory board, and the others used preexisting local youth manpower planning boards. In all cases, the advisory boards operated to sanction project activities or to "sign off" on project plans. Contrary to the expectations of two directors, they were not involved in creating job slots. One board created by an ACWE project to help with community employment contacts and community visibility never met. This board was comprised of employers, local politicians, manpower planners, and school system personnel. While boards were created by the ACWE projects with the twin objectives of increasing local visibility and recruiting businesspersons to obtain job slots, only the former activity was accomplished. The boards had neither the staff nor time to engage in the sustained effort necessary for the creation of job slots (Johnson, 1980b).

The two projects that placed youth only in the public sector developed slightly different linkages, although the results of their activities were the same as those projects who could develop private sector job slots. For the projects limited to the public sector, there was some communication with other local CETA programs on available public sector job slots. In both cases, although for different reasons, this linkage did not create job openings for the ACWE participants. At one project all the CETA-developed job slots were being utilized, but in the other community the CETA pro-



Figure 3.4 ACWE Projects Work Site Linkages

gram directors feared placement competition and would not share their job slots. Therefore, the public sector ACWE projects developed outreach activities to obtain job slots similar in design to the three projects that could place youth in either job sector. The diagram in Figure 3.4 details the interinstitutional linkages created by the ACWE projects to develop job slots.

IDENTIFICATION OF WORK SITES LINKAGE FUNCTIONING

The ACWE projects used the personnel of three sectors to develop work placements for their participants: public and private sector employers, and, for two ACWE projects, other local CETA project personnel. The CETA prime sponsor's office and, in two cases, the State Department of Education, monitored project activities to assure compliance with CETA regulations, ACWE project plans and, for the State Vocational Education Department, compliance with federal child labor laws at one project and waivers for

private sector placements at another. Two of the linkages sought by the ACWE projects functioned especially well in developing job slots. These were the public and private sector employer linkages nurtured by the projects on a one-to-one basis.

All projects assigned certain staff the responsibility of contacting and initiating communications with potential employers. ACWE directors carried out public relations by creating or attending preexisting youth advisory boards. The directors also approached potential employers to develop ACWE program work slots and employer cooperation. However, the main responsibility for creating and sustaining employer cooperation and work sites rested with ACWE project on-line staff.

Acting as youth advocates and community change agents, the project staff worked to solicit local business support. Initially, the three new projects had to spend more staff time in finding job placements for their students than did the two older programs. But for all the ACWE projects this was an ongoing activity as additional sites were constantly needed to meet increased enrollment levels, different interests of youth, and loss of old work sites.

The disincentives for employer participation appeared to be more numerous than the incentives. Included among the employer disincentives reported by on-site observers were the following:

- Negative image of CETA program (reported at three projects)
- Negative past experiences with CETA participants (reported at two projects)
- Not enough time for supervision (reported at four projects)
- Fear of federal scrutiny of business practices (reported at two projects)
- General problems with economy (reported at two projects)
- Too much paperwork (reported at three projects)
- Prefer adult CETA workers (reported at one project)

These disincentives occurred idiosyncratically for both public and private sector employers, although the public sector job market had had more previous CETA program experience. Public sector employers frequently refused to participate because past experience with the CETA participants had made them feel they could not adequately supervise the youth participants. Also, public sector employers reported more negative past CETA experiences than did the private sector employers. A possible explanation for private sector employers having more positive experiences with the YETP youth is that the three projects which used both sectors placed their best participants in the private sector slots. *More caution and careful matching between youth and jobs occurred for private sector placements than for public sector job slots.*

Two different strategies were employed to overcome both the private and public sectors' hesitation to participate in job creation. The most common strategy, employed by all ACWE projects, was public relations and appealing to employers' sense of altruism and humanitarianism. Public relations included calling employers and discussing what the employer could offer the participant in terms of learning and experience, how the employer would be helping the youth and contributing something good to society. One project made a point of trying never to tell the potential employer that the program was affiliated with CETA. All projects either tried to dispel employers' notions of CETA programs or to downplay this aspect of the program. The second strategy, that of partial or full subsidization of youth wages, was used at three sites.

Once a job site was secured and a youth placed at the business or organization, continued support of the program by the employer was accomplished by ACWE staff monitoring of the placement. This was not always successful, but where a placement was made that was satisfactory to the employer and the youth, a further incentive was created to maintain employer-program participation. Positive place-

ments, where the youth showed up for work on time, dressed appropriately, and were able to accomplish (at least minimally) the assigned tasks were also incentives for the employer to continue participation.

IDENTIFICATION OF YOUTH ACADEMIC CREDIT NEEDS LINKAGE DESCRIPTION

The linkages developed by the ACWE projects to determine the academic credit needs of their youth participants were similar to the interinstitutional linkage developed by the projects to identify potential project enrollees. LEA guidance counselors were the persons first approached by ACWE project personnel to determine both potential enrollees and their academic credit needs. At the two alternative school projects, academic transcripts were obtained from the LEAs for new enrollees; and for past program participants, state guidelines were followed to design their credit programs. For the three new projects, LEA contact was an ongoing process. These projects had to coordinate their programs with the LEAs, as the ACWE participants, with few exceptions, were simultaneously enrolled in credit courses at both the LEA schools and ACWE projects.

The state Department of Education was annually to monitor the alternative schools in their respective jurisdictions. This effort was not to ascertain the academic credit needs of particular students, but to check on the school's overall credit offerings. Only one of the alternative schools had actually been contacted by the state Department of Education in that year. The other alternative school was monitored by its LEA affiliate in lieu of a state visit. For both schools, the design of credit arrangements for ACWE youth participants was an internal project affair. The states, although the curriculum sanctioning authority for the LEAs, left program design and control to the LEAs. The linkages developed by the ACWE projects for the determination of youth academic credit needs are shown in Figure 3.5.



Figure 3.5 ACWE Project Academic Credit Determination Linkages

IDENTIFICATION OF YOUTHS' ACADEMIC CREDIT NEEDS LINKAGE FUNCTIONING

The linkage of the ACWE projects with the accreditation authorities varied, depending upon project affiliation. For both alternative school ACWE programs, there was little or no input from the LEA or state Department of Education on their credit services. Evidence of the "sign-off" quality of this relationship occurred at one of the alternative school projects when the regular State Department of Vocational Education monitor was sick for a day. As the on-site observer explains:

> The ACWE staff person told me about a problem with the State Vocational Education people. Apparently the program had not been complying with the law about 14 and 15 year olds working at certain job sites. Certain placements were not allowed, and the program had gotten away with it for years because the State Voc Ed people had just routinely filled out the working papers. It seemed the clerk at the State Department of Education knew about the program but was sick for one day so the new clerk assigned to the project called the State Vocational Education Department to get an answer to a question and blew the whistle on them. So the State people came to the project

> and the project had to take some kids off their job sites because they were too young. Another requirement was that one of their staff be a certified teacher. Only one of the staff was certified as a vocational education teacher and had taken a course in career education. So they gave this teacher a probationary status. He did not know how much they would push for accreditation for the staff, so he thought he would just wait and see. The more serious problem was that the Voc Ed people want the project to assign grades to the students for their work to which the project staff are vehemently opposed [February 1980].

At the three new ACWE projects the determination of participants' credit needs was a more complicated process. Arrangements for the amount and type of credit to be awarded ACWE participants were made by negotiations between the guidance counselors and ACWE project sta.. This occurred when youth referred to the ACWE projects by the guidance counselors were determined eligible and in the process of being enrolled in ACWE. One participating guidance counselor discussed how she determined potential ACWE candidates and why she circumvented a linkage with the regular school teachers:

> I always look at the student's permanent records, their aptitudes, things like that and see what they need. And if they do not need required courses, then they can take career education through the project. I think career education is great, but the teachers do not always understand. No one could explain this program to all sixty teachers. They could not understand without going through the program themselves [April 1980].

For program operation, circumventing a linkage with the LEA teachers did not affect the credits ACWE participants received. The effect, rather, was a political one, as the teachers resented being left out of something they felt was

within their jurisdiction. An observer asked a guidance counselor what the teachers thought of the program:

> Some of the teachers resent it. They are afraid the students will not get as much from the program as in class. You know, that could not be further from the truth. The kids in this program have already shown that the only thing they get out of school classes is F's. The teachers do not want to admit that someone else could succeed with these kids where they have failed [April 1980].

Acceptance and support of alternative experiential education programs were the reasons guidance counselors would refer youth to the programs and make credit arrangements. The incentives to the teachers, after the program's first year of operation, was based on partial acceptance of alternative education, and more importantly, relief at getting "troublemakers" out of their classrooms. A guidance counselor, when asked the teachers' opinion of the ACWE program, said:

> At first they were skeptical. 'Why should a person work and get academic credit?' But after they understand it, they like it. Sometimes they like it because they are able to get rid of certain students this way. They can use the program to get these students out of their classroom [April 1980].

The political climate created by not initially linking ACWE students' credit plans with the teachers was the main reason teachers began to be contacted more often by the guidance counselors during the second year of operation. The teachers were contacted by the ACWE staff to design ACWE students' curriculum, most often when ACWE participants were taking required courses through the project. But this contact occurred after the student and project were given permission by the guidance counselors to receive credit in a certain area. The change in operating style by

including teachers in students' ACWE program plans helped the project's linkage with the LEA. One LEA guidance counselor explained:

> The program is definitely much smoother, more accepted this year. We sat the teachers down and assured them it was not the same as a past experiential learning program which was disliked. We like this program and have pushed it [April 1980].

Teacher program involvement was thus a linkage important to the project's acceptance at the LEA.

For ACWE participants to receive academic credit for project participation, another important linkage was support from the principal. The school building principal was the project's entry point. Cooperation from guidance counselors, who were the staff persons responsible for the youths' overall academic experience, came as a result of directives from the principal. Further, the principals were not adverse to this linkage, as were the teachers, because they supported experiential learning programs and were not threatened professionally by them. The support from principals may also be attributable to the fact that they were asked to participate and the program had been discussed fully with them.

PROJECT MODIFICATION LINKAGE DESCRIPTION

Regardless of whether one subscribes to the notion of program implementation being "top down," "mutual adaptation," or "locally defined," the perspectives do have in common the view that program implementation is not a linear process. There are constant modifications, adaptations, and redefinitions. Originally defined goals and objectives are changed, early regulations and guidelines are constantly rewritten, and position descriptions for staff are sometimes outdated before they are formally issued.

The consequence of this state of consistent change was that the ACWE project proposals were frequently at some

distance from program realities. This would not have presented difficulties to the programs, save that they were receiving public funds to conduct a program according to their original proposal. The result was a need for the programs to periodically seek modification of stated procedures and objectives. That such needs were frequent and critical to the ongoing survival of the programs led to the creation of a special set of interinstitutional linkages.

PROJECT MODIFICATION LINKAGE FUNCTIONING

The quality and functioning of the relationship between the prime sponsor and the projects were most evident when the project requested program modifications. While the biweekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual reporting linkage between the prime's office and the project consumed time, it usually did not reflect on the quality of the linkage or its functioning ability. Project requests for enrollment level, sector placement, or budget changes were one of the tests of the linkage, and the results of the requested changes were often unpredictable. Several factors affected the outcomes of a requested diversion from the project's plan or from CETA regulations. Three of the ACWE projects requested major changes in their program plans, and each encountered different outcomes.

In all three cases, part of the problem was a conflict between their program activities and CETA regulations. Each of the parties involved — the project, CETA, and regional DOL representatives — had different definitions of the term. Consequently, there was ambiguity as to which, if any, CETA regulations the projects should obey. An on-site observer summarized a CETA liaison person's discussion of the issue of demonstration status and misunderstandings:

> The CETA liaison person said the federal representative did not understand Youthwork and the particular status of

> being a demonstration project. She said every time she talks to him she has to explain it all over again. He recently suggested that if there was money left over from the project they should spread it around to other projects, or start a new project like the ACWE project. She realized then that he did not understand again what the award was all about [March 1980].

At two of the ACWE projects there were budgetary problems because of differences between CETA regulations and the Youthwork, Inc., funding and budget expectations. In both cases the regional funding DOL representative made the project (through the prime sponsor's office) conform to CETA regulations. A local CETA officer was observed to say:

> It is too bad that the project had to function under the restrictions set by the federal rep, who, he went on to say, never really understood what the project was all about. One of the weaknesses was that Youthwork had not laid the groundwork better with the people from DOL and specifically the federal regional representative who had so much power over the prime. Much of his complaint had to do with the DOL representative, the bureaucracy and their lack of flexibility [March 1980].

Other factors, beyond CETA regulation inflexibility or interpretation by the DOL regional representative, influenced program modification outcomes. In one instance, severe personality clashes between the project director and the CETA prime sponsor representative curtailed program operation. The on-site observer summed up the results of the relationship as follows:

> In any case it seemed clear from early on that the prime was not going to allow any degree of flexibility in interpretation of the grant and the CETA regulations. For exam-

ple, the project director argued for a few weeks time to assess the students being enrolled before placing them on a job. The prime insisted that a student was not considered enrolled until he/she was placed on a job. This in itself might not have been a problem if the prime had not demanded that the project live up to expectations of enrollment figures as described in the original proposal. The original proposal, however, was predicated on a beginning date of July. As it turned out, the director was not hired until mid-October and a full staff was not on board until the end of November. The prime's position was 'you contracted to do this by this date in your proposal.' There was also confusion at this time over which intake forms should be used, the regular CETA forms or the new Youthwork forms. When the project director noted that much of the enrollment problem was the result of the late start-up date, which put them in a position to heed certain modifications on the original proposal, the CETA director wrote on the project's monthly report "The DOL allows no modifications during the first quarter of any plan. The prime sponsor will be unable to allow the modification of enrollment as requested by the school district" [January 1980].

The result of this relationship was near defunding of the project owing to start-up first quarter low enrollment figures in the winter of 1979. A change in the project/CETA liaison person helped mend the project/CETA relationship, but the project in its second year was still operating under some of the earlier CETA restrictions, for example, taking county holidays instead of school holidays (which meant a full staff turnout and no students). This was enforced because the project was on the county, rather than the school district, payroll.

At the second of the three projects requesting program modifications, the problems caused by lack of flexibility by the prime sponsors (under the regional DOL's auspices) also impacted on program services. Because of unique city fund-

ing procedures, one project did not receive its continuation funds for over four months after their Youthwork, Inc., award. In this instance, the problem was attributed to Youthwork's misperception of local funding regulations. Summarizing the prime sponsor's description of the problem, the observer noted:

> Although Youthwork thought they were funding the project they were in fact funding the city to fund the project. So once the award notice came from Youthwork, the city had to put out a competitive bid notice. This process took two months. Youthwork did not seem at all sensitive to this local level problem. There was also a problem writing up a new contract for continuation funds. The city does not write contracts for more than one year, even though Youthwork had funded the project for eighteen months. It had to go through the competitive bid process again and the money was held up again [February 1980].

The result of this budgetary process was that student ACWE participants were not paid for their work placement time for over four months. The students were unhappy about this, and the employers complained that it was unfair to the youth, since they continued to work without receiving their weekly pay. As was recorded in one instance:

> The private sector employer wanted to pay the youth directly since they were not getting their pay because of the problem of CETA releasing project funds. The job developer said he spoke to the employer and tried to explain the situation, but the man was angry because the youth was not performing well because he was mad about not getting his pay [February 1980].

Another of the difficulties in obtaining project modifications was that prime sponsors at these three projects were sensitive and responsive to political pressures. Being closely

monitored by the DOL federal representative and local politicians, the prime sponsors were loath to allow less stringent interpretation of the CETA rules and regulations as they feared controversy or public humiliation. One observer related the problem that applied to these three cities:

> The project director explained a bit more about the political connections of the CETA director and how he thought everyone was 'covering their ass' at a time of closer fiscal scrutiny [January, 1980].

Indeed, the politics of the CETA system played a major role in the decision-making process at all three projects trying to renegotiate their contracts. At the third project, program services were only temporarily interrupted because the project director did not attempt to push his modifications. A politically astute administrator, the project director circumvented a potentially large start-up problem by accepting CETA regulations and assaying CETA by turning over complete budget control to their liaison person. In turn, aside from routine monitoring, the director maintained control over daily program operation and services. The CETA person was thus directly involved and had some personal responsibility for the smooth functioning of the project. This involvement helped expedite a number of project requests for budgetary modifications, all of which were approved.

In Review

The ACWE projects created or had created for them two types of linkages. Both types of linkages were designed to facilitate the delivery of services. The first was developed from "the top down" by the ACWE project's funding sources to obtain service delivery accountability. The other set of linkages, developed from "the bottom up" by the projects to enable them to act as social intervention pro-

grams, was created to identify community resources to fulfill participant and program needs. Based on an analysis of the functioning of these two types of interinstitutional linkages, the following conclusions applicable to the ACWE programs are drawn:

COMPLIANCE MONITORING

- Both ACWE project personnel and their sponsoring CETA organization staff experienced routine paperwork flow problems. From the project perspective, the reporting problem was alleviated by either: (1) assignment of a trained person for project reporting, or (2) becoming insensitive to reporting requests by reporting whatever the funding source seemed to want to hear. In this latter situation, the phenomena of too much funding source concern for case reporting and product oriented goals resulted in alienation of the project from their funding source and consequently, intentionally faulty reporting. Spencer (1970: 150); and the National Commission for Manpower Policy (1978: 26) have both discussed the problem of accountability procedures predicted on program inputs rather than program outcomes. The result of such a process is hindrance in program operation and service delivery.
- Because extensive paperwork was involved in routine project reporting to funding sources, both the projects and the funding sources had expectations on returns for their extra work. As there was little or no reciprocal feedback, both the projects and their CETA prime sponsors were disappointed with the interaction. Both parties expected feedback on program operations and service delivery technique.
- The ACWE projects and CETA personnel responsible for the programs were unclear as to the program designation of "demonstration status." This created two problems: (1) program modifications requested by the projects were difficult to obtain as CETA personnel held the projects responsible to YETP regulations, and (2) both parties had raised expectations for feedback on "program success." In the former

situation, innovative changes deemed necessary for the success of the project were either not requested or implementation of requested changes took months. Even when requested changes were implemented, they went through regular CETA channels and were in compliance with YETP regulations. CETA political considerations and accountability pressures took precedence over innovation because the ACWE projects' status as "demonstration" was not understood by either party.

Program Operations

- All service delivery operations were implemented through the ACWE projects operating as community change agents. Programs which had been in operation for several years had an easier time with entry into the community than did new ACWE programs. After two years of operation, the three new ACWE projects had integrated into the local community network in a similar fashion to the older programs.
- Entry into the LEA institution was initiated by ACWE program directors. The more responsibility the directors (particularly of new programs) took in obtaining LEA support through school principals, the faster target population enrollment levels were reached.
- LEA guidance counselors, after being given the initiative by their LEA school principal, were the main source of ACWE program referrals and determination of student academic credit needs.
- The program advocacy role of the ACWE project director and staff was responsible for the development and sustenance of youth work sites. Preexisting friendships and the ability to act as an advocate resulted in faster and easier entry into the job market and the development of youth work sites.
- Advisory boards functioned to sanction project activities but did not result in better service delivery or help with program operations.

- The interinstitutional linkages established by the CETA prime sponsor and the LEA functioned to sanction project operations, whereas the informal linkages established by the projects with community resource persons and human service organi[illegible]ons were developed to improve services. The latter linkages resulted in more effective and comprehensive service delivery.

CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGY TWO: EXPANDED PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

Introduction

The linking of organizations to address the training and employment needs of youth has been of high priority in the implementation of the YEDPA legislation. The priority has been of two parts: first to explore how linkages between an educational program and an employment training program are initiated. Second, there has been a concern with the functions of these linkages and how it is that they might be maintained over time. As suggested by the National Manpower Institute (1980: 54), there exists only a weak research base to assist in understanding these processes.

> This new emphasis on community involvement is not really new. The concept of allowing more local control over the federal programs is one of the characteristics that distinguishes CETA from MDTA. Yet it is ironic that so little research has been done to find out whether local leaders are able to run programs better than federal administrators can. More importantly, almost no research has been financed to discover — in those areas where local collabora-

> tion seems to be working — what the common denominators are. True, all communities are different to some extent. Yet little effort has been made to analyze local conditions which make cooperation among disparate groups a working reality or merely an objective.

That which we do know about the preparation of youth by various organizations was suggested by Wurzburg (1980: 3):

> For years, education and employment and training institutions have coexisted at the local level. Since their client populations are not mutually exclusive, there has been considerable overlap in the populations the two institutions have served and the services that have been provided. In some cases, the overlap hasproduced productive partnerships and specific strategies for developing complementary services. More frequently, the overlap has produced competition over turf and occasional charges and countercharges of institutional failure and incompetence. The result has been a collective inability to service some youth adequately.

In light of these findings, the YEDPA legislation established an ideal starting point for a more thorough investigation of the linkage process. In particular, YEDPA provided a mechanism through which CETA and the schools could be linked (Wurzburg, 1980: 3). The end result, it was hoped, would be a joint effort to address the needs of specific youth populations, as opposed to the mutual distrust of the past (Rist, 1981).

This chapter explores through a case-study approach the program linkages developed at four private sector programs. Each of these programs established an extensive network of links to other community organizations (Johnson, 1980). The focus here is to document the purposes and functions of certain key linkages (such as program/CETA/LEA;

TABLE 4.1 Private Sector Program Characteristics

Program	*Operator*	*Area Population Range (in thousands)*	*Where Conducted*	*Actual/Planned No. of Students to be Served*	*Program Status*
Site 1	LEA	50+	Alternative School	134/140 (95.7%)	Expansion
Site 2	PNP	rural	Public School	108/118 (91.5%)	New Program
Site 3	PNP	1000+	Public School	161/185 (82.0%)	Expansion
Site 4	PNP	500+	Alternative School	104/96 (108.0%)	Expansion

NOTE: LEA = Local Education Agency; PNP = Nonprofit Organization

program/social agencies) and then examine factors that influenced the ability of these collaborative programs to function within their communities.

Program Characteristics

The four programs represented attempts by one rural and three urban organizations to address the school-to-work transition of youth. They were located in two midwestern states and one eastern state (two programs). Only the rural program represented a newly created program. The remaining three were modifications of prior programs. Three private nonprofit organizations and a local education agency (LEA) operated the programs, two of which were established as alternative schools. The various programs were each designed to involve approximately 100-180 youth. Table 4.1 graphically presents these data.

Basic to each of these programs were the following components: classroom training, career exploration, the awarding of academic credit, and vocational exploration. The focus of each program is briefly presented below.

Site 1: An alternative school providing basic academic skills, job orientation classes, and vocational exploration. Both public and private sector employers were utilized for the work experience phase. Additionally, a "community partner" (mentorship) component provided students with a one-to-one relationship with community volunteers.

Site 2: A rural program provided classroom training in job readiness skills. After completion of that phase, youth participated in vocational exploration in private and public sector jobs.

Site 3: Youth canvassed the local community around their schools to identify potential work sites and employers interested in providing various services to the program and to the schools (such as guest lectures, tours of businesses). During phase two, youth were placed in vocational exploration within the private sector. Students spent one afternoon per week (of each program phase) learning about various careers and developing job readiness skills.

Site 4: This program provided basic skills development, job preparation skills, and vocational exposure in the private sector. A mentor corps was to be developed for one-to-one relations between the youths and community volunteers.

Building Linkages

The development of linkages within the community was an important process for each of the programs. The findings are presented in four brief, program-specific case studies. Each case study details how the program established and nurtured the CETA/Prime Sponsor/LEA/Program linkage. At two sites the program's linkage to CBOs is also discussed. Each linkage is examined in terms of its operation, incentives to participate, and focus of decision-making authority. A final section examines a number of questions per-

taining to the interrelationships of programs and the network of organizations within which they operated. As but one example, the need for different linkages at different times is discussed. Additional site-specific data, relevant to these issues, are included in this last section.

Case Study I

OVERVIEW

The program at this site established a small alternative school serving approximately 80 students. As part of this school, a job orientation course and follow-up work experience were provided as curriculum options. Those students choosing this option had to successfully complete the classroom phase prior to being given a work placement. In addition, students spent a portion of their day in academic classes. A community partners component was included to provide students with role models.

This particular program developed linkages to: the CETA prime sponsor, the school district, public and private sector employees, social service agencies such as the Lions and Rotary, and community-based organizations such as youth service programs and a crisis center. For each linkage an exchange of services occurred. Patterns of reciprocity were established. For example, the program provided speakers to service agencies who in turn provided the program with volunteer community partners. In another instance the program provided employers with employees, while the employers provided the program worksites. In this way, the program linked into the overall system providing and receiving needed services. The field observer identified the program's need for these links as being greater than the needs of the other groups for these same linkages; that is, the other groups could get along without the program, but the program could not function without these links.

> For the program these linkages are essential for meeting program goals. The program needs the organizations more than the organizations need the program. Therefore, it is the employees of the program who initiate the linkages and court the desired cooperation. Note that the organizations are linked to each other forming a "network." It appears that the program has successfully tapped into the network. In one case the program helped form a linkage between the school and the prime sponsor [March 1980].

In the establishment of these linkages, the field observer found that this process was contingent upon: (1) identifying a program goal; (2) identifying the appropriate source of assistance; (3) delegating linkage responsibilities to a staff member — preferably one with a background or familiarity with the organization to be approached; and (4) developing a pattern of mutual exchange. The field observer noted:

> Based on the program's experience it appears that a necessary condition for an establishment of a linkage with other organizations is the identification of a person or a position as responsible for the development of such a linkage. . . . The characteristic that seems common to all of these individuals and their establishment of a linkage is that they have had some prior experience within or dealing with organizations to which they have linked. . . . So, based on the observations of this site, it appears that it is helpful in the establishment of linkages that the individual who does the actual linking with other organizations either have had prior experience, and identifies with the philosophies and goals of that organization, or the individual has the necessary authority or "pull" to make the request for linkage legitimate.
>
> I am not suggesting that if these conditions are not met a linkage cannot be built; but it will take longer because prior to establishing a linkage they must make themselves legitimate. Individuals who have already dealt with these organizations and who can and do share in certain key

> values and philosophies should be able to link easier than individuals who lack these characteristics and experiences [March 1980].

Stemming from the program's need to meet stated goals, the field observer identified four phases through which this program passed in the development of program/community linkages. Stage 1 began prior to the program with the acquisition of letters of support from community organizations and the creation of formal linkages with the CETA prime sponsor and the LEA. The outcomes of this phase were the establishment of contractual agreements and an identification of operating procedures.

Stage 2 was closely associated to stage 1. Where stage 1 laid the groundwork for the program, stage 2 began to implement the program. Daily operations began, students were identified, and community contacts were more formally initiated. At stage 3 the task of meeting program goals was addressed. This meant identifying a specific goal and then delegating responsibility for meeting that goal to a staff member. This stage was also a time during which program modifications occurred. For example, one program goal was to place youth in private sector work experiences. The modifications that transpired were noted by the field observer:

> The job coordinators found it very difficult to place students on private sector jobs. They found the difficulty with the 14 and 15 year olds who, for the first part of the program, accounted for a large part of the participants. Also the OJT contract did not attract as many private sector employers as first thought. Therefore, the job coordinators began to explore the possibility of using the public sector. . . . A meeting was held with the prime to discuss that option. The program was later modified to allow program funds up to 200 hours. After the 200 hours were used, the students would be transferred to regular CETA rolls and be allowed to continue in the same job [April 1980].

The final stage, institutionalization, emphasized development of a permanent position within the community. The major goal became one of program continuation and was approached through increased attention to the operation of established linkages.

CETA/LEA LINKAGES

The development of this linkage began prior to the program's start-up. The proposed alternative school was to be an integral part of the school system. Interaction between the CETA prime sponsor and the LEA was precipitated by the need of the school district for technical assistance in developing the proposal and by the fact that the proposal had to demonstrate a cooperative arrangement between these two systems.

Once initiated, the respective roles of CETA and the LEA to the program were clearly defined. CETA functioned as a source for regulation clarification, assistance in writing proposals, program modifications, technical assistance, and fiscal matters. The LEA provided program facilities and program staff and helped identify eligible students.

The program's impact on the CETA/LEA linkage was quite noticeable. The situation which legitimated collaboration occurred about five months into the program. Personnel at the alternative school were reluctant to enroll more students needed to meet proposed service levels for fear of changing the nature of the school. CETA, LEA, and program personnel met to discuss what actions could be taken. The first step was for the CETA representative to suggest a dual enrollment of youth. Through this process, youth in another CETA program were provided the job orientation class of the program. This effectively raised the enrollment figures through "satellite programs" without affecting the services being offered the alternative school youth. For the CETA prime sponsor, this agreement represented the first

time that CETA program youth could receive academic credit for CETA program participation. Further, it fostered similar relationships with a second school district. The field observer noted in November 1979:

> I had an opportunity to talk with the Youth Program Director at the prime sponsor. She reported that this is the largest school district within their service area. She told me that the second largest school district is now more than ever willing to cooperate with the prime sponsor because they have learned of what this school district is getting, and they feel like they are being cheated out of something. What the second district is planning to do is replicate the satellite component of the program. The school district will provide a teacher, and in the case of the teacher's salary, half will be paid by the school district and half by CETA. Then, for a job orientation class, CETA will provide the jobs. The person speaking directly attributes this development to the program. She was the one who suggested, in an interview last year [1978-79], that if one could get districts competing against one another for these benefits, CETA would gain more acceptance. Apparently that is what is going on now.

More recently (February 1980) the field observer noted:

> In an attempt to increase enrollment figures without increasing the number of students at the alternative school, satellite programs were established. This resulted in very firm linkages between the prime, the program, and the schools. A second goal, placing students at jobs, resulted in developing, again, a stronger connection with the prime and with the schools.

The incentive for the CETA/LEA linkages shifted somewhat during the course of the program. Initially the emphasis was on dual participation for grant writing. Later, the incentive shifted to developing joint responses to meet needed program modifications. Both systems received benefits through this relationship in the form of academic credit

and student enrollment for CETA and the LEA, respectively. Most recently there have been joint planning efforts for program continuation after federal funds end.

The CETA/LEA/program linkage also benefited the youth participants. The prime sponsor through the satellite programs picked up youth who had earned the maximum income allowable via the project. The youths were then transferred onto CETA payrolls but retained the jobs they had when with the program. This process reduced the chance of youths being without a job and income. The youths also had the choice of remaining in the traditional school system and taking part in the satellite programs or of attending the alternative school.

The decision-making authority for this linkage varied. For routine daily decisions, the program director was in charge. The overall responsibility for the program, however, rested with an assistant superintendent. Whan program modification decisions had to be made, as in reducing the number of students to be served within the alternative school, the program director relayed such requests to this next higher level of authority. The prime sponsor, as the program's monitor and funding source, also participated in decisions that would necessitate modification of the proposal. Data provided by the observer regarding this process of securing program modification suggest there existed a high degree of cooperation among the three parties in this area.

CBO AND SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCIES/PROGRAM LINAGES

Productive linkages were created that directly related to meeting program goals. The observer explained:

> If it were not identified that jobs were important, the public sector may never have been tapped. If it were not identified that the community partner program was important, then the recruitment of partners from organizations like the Lions Club or Rotary Club, colleges, and churches may

> not have been developed. And if it were not important to serve as many students as possible, the cooperative effort between the prime sponsor and the program would not have developed. If the goals were strictly identified as only improving academic achievement level, self-concept, and value clarification, then these other linkages would not be formed. The limited goals could be met with the resources of program staff and the school; there would be no need to go to other organizations and seek their cooperation [April 1980].

The identification of a goal and development of a linkage were repeated time and again at this program. In contact with community-based organizations, the emphasis was on fulfilling program components through the exchange of services. A specific benefit of this relationship for the program and its youth was the acquisition of community partners who worked with the youth as role models. The manner in which this linkage developed is a particularly good example of the need to delegate goal attainment to a specific person. During the program's first year (1978-1979) this component was never operational as program personnel worked on it only when there was extra time available. Year two (1979-1980) found the responsibility for this component given to the social worker and the assistant director. Under their guidance the number of community partners increased and the component became functional.

The social service agency linkages differed from CBO linkages in that they focused on the needs of mutual clients. This linkage was found to have been initiated very early in the program. The field observer noted:

> According to the project director, the development of this linkage came about early on. She said that initially the program contacted many of the social agencies to determine what services were available within the community and to attempt to avoid overlapping services [April 1980].

The alternative school's social worker was the key person in relations with the various social service agencies including Children and Family Services, Juvenile Probation and Parole, the County Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, and also two colleges. The social worker felt that particularly strong relations existed with the first two agencies as she knew the caseworkers quite well. The field observer identified several reasons for these linkages:

> First of all, such a linkage can provide a cooperative effort and the combining of services for a common client. Secondly, it provides a means for sharing information and understanding about a particular child. Thirdly, social service agencies are a referral source, and fourthly, they can help provide support within the service network for the program [April 1980].

The social service agency linkages provided professional support for the program. By means of referrals and through case-by-case cooperation, a much less fragmented approach to service delivery for mutual clients was developed. The sense of interinstitutional collaboration was evident to the observer in noting that the social service workers respected the expertise of the education staff in matters of curriculum, and vice versa in matters of social services. The field observer explained the situation as follows:

> The social service people are allowed to provide input and take the lead in making suggestions specifically when you are dealing with the social service needs of an individual student. But they do not attempt, nor act to dictate the running of the program, the development of the program, or acceptance of the participants. I think the social worker put her hand on it when she said that the social service workers were not in education, so it would be inappropriate for them to come and tell the program staff how to educate the children [April 1980].

SUMMARY

A number of important factors in the development and maintenance of linkages occurred at this program. First, a four-step process in the development of a linkage existed. This included identification of a goal, an appropriate linkage, someone within the program to oversee attainment of the goal, and the development of reciprocal benefits. Second, four phases that the program passed through were identified: start-up, intake, attainment of goals, and institutionalization. Third, not only were linkages developed, but there was always a two-way exchange of services. This giving as well as receiving acted as an incentive for community organizations to participate with a new and untested program. Fourth, the program was clearly located within the community's network of organizations and worked to foster linkages between itself and other organizations.

The CETA/LEA linkage was strengthened by their joint development of this program. Both organizations received incentives to maintain the linkage. For the CETA prime sponsor it also fostered linkages with another school district. The most notable occurrence suggesting sustained cooperation between the CETA prime sponsor and the LEA was the joint effort to examine ways to maintain the program after federal funding expired. Planning for the program's future further indicated the extent to which the program had made itself needed within the community.

Development of linkages to CBOs and social service agencies were dependent on meeting goals. With CBOs the relationship was primarily one of exchange of services, whereas with social service agencies it depended on the needs of shared clients. While decision-making in the CETA/LEA linkage was often shared, this was not the case with other linkages. CBOs and social service agencies had no say in program operation. These were supportive linkages.

Case Study 2

OVERVIEW

The aims of this program were to provide rural youth with classroom training in job acquisition skills and career exploration and then provide brief work experience with private sector employers. To accomplish the former, program personnel operated the program in five rural schools after the school day. For the latter, job specialists contacted employers and arranged for the program's work phase. The program's linkages included those to the schools, employers, a tutorial program, the county action program, and CETA. The program's primary linkages were with the schools and employers while less extensive contact with other organizations generated a set of secondary linkages.

CETA/LEA LINKAGE

This program represented a unique case in that a program sponsor did not enlist the participation of the local CETA prime sponsor in the development and submission of a program proposal. As a result, the link between the program and CETA was minimal at the outset and remained so. The linking that did occur came through contact between program personnel and CETA program personnel at meetings to discuss the various services available to youth in the county. Limited effort to maintain linkages by personnel from these programs resulted in little coordination of county-wide youth programs. The field observer noted:

> As could be expected, with such a limited degree of joint endeavor the decision-making authority has remained firmly within each individual program in relation to recruitment, solicitation of job placements, and similar program decision making. The impact on service to enrollees has been minimal. While the program has placed two students with a CETA-funded tutorial program and

> has shown some students the County Action Program's work module facility, these instances have been limited [April 1980].

The youth program successfully obtained letters of endorsement for program continuation from local CETA programs. There was, however, no commitment by the CETA prime sponsor to supply funds for the proposed continuation after the In-School Demonstration Projects support ended.

The linkage to the several LEAs in the county fared better. A number of program characteristics made it attractive to the schools, including: (1) a lack of similar programs in the schools (there was no extensive career education taking place); (2) a requirement that to participate in the program the student must remain in school; (3) no request for financial support by the program; and (4) limited time demands and lack of paperwork for school officials.

In opposition to these factors was the operation of the program. Administratively, it was housed at a location other than at the schools being served. Second, the classroom phase was conducted after the end of the regular school day by individuals who were not part of the regular staff. Consequently, one guidance counselor labeled it a "ghost program" as little was actually known about it.

Rist et al. (1980a: 131) detailed a number of factors enhancing program administration: in-school programs should involve the use of school faculty or the regular presence of program personnel at the school during school hours, the program should begin during school hours, and program operators should be experienced with the systems encountered when conducting an in-school program. The less these conditions were present, the more difficult program implementation would be. Given that this was the present program sponsor's first in-school endeavor and that none of the other prerequisites were met, it is not surprising

that uncertainty about the program existed among school officials.

Despite the obstacles faced by this program, including an almost entire change of staff, there was evidence of growing LEA support. As but one example, all school districts were approached about the awarding of academic credit at the program's outset (December 1978). The response was reserved, there being concern that too many ways already existed for youth to acquire academic credits. Once the program was better established, the program director again approached the school districts with a clearly outlined request for academic credit. At that point (Spring 1980), school representatives were quite receptive to this process. The field observer noted that a program's credibility became a factor in the acceptance of a program modification:

> It seems that, in the instance of a program, longevity equals credibility. What a program may have difficulty accomplishing in its formative stages may be easier when it has established itself in the community [April 1980].

A second instance of the growing support by LEAs occurred when officials from the participating schools wrote letters encouraging the program's continuation.

The decision-making authority remained in the control of the program's staff. The field observer noted that two barriers, in particular, reduced the possibility of greater sharing of decisions between the program and the schools. The first was the location of the program outside the schools, and the second was a lack of lead time before enrolling students. The former was an administrative problem mentioned earlier. The latter resulted from late program start-up and the funding sponsor's hurry to get under way. The field observer further discussed this problem:

> Starting up in the middle of the school year also complicated a cooperative arrangement such as this. But,

> even if the program had started in September without a sufficient lead time to develop a cooperative agreement based on mutually shared goals and LEA input into programming, it is unlikely that cooperative efforts can be fostered during the first year of program implementation [April 1980].

The strength of these two respective linkages (CETA and LEA each to the program) was unclear. Certainly both CETA and the LEA provided "verbal" support for the program. However, there exists no evidence to suggest that either system offered any assistance for program continuation after federal funding ceased. For the CETA linkage, the few contacts between the program and CETA programs were not sufficient to warrant CETA support. The lack of more direct contact with CETA administrators was a missed opportunity. A more focused relationship did exist between the program and the schools. Interaction was necessary for implementation of the program, and there were clear incentives to encourage involvement. However, the direct link to the schools was not strong enough to have fostered the commitment to a program that was necessary for continuation support.

CBO/PROGRAM LINKAGES

The linkages in this category were developed primarily to exchange services and information on shared clients. The program acted as initiator in these contacts. Early in the program (March 1979), staff arranged the meeting of individuals from many of the country's programs for youth. At other times they contacted individual programs. Program staff were also involved in the preparations of two planning meetings held prior to a regional hearing by the National Youth Advocacy Coalition (May 1980). These meetings were used to develop testimony for presentation at the hearing.

The problem faced by program staff was to find a means to maintain the dialogue initiated between programs. After fulfilling the need for contacts and introductions, the principal actors and organizations have each gone their own ways with little further communication. As suggested by the field observer:

> While it would seem that there would be many theoretical advantages to close cooperation among the youth programs within the country, the sporadic contact between programs and the fact that formal contacts were always initiated by this program indicated that the staff of various programs did not perceive a cooperative effort as an important goal in a generalized sense. However, when a specific instance arose which required cooperation, that cooperative effort was forthcoming [April 1980].

SUMMARY

This program fulfilled its goals through linkages to the schools and employers. For the development of each, specific personnel were responsible. The site provided evidence that program longevity enhanced credibility which in turn enabled it to better meet its goals. This suggests that the current YEDPA strategy of funding programs for only twelve months at a time is counterproductive and inhibits the development of program stability. This may be especially true for newly developed programs. The constant press of proposal development and uncertainty over program existence took its toll. It was not until the end of the second year that the program was beginning to stabilize and be viewed as a contribution to the schools.

Certainly, this program was poorly located in terms of facilitating its linkages with the schools. While it did fill an educational gap, it remained too detached from the schools to ensure its position as a community program. This detachment was exacerbated by the fact that this was the

sponsor's first attempt at serving in-school youth. While the overall effort to serve these students succeeded, an operator more experienced in school-oriented programs may have been more cognizant of ways to foster the necessary linkages.

Finally, the lack of a CETA/program linkage must be noted. This omission precluded the possibility of establishing and fostering CETA/LEA relations via the program: an original intention of the exemplary programs. More importantly, a key source of continuation funds, through the YEDPA 22 percent set aside or other CETA means, was lost.

Case Study 3

OVERVIEW

This urban program was divided into two phases. During the first few weeks youth, in pairs, canvassed the neighborhood surrounding their schools identifying and soliciting the participation of employers. Employers who agreed to participate did so in several ways including giving site tours, giving presentations about their business, and providing a worksite. During the second phase of the program, youths' career interests were matched with employers who had comparable work experience available. One afternoon during each phase the students met in a classroom setting to learn about various careers and develop their job seeking and job keeping skills.

The focus of investigation at this site was on the program's linkages to the CETA and LEA systems. The purposes for these linkages were briefly described by the field observer:

> *Department of Employment (CETA)* — As a cofunder of the second year's program, the DOE has been closely involved in defining the bases for the project and in han-

dling fiscal matters. Close working relationships are necessary to assure the flow of funding relative to program expenses, student payrolls, etc. The DOE is responsible for the resolution to the Board of Estimate mandated for program approval.

The *National Alliance of Business* is the sponsoring organization and brings to the program the resources of its affiliated organizations.

Board of Education — an important reason for this linkage is the requirement of a Board Resolution enabling the Board to accept funds for the part-time involvement of school staff on the project. Further, this linkage is necessary for involvement of individual high schools.

Division of High Schools — A critical linkage as activities with and in the high schools come under the Division, its Executive Director, and the Regional High School Superintendents. Linkages are required in setting up the in-school programs in future years.

Participating High Schools — One critical set of linkages was that working relationships needed to be established with the school's administration prior to initiating any school programs involving school staff and students. While initial contacts were through the appropriate superintendents, subsequent contacts were with the school principals and with program staff located at the schools. Through the high school administration and project staff, linkages were established with community organizations and governmental offices, private industry establishments, and the project/school advisory committee.

Center for Career and Occupational Education (CCOE) — linkages with this organization were critical in providing resources of CCOE's Career Experience Center and its staff for student intake, testing, etc. Through the CCOE, linkages were also maintained with the YETP program. Central administration of CCOE may well have played a critical role in the continuation of this program in the school system after discontinuation of Youthwork fund-

ing. Not only did the CCOE have responsibility for the Board's YETP project but it was also responsible for other programs involving CETA funding [March 1980].

CETA/LEA LINKAGE

The nonprofit organization that operated this program had had prior contacts with CETA and the schools. The proposal received the support of both systems, with the CETA prime sponsor assisting in regulation clarification and fiscal matters while the LEA provided facilities, staff, and students. The initial relationship was much the same as at Site 1. The main goals of this program, student preparation for employment and work experiences, were met through linkages with the LEAs and employers, as was the case at Site 2.

As with Site 1, Site 3 enhanced the CETA/LEA linkage, though the nature of this relationship differed. At Site 1, the link was strengthened via efforts to meet program objectives. In contrast, Site 3's linkage was centered more around the continuation of the program and how each party could contribute to this process.

Actual program operations were facilitated by avoidance of the CETA and LEA bureaucracies. The program director suggested that success came with the direct linking with school personnel as opposed to going through the "political system." He noted:

> We are talking about what makes this program successful. From the standpoint of management and working with people, we work directly with the people in the schools and we avoid the linkages with the political system of the high schools and the prime sponsor. For example, if we had to run the program, from its outset, through the Bureau of Cooperative Education, the Career Center, the high school system's administration, the YETP, and try to coordinate that with the sponsoring agencies and the prime sponsor,

> we never would have gotten it off the ground. We say we have worked with these groups, and in a sense we have. But in reality, we have circumvented all of these groups and have gone directly to the high schools.
>
> I think one of the major weaknesses of the sponsoring agencies is that they try to implement and bring about change in the school system through the political structure of the high schools. That is impossible to do for as soon as they link up with the people of the organization, the program gets submerged in bureaucratic snarls and rhetoric. But as soon as you link up with people in the schools, and maintain liaison with them, you have a good basis for success and involvement with ongoing programs [March 1980].

The critical linkage for operation of the program was at the individual high school level. However, the ultimate fate of the program lay with decisions made in both the CETA prime sponsor and LEA bureaucracies. Financial support for this linkage was not likely to be forthcoming from the school system, as the field observer noted:

> The Superintendent is interested in the program and its extension into other high schools. He does feel that the high school system will be in a tight financial situation this coming year and that it will be virtually impossible to provide staffing for a program of this type [April 1980].

Fortunately, the CETA prime sponsor also found this to be a promising program. As a result, the second year of the program (1979-1980) was funded to a greater extent by local CETA funds than by Youthwork, Inc. This included an expansion from two to three schools. Continued CETA support for 1980-1981 was also provided, including the addition of a fourth site.

The program's future was linked to the school system's Center for Career and Occupational Education. One of its

functions was the overseeing of CETA-funded programs. The program's relationship to this center was established during the first two years of the program (1979-1980). Initially, use of the CETA-funded Career Experience Center was contested by CETA as it would result in a co-mingling of CETA and Youthwork, Inc., funds. During the second year (1979-1980), CETA's cosponsoring of the program eliminated this problem. As a result, students made extensive use of this facility. This linkage was further facilitated by the initial contacts made during year one and by the program's provision of additional staff to help oversee the program's use of the Career Experience Center during year two.

Two significant developments occurred in the furthering of the CETA/LEA linkage. First was the creation of a commission to study ways to improve this linkage. Initially, the program's director served as acting head of this project, the purpose of which was to "develop linkages that will expedite work between the two institutions." The second involved linking the program's youth with youth from another CETA program in an effort to help locate jobs for the summer (1980) months. The program director explained:

> The program students are presently scheduled to end their vocational exploration experiences on June 6. A plan is now underway to extend the program an additional three weeks so that program students, the experts in job development, may pair off with other YETP students in an attempt to develop jobs for themselves and/or other students in the six schools desiring summer employment. The students at six schools, three program and three other YETP schools, will attend joint workshops prior to outreach into the private sector community [May 1980].

This program modification was approved by CETA.

Decisions regarding the day-to-day operations of this program remained in the domain of the private nonprofit operator. However, extensive contact with the individual

schools was maintained via a program coordinator at each school. Decisions at individual schools were made by this individual. A strong bond developed between the program and each school. This was fostered by continuing efforts to involve school personnel through working part-time for the program and by keeping the administration informed of the program's activities.

SUMMARY

An important aspect of this site was the necessity to foster linkages to different levels within the LEA system. For the actual conduct of this program, firm linkages to the schools served were of paramount importance. However, where the program's future was concerned, the district-wide administrators had to be involved. Second, the program director as well as the sponsoring organization had extensive backgrounds in and prior experience with programs of this nature. Prior experience in operating youth programs, combined with a familiarity with how to negotiate the various systems facilitated program implementation. Finally, although operated by an outside agency, the program was linked directly to the schools through its location, staffing, and continued efforts to keep administrators aware of program activities.

Case Study 4

OVERVIEW

This alternative school operated during the afternoon hours of the school day. During this time youth took courses in reading and math, as well as a job orientation class. Work experiences with private sector employers were provided students and a mentor corps was proposed but never developed.

The linkages developed by the program included ones to the schools, CETA, colleges, employers, children's court, and a group of youth-serving agencies. The linkages to CETA and the LEA and their purposes were noted by the field observer:

> Linkage: CETA office
> Time relationship began: November 1978/start-up
> Nature of relationship: file reports, forms, occasional site visits, monitor, minor technical assistance
>
> Linkage: LEA (Special Programs, Guidance, Reading Department, Math Department)
> Time: November 1978/start-up
> Nature: cooperate in the awarding of academic credit, refer students, provide feedback to project through guidance counselors, advise education component teachers.

This private nonprofit program had difficulties in establishing linkages to meet goals. Both a mentor corps and an advisory council remained undeveloped after fifteen months of program operation (January 1980). Two factors entered into this situation. First, there was a large staff turnover within the first year. Second, no one was assigned responsibility for these components. Fortunately, components crucial to program success, such as the training phase and the acquisition of work experiences, were carefully overseen.

CETA/LEA LINKAGES

The program's linkage to CETA remained one focusing on monitoring and technical assistance. This occurred because the CETA office had many programs to oversee and was understaffed. The CETA representative described the relationship as "a somewhat formal administrative relationship."

The LEA/program linkage was one that developed over time. Initial contact between the sponsor and the LEA cen-

tered on LEA input into the educational component of the original proposal. Once initiated, the program faced difficulties brought on by late start-up and the system established for identifying eligible youth. The former made it difficult to synchronize the program components to the school's schedule. Mid-summer was too late for the school system to rearrange student schedules. The latter found the program relying heavily upon referrals from a coalition of youth-serving organizations rather than the schools, thereby reducing anticipated enrollment. This referral process further complicated the LEA/program relationship as noted by the field observer:

> The school representative said that he had no problem with the agencies referring most of the students to the program. He expected that the agencies knew the students and their families very well because they had worked with them for long periods of time. However, they did not know the situation the students were in at the school and expected the clearing process to take place through the school before placement in the program. He said, "No agency, no matter who they are, can pull these kids out of school without our permission." He gave an example of one student who was doing well in school and was a senior who had been referred by an agency and placed in the program. The school was unaware of his enrollment for quite a while, and his mother thought he had been assigned to the program. It was decided that the student would do better to stay in school full-time and graduate through the school system rather than the program [May 1979].

High staff turnover and administrative problems were additional factors that impinged upon program operation. By the beginning of the second year of the program (September 1979), school guidance counselors were unsure of the program. Contact with the program and its ending in mid-semester (since it had begun in a previous mid-semester)

were expressed concerns. Counselors were reassured by program staff that there would be improved communication and that a program extension to the end of the school year was being sought.

Shortly after the beginning of this second school year (November 1979), the program's administrative problems were resolved. The private nonprofit sponsor took on overseer responsibility for the program. (Formerly this authority had been delegated to another organization.) A new program director was also hired. From that time on, the program's relations with the LEA flourished. A waiting list for entrants into the program began to develop. Most referrals were coming from the LEA. Additional improvements were noted by the field observer:

> The relationship with the LEA has become quite firm. They now have a formal agreement with the administration covering such things as referrals, amount of credit, and communication channels. In particular, the communication between the schools and the project has improved in the area of attendance and truancy. . . . In developing this new program to deal with truants at school, there has been "more cooperation from the LEA than ever expected. Guidance counselors, social workers and administrators of particular schools are involved closely with the project to monitor attendance." The two program counselors feel that the LEA and the project are "providing a network of supportive services for students" that were not there before. . . . I mentioned some instances in the past where this cooperation between the schools and the project was not taking place over the last year. I asked them what they felt the changes were due to. Both agreed that one of the major factors was the coordination of the program with the school year that was instrumental in producing more cooperation with the school. Also cited by them as a factor was the continual contact initiated by project staff with the schools on an individual and frequent basis [March 1980].

Corroboration of strengthened linkage was given by the LEA liaison. Particular mention was made of the efforts by program personnel to better understand the operation of the school system and time constraints on program development.

> He said the project had come a long way in understanding the constraints under which the LEA operates. Teacher contract agreements, department and interdepartmental procedures, accountability to many levels of administration have all presented grounds for misunderstanding between parties in the past. These misunderstandings have slowed down the development of agreements. He considered the quickness and ease with which this agreement had been made as a reflection of the growing stability and trust that has developed over a period of time. The project's director has been, "a very easy person to work with." Requests to him are met promptly, reports are shared, meetings are frequent. The relationship has changed over time and overall is "improving steadily." One recent development is that project counselors have established consistent working relationships with participants' school counselors. He suggested that the LEA "would be sensitive to suggestions of a continued relationship" [April 1980].

The continued relationship alluded to was pursued. The program's director requested letters of support for program continuation from the schools served. Several proposed funding sources were pursued, including a Law Enforcement Administration Agency (LEAA) grant or funding through federal support for vocational education. Support for the program was forthcoming from the school representative as he realized the program's value to the schools lay in its provision of services which were otherwise unavailable.

SUMMARY

As with the other three sites, this program went through a period of maturation. During this time several problems (such as staff turnover, late start-up) impinged on the LEA/program linkage. Just as relationships were stabilizing, the program faced termination. Support for continuation was forthcoming from the LEA as the program provided needed services.

The linkage to CETA remained one focusing on administrative matters normally associated with CETA: fiscal oversight, program compliance, and technical assistance. There was no evidence, as in Sites 1 and 3, to suggest that the program had any impact on the CETA prime sponsor or CETA's linkage to the LEA.

The operation of this program fell somewhere between the experiences at Site 2 and Site 3. It was not as isolated as at Site 2 where the program was located outside the schools and operated in the schools after the school day. Nor was it developed as an integral part of the schools served as at Site 3. Instead it was located at a site separate from the schools but operated during the school day. The latter required that a linkage be developed.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

As a program runs its course it comes in contact with many other organizations. At its outset there are organizations which give assistance in the development of the proposal. Later the program needs specific linkages as a means to carry out program components. Even later, as the program is maturing, there is the need to establish links which will help sustain the program over time. This process occurred at each of the four private sector programs documented here.

The cooperation among CETA, LEAs, and program representatives was necessary for the initiation of the programs. Once begun, program operators began creating linkages that would assist in the meeting of program goals. For example, the need to acquire work placements necessitated contact with employers. The extensiveness of these linkages varied with the number of services or breadth of the program. One field observer noted:

> Programs with goals requiring little cooperation from other organizations will have fewer linkages than programs with goals demanding input and cooperation from many organizations [April 1980].

For the four programs studied here, this observation was quite accurate. As an example, one can contrast the linkages developed at Site 2 with those of Site 1. At Site 2 only two linkages, to the schools and to employers, were crucial to program success. In achieving these linkages all major program components could be addressed. In contrast, Site 1, as an alternative school, needed those two linkages plus ones to social service agencies (for shared clients) and to CBOs (for the community partner component). Therefore, as program goals expanded and as the clientele changed, for example, from in-school youth to dropouts or juvenile delinquents, more extensive linkages were required. In all cases when linkages were formed, an *exchange* of services occurred.

The final stage for these programs, and undoubtedly the most difficult, was the development of linkages that could be used to help sustain the program after federal support ended. Through the development of CETA and LEA linkages, Sites 1 and 3 received a clear commitment for program continuation. In fact, at Site 3 much of the program's second year costs (1979-1980) were picked up by CETA. In both instances, the extensive cooperation and mutual benefits that occurred generated strong linkages. Site 2 fared less well in

its creation of linkages that would insure institutionalization. While the schools verbally support it, they had no funds available for its continuation. Contact with CETA, the most likely source for continuation funding, was minimal. The continuation possibilities at Site 4 were unclear. LEA support grew as the program stabilized and matured. School representatives were anxious for its continuation. However, CETA was not identified as a possible funding source, suggesting the negative consequence of their mutual isolation.

The effect of positioning a program within the community's organizational network can clearly be seen at the four private sector programs. For each the emphasis was on serving in-school youth. Sites 1 and 3 took the most direct approach to this and located their programs within the physical facilities of the schools. Staff were drawn from these schools and students were easily identified. Site 2 was hampered in the development of community recognition by its location outside both the school system and the CETA system. For the schools, each of which was anxious to have the program, contact was limited to late afternoons after the school day. Failure to involve CETA at the planning stage was never rectified. As a result, a key source of future funding was lost. Site 4, while located separate from the schools served, had the advantage over Site 2 in that it operated during the afternoon on school days. This necessitated greater LEA/program cooperation. It was also initiated by a consortium of youth-serving agencies which provided a broad community base upon which to function.

Each of these programs addressed its goals and served approximately its projected number of clients. The data suggest that the stronger the initial linkage built between the program and the school systems being served, the more easily the program could serve in-school youth. The most efficient means of accomplishing this was through direct connections between the school and the program, such as

through shared teachers and facilities and through operation during school time. Interestingly, the program that had the most difficult time strengthening school linkages, Site 2, was a newly conceived program operated by an organization that had never before conducted an in-school program.

The case studies presented here suggest several key factors affecting the ability of programs to form linkages to LEAs. These include: (1) development from preexisting programs, (2) minimal staff turnover, (3) location within the schools whose youth are being served, (4) staff members who are either members of the school's faculty or are on the premises daily, (5) operators who are experienced in working with the systems encountered when conducting an in-school youth program, and (6) a program that begins during the school day. Points 1, 2, and 5 suggest experience to be a useful, if not requisite, quality to possess. The remaining three factors focus on proximity and interdependence to nurture LEA/program cooperation. As adherence to these factors diminished, so too did the process of linkage formation.

One aspect of these programs that may be overlooked deserves attention. These programs were to be cooperative ventures. In one sense, three were. These three each used CETA in its traditional role of monitor and technical assistance source and the LEAs as the source of students. (The fourth site was never linked to CETA.) This form of linkage was a very narrow, traditional use of these institutions and did not reflect the actual intent of the legislation — improved relations. Rist et al. (1979a: 23) noted that after nine months this linkage did not appear to have progressed beyond traditional CETA/LEA roles. Since that time, however, data from Sites 1 and 3 suggested that these sites did move beyond the status quo and acted as catalysts for greater CETA/LEA linkage. At Site 1 extensive modifications necessitated joint agreements. These, in turn, fostered further joint ventures. At Site 3, the tremendous success of

the program led to joint efforts to continue it. Both situations led to cooperation beyond the scope of the immediate program. This was evidenced by the request of other school districts near Site 1 to develop working relationships with the CETA prime sponsor and the creation at Site 3 of a commission to study ways to strengthen the CETA/LEA linkage.

Successful attainment of goals at these programs hinged on establishing a clear responsibility for their accomplishment. This was substantiated at each site. Each program placed youth in work experiences and at each site someone was given the task of identifying work sites. The work sites were found. Two programs proposed the development of mentor corps to assist youth. Neither program, however, delegated the responsibility and neither had mentor corps.

Distinctions must be made among program goals. Some goals were crucial to program operation, such as the acquisition of work sites. Others, such as mentor corps, were like window dressing, nice but not essential. It was along this line that attention to goals by program personnel changed. All programs made extensive efforts to address crucial components such as classroom training and work placements. The let-down came with the nonessential goals. One scenario would suggest that these nonessential goals were frills added to a proposal to attract attention. The reality of actually achieving them may well have been extremely remote.

The extent of program linkages hinged on the program's goals and its need for assistance in meeting these goals. A possible continuum would have programs running from being completely self-sufficient to those in need of extensive community support. Each of the four private sector sites fell at a slightly different point on such a continuum. Sites 2 and 3 would fall near the self-sufficient end. Only two major linkages, to the schools and to employers, were essential to program conduct. Site 4, having been developed by a consortium of youth-serving agencies and serving a clientele that includes juvenile delinquents, required a broader network of

linkages. Site 1, an alternative school serving youth with a number of different problems, had the most extensive network. These latter two programs also had additional goals, such as remedial education, which were not present in the first two sites. Linkages varied as programs became more dependent on community assistance. Overly simplified, gaining entry into various community networks was dependent on the need for those linkages.

It is significant that the feedback on linkages from projects emphasized the absolute necessity of starting in-school programs in tandem with the school terms. Schools were not receptive to changing their schedules midstream to accommodate a new program.

A maturation process occurred at all four programs. Early difficulties (such as late start-up) were overcome as staff became more sure of their roles and procedures were clarified. As programs settled into a routine, linkages were stabilized and strengthened. Unfortunately, this process was rather long for some programs (15 months of an 18-month grant at one site). The result was that the demonstration of program worth and the garnering of support began just prior to program termination. The bottom line for these programs was that *longevity yielded credibility*. But by the time this status was achieved in the community, the program was nearly over as federal funds had been depleted.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGY THREE: CAREER AWARENESS

A shared goal of this strategy was to improve the transition of youth from school to work by providing youth with career information, job-seeking skills, and counseling. The intent of this chapter is to describe through case study analysis the interinstitutional linkages that were operational for three projects. The focus will be on the process of implementation, in an effort to better understand both anticipated and unanticipated obstacles which surfaced during the life of the project (Hamilton, 1980). Pressman and Wildavsky (1979: 190-191) have stated that it is not surprising that implementation of new programs is difficult, but that the more interesting and useful questions focus on understanding *why* it is difficult:

> Implementation is evolution. Since it takes place in a world we never made, we are usually right in the middle of the process with events having occurred before and (we hope) continuing afterward. At each point we must cope with new circumstances that allow us to actualize different potentials in whatever policy ideas we are implementing. When we act to implement a policy, we change it.

Yet while the policy and programs may change, they are being implemented by institutions that have histories and by people with histories in those institutions. This is but another

way to say that program implementation is not an ahistorical process. The questions that will interest us here will focus on the actions taken by those institutions to facilitate implementation, especially as daily problems arose. Each case study will describe the key institutional linkages for the particular project. The roles of the institutions as they relate to the project are discussed, as are the incentives for their roles and the decision-making authority of each institution.

The three projects which serve as the basis for this case study analysis began in FY 1979 as part of the Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects. The projects varied considerably along the dimensions of program operator, population of the geographic region, and the services provided. Project 1 was an alternative school operated by a Local Education Agency (LEA) in a region of 50,000 people. A nonprofit organization (NPR) operated Project 2 in an area of 500,000 people. The services included career awareness sessions for over 100 youth, and work experience for approximately 100 of these same youth during each of the project's two years. Project 3 united a community college and an LEA through its peer counseling and work experience components. The project operated in a large metropolitan area.

Case Study 1

Project 1 was a new alternative junior and senior high school located in a population area of 50,000. The school was operated for two years by a school district (the LEA) and funded during this time by YEDPA. It offered a full-day program to a maximum of 50 students and counseling services to an additional 100 students affiliated with an extended day program located within the same school building.

The major institutional linkages were between: (1) the project and the LEA; (2) the project, the LEA, and CETA; and (3) the project and other human service agencies within the community. The linkages served to strengthen the pro-

gram's services to the targeted youth and to win acceptance and LEA financial support for the school. This enabled it to continue beyond the end of federal funding.

LEA-PROJECT LINKAGES

The project developed relationships with the LEA at various interinstitutional levels. These included: the school board and the superintendent, the middle level LEA administrators, and the secondary school staff.

School Board and the Superintendent. The school board and the superintendent supported the establishment of the school in 1978. The on-site observer reported:

> The elected school board and the administration of the city schools have publicly supported this project from its beginning. The need for such a program had been shown as a result of school surveys, citywide surveys, and an assessment of needs of the school presented by a citizen's task force. The central administration proposed the alternative school project and continued to be closely involved with the project [April, 1980].

During the project's first two years the school board and superintendent kept themselves closely informed of the school's efforts. The superintendent and the associate superintendent acted as the project operator on alternate years. They visited the school regularly, attended most of its functions, and worked closely with the principal/director of the school. As for the school board, the on-site observer summarized their involvement:

> The school board had three of its members on the alternative school advisory committee which met at least once each semester. Several of the school board members visited the school to acquaint themselves with it, and one member served as a volunteer at the school. After the first year, the advisory board voted unanimously to recommend

> that the Board of Education adopt a resolution commending the principal, teachers, and staff for their 'outstanding work in implementing the alternative school program in philosophy, and for the services rendered to students during the school year.' The board of education passed the resolution [April 1980].

Middle Level Administrators. Linkages developed between the project and middle-level LEA administrators included directors of vocational education, psychological services, attendance, testing, secondary schools, personnel, and community-school relations. The assistance from these sectors was vital to the establishment of the school. The director of personnel, for example, helped recruit staff for the school. The support from these directors was based both on a recognition of the support being given by the superintendent and their own belief that the school was fulfilling a need within the school system. One director explicitly acknowledged this in her description of an administrative meeting where budgetary plans were being approved for the following school year:

> She mentioned that last week when the proposed budget for the city schools was presented, it included monies for the operation of the alternative school, and permanent faculty positions for the teachers. Usually, she pointed out, when a federal grant is terminated, the school program it funded is also terminated. Therefore, she sees this inclusion in the budget as an acknowledgement by the school system of the value and worth of continuing the alternative school [April 1980].

LINKAGE IMPLEMENTATION

Students enrolled in the alternative school because they had disciplinary or academic problems in one of the traditional schools. Students completed work similar to what would be accomplished at the three regular junior and two

senior high schools in the district. The alternative school featured smaller classes and individualized instruction, along with counseling and career information classes.

Of eleven full-day students interviewed in the spring of the school's first year (1979), nine indicated that they had entered the alternative program because they were doing poorly within a traditional school. Excerpts from interview protocols explain five particular student cases[1]:

> Ed had failed ninth grade and last fall had begun to fall behind again at the junior high. There were "always hassles and fights" and he was not getting along with the other students or the teachers. The guidance counselor recommended that he transfer to the alternative school. He went to visit the school, "saw it, liked it, and decided to go there . . . at least it would be better than where I was" [May 1979].
>
> Mary said that she had been expelled from the junior high, and was out of school for a few days before coming to the alternative school. She and her mother had heard about the alternative school and came to inquire about it and was accepted [June 1979].
>
> Kenneth said he was "sick of" the junior high he was attending and "couldn't adjust there" [May 1979].
>
> During the interview Dan sucked on a lollipop, while slumped in his chair. He would be silent for several seconds after each question and then answer usually in very few words. When asked why he came to Glenwood, he replied, "I had no choice — it was either training school or here." He didn't have any expectations about Glenwood and didn't know anything about it [May 1979].
>
> Mark said he had been "thrown out of school for getting into some trouble." He had not gotten a job, and he had "hung around the house most of the time." He would read the paper each day, and one day in early October he read an article about the alternative school that would soon open for students. It announced that the principal would be Mrs.

> Dates. Mark recognized her name and picture — she had been administrative assistant at the junior high he had attended and had worked with him there. He called Mrs. Dates at the school, told her he wanted to return to school, and asked if it would be possible to get into the alternative school. She told him a little about the planned program and said if he was still interested he should come with his mother for an interview. Mark and his mother promptly made an appointment and as a result, he was the first student enrolled [February, 1979].

The perceptions of these youth about the choice to enroll in the alternative junior high school illustrated the importance of the school as a viable alternative to a conventional junior or senior high school. It was within this context that the links with the LEA, the human service agencies in the community, the local CETA offices, and the business community began to take shape during the two-year life of the program.

Most students were referred to the school by principals and guidance counselors. After acceptance, the student records were forwarded to the alternative school. The principal at the sending school also signed an agreement of support for and cooperation with the program and the student.

Interviews with the principals of two of the junior high schools indicated their support for the school. The on-site observer noted the following conversation with one principal:

> She has been most supportive of the school and spoke positively about it. She said: "It has filled a great need in the school system." She continues to be pleased and impressed with the school and gives much credit to the staff.
>
> When asked how others connected with the school system felt about the alternative school she remarked that she had "heard nothing negative about it." In fact, she mentioned that last week when the proposed budget for the city

> schools was presented it included monies for the operation of the alternative school and permanent faculty positions for the Glenwood teacher [April, 1980].

This continued support of the school by the different layers of the school district's administration resulted in the decision of the district to finance the school in its third year (1980-1981). The project achieved acceptance by the administration in that they chose to make a financial investment in the school. The implementation process convinced them of its merits and feasibility as a programmatic alternative to meet the needs of a particular cohort of youth.

The LEA school administrators and staff expressed concern about the educational future of the youth after their stay at the alternative school. During the second semester of the school's second year, the guidance counselor initiated visits with youth who returned to their home schools. The follow-up on students who reentered the traditional school exposed two crucial issues concerning the role of the alternative school in relation to the traditional schools. First, that youth were returning so quickly to the traditional classrooms indicated the administrators supported only the *temporary* shelter for students at the alternative school. One administrator noted:

> They cannot live in a dream world forever. They have to return and cope in the real world . . . the real world will not be giving them the love and attention they got at the alternative school [April, 1980].

The second issue concerned the role of teachers in the traditional school who again came into contact with this group of students. The on-site observer described the following comments by these administrators to illustrate the dilemmas the teachers experienced: dilemmas between time and willingness to help, and between cooperation and know-how.

Administrator 1:
A program should be designed to aid in the transition back to school so there is not an abrupt separation from Glenwood where the students have had a warm loving atmosphere and experience a sense of belonging. While she feels the teachers at the home school should have an active part in the re-entry program, and acknowledges that it "will be difficult" to get the teachers to cooperate with their already busy schedules, "This is an area that needs further study" [April 1980].

Administrator 2:
"I am sorry to say . . . the teachers are happy there is an alternative school so that they don't have to deal with those kids." He described how one student reentered and was expelled for behavior problems. He said that there were no plans made for re-entry adjustment. There is a need, he feels, for a "half-way house" — possibly temporary placement in a special skills class at the home school before the student is put back into the regular classes.

He added: "The teachers need to be supportive and expect success. Too often a teacher remembers the student and has the same negative expectations concerning him/her. We need teacher cooperation here to aid in successful return of our students."

He then spoke positively about the alternative school and its program. However he lamented the need for it. "Those students should be able to do as well right here, and we need to find out how that can be done. One key certainly is teacher attitude and cooperation. Right now that is definitely lacking here. We are working on it, but we have a long way to go" [April 1980].

Administrator 3:
This principal felt that students should not return to their junior high home school, but to the senior high after completing ninth grade at the alternative school [April 1980].

During the summer of 1980 the school district, according to the associate superintendent (August 1980), provided: (1) dissemination of information about the project to the tra-

ditional schools, and (2) workshops for regular and alternative school teachers about the content and methods used in the alternative school that could be adapted to the traditional school. The on-site observer reported that these meetings also helped make teachers more aware of the "personal, family, and financial problems that many of the youth face in this school district."

LEA-CETA LINKAGES: A NATURAL BRIDGE

The CETA-LEA relationships had been excellent before the project. The associate superintendent reported (March 1979): They need to spend money and we are able to use that money in legitimate ways. The prime sponsor reported that 80 percent of the YETP funds were being spent on in-school programs, and that the schools had become more aware of the role they could play in programs to train and employ youth:

> It is becoming more clear that CETA can be a natural bridge or transition between school and work and that the two can work well together for youth [March 1979].

This spirit of cooperation and vision in using CETA money to create more in-school programs for youth characterized the CETA-LEA relationship during the two years of the alternative school project.

The principal/director of the alternative school served as the mediator between the project and CETA. Responsibilities included filing reports, questionnaires, surveys, and so on that were requested by CETA. She also attended occasional meetings with the CETA office and the LEA project operator to air opinions, to answer questions, and to resolve problems. Two problems that arose centered on CETA paperwork and eligibility of the target group. In both cases CETA facilitated resolution:

> First, record keeping and report filing took considerable staff time. This lessened as personnel became more famil-

iar with guidelines and requirements. Also, as a result of open communication and cooperation, the local Youth Employment Training (YET) office started to certify all youth participants enrolled in the program for eligibility. It was felt that YET was more familiar with the procedure and in this way could relieve the school of one aspect of record keeping and reporting. Also, the YET office was conveniently located in the same building as the alternative school.

A second example of problem-solving involved the question of allowing students to participate although they did not meet the eligibility requirements based on family income. A compromise was reached which allowed for 10 percent of the particpants to be above the income level. The school system agreed to provide evaluative information to demonstrate that the inclusion of these students would not adversely affect the objectives to be met by the project [May 1980].

HUMAN SERVICE AGENCIES - PROJECT LINKAGES

Links with human service agencies in the community existed throughout the life of the program, mainly as a means of sharing information that might help the school or agencies provide services to the youth. The principal of the alternative school outlined the agencies and their functions as follows during an interview:

(1) *Department of Social Services:* Many of the students and their families qualify for services from DSS. Some are in foster homes, some are eligible because of income level. These students continue to be served by DSS. DSS and the administration at Glenwood share information that might be appropriate and helpful for the total well-being of the student. DSS, for instance, is more apt to have information concerning the home life than Glenwood. Glenwood, on the other hand, can tell more of the day-to-day attitudes, health, behavior and achievement.

(2) *Youth Court Counselors:* These counselors work very closely with the students involved with the courts due to infractions of one or more laws. They keep the administration of Glenwood informed and Glenwood provides necessary information to them. Often, for instance, a stipulation of probation is attendance at school. Also court counselors gave a two-week mini course on the Juvenile Justice System recently.

(3) *Youth Unlimited:* This is a private nonprofit group that works with and counsels troubled youth in a "Christian atmosphere." This has been a "tremendous help for some of our students who need and get more in-depth counseling than we can provide."

(4) *City Museum:* A member of the staff has given talks and demonstrations to the social studies classes last year and this year.

(5) *City PTA Council:* Worked with Glenwood parents and administration in helping establish the Glenwood PTA.

(6) *City Parks and Recreation Department:* Provided facility for Glenwood students to have physical education classes. Also provided facility and instructors for bread-making classes and ceramics classes offered as electives to the Glenwood students.

(7) *County Technical Institute:* Has accepted students referred by Glenwood to work toward their high school equivalency exam. Also, a course in commercial art was taught by one of the instructors who volunteered his time.

(8) *County Health Department:* Has provided workshops for the students.

(9) *Drug Action Counsel:* Has worked closely with a group of Glenwood students. A person from the council comes to Glenwood once each week and meets with this group on a "completely confidential basis" [April 1980].

Incentives for collaboration with the human service agencies were reciprocal. The project could increase serv-

ices to the youth and avoid duplication of those services, while the human service agencies benefited by easy access to a target group already identified. The observer reported:

> During the project's first year, a university graduate student served her internship at the YWCA. She wanted to work with a group of "troubled girls." She was able to do this through contact with the alternative school and came on a regular basis. The YWCA has provided personnel since then. A "Y teen group" was formed during the project's second year to add community and statewide activities for the young people [May 1980].

Through this collaboration the YWCA was able to make contact with a new target group. This is but one instance of the way in which the project increased the amount of services available to the youth by arranging a set of reciprocal agreements.

SUMMARY

The alternative school project was successfully implemented for two years in that it delivered services as proposed to the target group and number of youth. The positive collaboration between CETA and the LEA provided an umbrella of good will and support over the relationship between the project and CETA. The prime sponsor helped ease certification paperwork by allowing the YET office to handle student forms and by redefining terms of eligibility. Both the LEA and CETA shared a commitment to serve the CETA eligible target group through in-school programs. The LEA at all staff levels recognized that the schools were not providing adequate programs for these youth and were eager to have CETA support for this special school.

The spirit of serving the special needs of this target group also enhanced the extensive collaboration with the other human service agencies in the community. Services were available through these groups that could not be provided by

the small staff of the alternative school. The human service agencies also benefited by the easy access to a target group in one location.

The impacts on the LEA of such close collaboration were several. First, the LEA agreed to continue the alternative school after project funding ended in June 1980. The project had kept the LEA informed of the school program and progress throughout its two years. When the decision for continuing the school was made in the spring of the second year, the school board, administrators, and superintendent all saw the school as a viable and worthwhile venture.

The second impact of the alternative school on the LEA was intrainstitutional. The presence of the alternative school heightened the level of consciousness of the teachers and principals to the fact that this target group of students was not being adequately served by the traditional schools, and that separate but equal services were not justifiable. Principals and administrators agreed that the youth needed to be integrated back into the traditional school, but that the services in those schools needed also to be changed. The project served as a catalyst for the secondary school to reassess its ability to serve these youth and to then consider ways in which this might be done.

Case Study 2

A nonprofit career guidance agency operated a career awareness project for two years in a metropolitan area with an approximate population of 500,000. The project consisted of several components designed to enhance the career awareness of low-income youth. These components included:

(1) Youth advisory board.

(2) Work experience for 100 youth the first year and for 85 the second year.

(3) Career guidance support centers in five high schools the first year, four the second.

(4) Classroom infusion of career awareness into classes of regular high school teachers.

(5) Elimination of sex-role stereotyping through training of staff and high school teachers.

(6) Junior high school career awareness in project's second year.

(7) Inservice training for project staff and high school teachers.

The major institutional linkages developed and/or continued during the two years of this exemplary program were between (1) the parent project and the schools (LEA), (2) the parent project and the director of the new program, (3) the program operator and CETA, and (4) the parent project and the public sector. These linkages resulted in the provision of services for the proposed target number of students. The linkages also affected the service delivery of the nonprofit operator and the schools.

LEA-PARENT PROJECT LINKAGES.

The "parent" project had a history of sponsoring projects related to career awareness through the schools. The new in-school project built upon those linkages and established new ones, which in turn affected interinstitutional arrangements within the schools. The components of the new project resulted from an expansion of activities that were already offered in the schools. During the previous seven years, the parent project had established linkages with the LEA central administration, the individual school principals, and the teachers. The county school superintendent, for example, was on the board of directors for the parent project.

The original project proposal planned to target career awareness sessions to the CETA eligible group. Previously,

the parent project had delivered such services primarily to middle-class students. Concurrent with this proposal, the county superintendent's office drafted a separate proposal to fund a work experience program already in existence. At the suggestion of the local prime sponsor, the proposals from the parent project and the superintendent's office were merged into one proposal and submitted to Youthwork, Inc. The nonprofit agency would operate the total project to the satisfaction of the superintendent's office.

The operator depended upon good working relationships with the LEA as a vital part of service delivery. The links gave the operator access to clients, clients being both students and teachers in the schools. One parent project administrator said:

> We probably would not have secured any building space. Also, teachers and counselors would not have been as cooperative. She continued that the success of the parent project really was related to the administrators and how supportive they were, and their willingness to take time to endorse and get behind the project [February 1979].

The exemplary project placed "career specialist teams" in the schools to work with the target teachers and the target youth. During the first year the career specialist teams consisted of three persons. Two team members at one school described how they made contact with the target youth and how they established their roles within the school.

> They described a situation where a businessman who had been visiting their portable classroom behind the school doing a presentation for them ran into the football coach. The football coach and the businessman were good friends. After this experience, the football coach wandered into their portable classroom one day and said that he had seniors who really needed work on goals and wanted someone to work with them. They then set up a series of

> two-day events specifically for these youth. They also did a computer run for getting information on different colleges and universities, given certain specifications. The coach later checked with them to see if these youth had followed through [January 1979].

The career specialist teams also organized speakers for classes or assemblies and arranged career carnivals.

The on-site observer deduced that the role of "expert on site" evolved in importance as the career specialists became more familiar in the schools. The on-site observer reported on the interpersonal and professional competencies of the career specialists:

> These individuals are known personally to the teachers and are known to be valuable resources and experts. They function as a sympathetic ear to the frustrated teacher who has not been able to reach a certain segment of students in his or her class. They have abundant ideas and materials for these teachers to use, and I have seen it happening.
>
> I think one of the more popular resources provided by the career centers has been the arranging of speakers, drawing upon a pool already in operation under the parent project. Another important resource is the computer service that provides printouts describing occupations in detail [June 1980].

The English curriculum at one high school was altered partly because of the activities of the career specialist team at that high school during the project's first year. One team member reported:

> As a result of the project's experience last year, the English teachers are doing the tracking system again. They had been mainstreaming all the youth. Now the whole English department got together this year and they changed their curriculum to provide a lower track. This stresses self-

confidence, telephone skills, interviewing skills, and job applications [March 1980].

One of the high schools which housed a career team decided that they needed to finance a career guidance specialist. The parent project helped the LEA set up a new career center and the project shared this space during its second year. The parent project provided money for kits and paid a secretary for the computer terminal and materials. At another school, the career specialist from the project received muttiple requests from career placement groups expressing a desire for entry into the school. These requests were channeled to her by the principal.

PROGRAM OPERATOR-PARENT PROJECT LINKAGES

The nonprofit operator experienced organizational changes as a result of its involvement with the exemplary project, including initiating service delivery strategies for the CETA eligible and administrative reorganization. The exemplary project was the operator's first experience with service delivery targeted primarily toward the disadvantaged. The on-site observer reported these reflections:

> During the project's two years the operator has made dramatic contacts and inroads toward working with disadvantaged youth, using a model that had heretofore been primarily targeted at middle-class youth.
>
> I think it has been necessary for the operator and the project staff, who are from the middle class and whose experience has been middle class, to learn to deal effectively with the disadvantaged population.
>
> I have seen them struggle last year. I think they have come a long way from last year to this year. I think they are far more able (1) to describe the needs of these youth; and (2) to provide more relevant services to them [June 1980].

The on-site observer described an in-service program for target teachers entitled "Building Success" that reflected this growth in understanding. "I do not believe that they ever dealt with the issues of alienated youth quite as in-depth as they did in this session" (February 1980).

Another impact on the operator was administrative reorganization. The project's visibility, paperwork, and size caused the top administrative staff of the project operator to experience pressures that removed them personally from the workings of the project at the service delivery level. The project hired a consultant to help them plan a reorganization. The plan included positions for a business manager and a director of research, planning, and analysis. These changes would help the project handle the administrative paperwork necessary for federal projects, engage in more long-term planning, and handle large grants more easily. Two associate director slots were created to work on instruction and school relations respectively.

PROGRAM-CETA LINKAGES

The program formed its first linkages with CETA through the exemplary project. Prior to this project, the operator had failed to compete successfully with CBOs in securing federal grant support for in-school programs to serve low-income youth. The prime sponsor explained that he considered it easier for this operator to continue their previously established links with the schools in the exemplary project grant competition than for the CBOs to initiate those links.

Following the creation of this new linkage, the operator experienced further success in subsequent grant competitions with the CBOs. The operator secured a Follow Through grant to provide work experience and academic credit to CETA county employees. The project, as might be anticipated, experienced frustrations in becoming accustomed to the DOL guidelines, regulations, and time lines that were not in accord with school schedules and policies.

PROGRAM OPERATOR-PUBLIC SECTOR LINKAGES

The program placed students in public sector work experience jobs. Although the job developers had had extnesive contacts with the private sector, the Exemplary In-School grant specified that job placements for youth were to be in the public sector. The work placements were to be 100 percent subsidized through program funds. The program was able, often creatively, to secure placements such as in cosmetology through a state-operated company. The on-site observer reported that the work experience employers showed appreciation of the program. The project produced a supervisor's manual to help them in working with the disadvantaged student. Several employers commented that they used this manual with their regular employees.

SUMMARY

The project's entry into the schools benefited from past LEA linkages with the project operator. New linkages centered on contact between the career specialist teams in the junior high and high schools and the target teachers and students. The specialists became recognized experts on site. They had contacts with the target group in classes or in the career center, often when providing a career information service or negotiating a work experience contract. One school decided to offer a lower track basic skills English course, with a curriculum including content similar to that offered by the career specialist team. Another school hired a career guidance specialist.

The project impacted upon the existing service delivery strategies of the operator. The staff learned to tailor career awareness sessions to the interests of disadvantaged students. The large size of the project also contributed to administrative reorganization by the program operator, increasing the ability to administer budgets, paperwork, and research, and keep in touch with staff in the field. The operator formed a new link with CETA through the program and also received approval of another large Follow Through

grant during the second year. The exemplary project also opened the door to other government grants through CETA.

The on-site observer speculated that the incentives for the linkages could basically be attributed to these factors: (1) All linking institutions felt some obligation to provide different or more successful services to the CETA target group. (2) The program operator had an established reputation for career awareness during the past seven years. The observer noted: "They presented themselves well. They were skillful, articulate, competent people. In addition, they presented things in writing." The project operator sought the grant as an attractive opportunity for their organization, given that funding from previous sources was less available. This grant also provided the opening to successfully compete for other funds to develop programs for the disadvantaged. In essence, the observer concluded that availability of funds would dictate the target audience for career services. (3) The public sector accepted students, partly because the work experience component was 100 percent subsidized and partly for good will.

Case Study 3

This project formed a consortium between a local board of education and a community college. The consortium operated the project in a highly populated metropolitan area for almost two years. In all, 90 high school students participated in work experience, and eleven college students were hired as paraprofessionals to assist the project staff with recruitment and counseling of these same high school students.

The major linkages formed for project implementation were between the LEA, the college, and CETA. Each bureaucracy had multiple and sometimes overlapping roles in programmatic and administrative decisions. This resulted in extended project negotiations that caused delayed implementation, fewer students served than originally projected, and fewer services for the students. The programmatic and administrative decisions centered on (1) the peer

counselors component, and (2) the work experience component.

PEER COUNSELORS

The peer component of the project was considered by the Department of Labor as a unique feature of the project. In fact, this component embodied the major linkage between the community college and the LEA, as the college students would counsel the high school students involved in the work experience component of the project. Problems of coordination and decision-making surfaced as unexpected obstacles to implementation of this component.

Coordination problems first involved training of the peer counselors. The LEA had processed 200 student applications for work slots in spring 1979. Since the college peer counselors had not yet been trained, the project came to a standstill and did not place the high school students.

A second stage of difficulties with project implementation occurred in the late spring and early summer of 1979. Peer counselors were paid from project funds for work with incoming freshmen. The college claimed that their work was therefore associated with the project. DOL, however, took a different view and placed the project on probation for this activity. The expended funds were subsequently returned to the project budget. The third stage occurred in late fall and winter of the project's second year (1980). Student recruiting began again in the fall and students were placed in work experience situations. This was done even before the selection and training of the peer counselors, who were not given their school assignments until December. Peer counselors had to travel to the high schools and meet with students who were free at one particular class period. The LEA coordinator explained the logistics of this operation to the on-site observer:

> The LEA coordinator will develop time schedules when students can be available in the schools. The college staff will attempt to develop schedules for the peer counselors to match the students' schedules.

> This now poses a difficult time problem, both with respect to finding a period when the student will be free, and in allowing the peer counselors as much as two hours for travel for a one hour (or one period) meeting with a student.
>
> All this assumes that the peer counselors can meet with the students in the absence of the school liaison person who, presumably, will arrange for the "interfacing" [October 1979].

While the schedules were being coordinated, the LEA, the college, and CETA had shared concerns about the role of peer counselors vis-à-vis the students. An unanticipated number of concerns surfaced from all fronts, resulting in a lengthy decision-making process about peer counselor roles and eligibility. These concerns included:

- CETA wanted assurance that peer counselors who were academically acceptable were also CETA eligible (November 1979).
- A college student group wanted assurance that minorities were included (December 1979).
- The LEA, including guidance counselors, wanted assurance that peer counselors were qualified (April 1979).

The discussions led to several evolutionary changes in the peer counselor role descriptions. First, it was planned that they would counsel high school students in career plans. Second, it was thought they would do sporadic counseling and file applications. Finally, all parties agreed that the peer counselors, now called paraprofessional aides or "paras," would help solely with recruitment and intake of high school students at the school sites. The coordination of schedules and decision-making process involved in role definition resulted in a more precise and, perhaps, operational definition of what the peer counselors would do vis-à-vis the students, as well as a less ambitious and responsible role.

CETA's participation in the decision-making process went beyond vocal advocacy of adhering to guidelines, that

is, the eligibility of peer counselors. CETA also played a part in approval of budget modification, which proved to be a lengthy process. After the project was placed on probation in the summer of 1979, CETA monitored the project closely and would not distribute staff and peer counselor pay until budget modifications were formally approved. Staff and peer counselors consequently had to deal with the troublesome problem of "no pay" for five months, receiving their checks in February 1980 when the budget modification for the 1979-1980 program was finally approved.

Interinstitutional support from the college for their project staff during this period was not forthcoming, mainly because the college administration had undergone staffing changes of a new president and dean. The exemplary project was not high on their list of priorities for needed attention. Another potential constituency from the college that did not develop was the student body. One might anticipate their support, as a good number of job slots were involved. But most students were over 21 and therefore not eligible for paid participation in employment sites. They thus did not have vested interest in the program. The on-site observer noted:

> The proposal called for a sizeable number of college students, aside from the peer counselors who were considered part of the project staff, to be involved in workshop training programs. Nine of these students were to be placed in work situations. Several of the workshops were held but the attendance was poor and at this time it was "discovered" that few, if any, of the college students were under 21.
>
> In mid-January of the project's second year this part of the college program was deleted and no college students were placed in employment situations. At this time the college part of the program was reorganized, the college coordinator dismissed, and the college-related effort was focused on the in-school work of six to seven peer counselors. The remaining four peer counselors worked at the college for the balance of the program [April 1980].

The requirement that the institutions form linkages to coordinate this project appeared after the two organizations had filed the proposal. In other words, the plan that the two organizations work closely together on this project was not a part of either organization's proposal. Rather, the requirement was imposed upon them as a condition for receiving the grant. What emerged was a brief and stormy marriage of convenience.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Ninety high school students worked in public sector placements after school hours. The program had originally included plans for career awareness workshops to be conducted by the college guidance counselor and peer counselors, but these were never implemented. Near the end of the program, in Spring 1980, some efforts were made in this direction. The on-site observer described what happened in these sessions:

> Groups of students were brought to the educational center. The students completed a questionnaire that involved statements (checks) about their interests, preferences, etc. This information was fed into a computer that returned information regarding types of occupations that might fit their interests, etc.
>
> The questionnaire was completed by at least half of the students and the print-out results were discussed with most of them. The type of feedback was informative but time did not permit discussion of the results with individual students [March 1980].

The on-site observer commented about the programmatic consequences of depending on this linkage (which did not occur):

> In general there have been no in-depth linkages established with the students. There have been contacts with all of the

> students, but these have been brief and served no major counseling purpose. The students have entered employment without job readiness preparation and there have been few opportunities for the staff to hold in-depth discussion with students since that time.
>
> There has been some follow-up with students, but this has been indirect, i.e., through conversations with their employers when the latter are contacted for time sheets [April 1980].

Staff contact with students centered in intake and placement activities. The on-site observer reported that contact with students after placement was limited:

> Contacts with the students thereafter were limited to brief conversations when the students came to pick up their paychecks. Since large numbers of students came at the same time and had to be processed in a matter of an hour or two, there was no opportunity for individual conversation. There were some exceptions, e.g., when a student had a particular employment-related problem [April 1980].

The project staff did make contact with the employers about student performance near the end of the program in Spring 1980. The results were documented on a form prepared for this purpose, and it was expected that this information should become part of the student's school record. (Whether, in fact, this occurred is unknown, as the observer did not have access to the records and thus could not verify the intention.)

A qualitatively different form of contact occurred at the work sites between the supervisors and the students. Here there was sustained and frequent interaction. The following comments by supervisors help define the nature of their relationship to the students.

> *Day-Care Center:* The director was pleased with the work performance of the three students. He felt that they were

interested and certainly helpful. They were working at tasks that needed to be done and it was not a "make work" situation. He stated the students were a help to the program and he was of the firm opinion that the program and its staff were providing assistance and experience that were valuable to the students. They were treated as regular employees. They participated in all the activities of the school that were being carried out at the time of day (3-6 p.m.) when the children were present.

The director believed the program was worthwhile, but he felt that he could be of greatest service to students if they were held accountable for quality work and were trained to handle their work in a responsible manner.

The students seemed to be eager participants, they were always on time and they did their work under the supervision of program teachers and staff. The staff, on many occasions, discussed with the students the work of the day-care center, teaching, and career possibilities.

Department of Health: A supervisor reported that the staff of the facility were interested in the four students and often discussed work-related matters with the students and the importance of continuing their education.

The students worked at a number of types of jobs in the facility, for example, they acted as messengers, they handled the telephone, served as file clerks, assisted in packaging school materials, etc. The students had an opportunity to become involved in all the departments of the facility, such as dental, child care, eye, immunization, working papers, etc. [January 1980].

As indicated by the comments of the observer and the work-site supervisors, decisions about work and interaction with students were left to the employers once the placements occurred. Incentives for the link between employers and youth were largely financial. The placements were in the public sector. Work sites such as the day-care center were anxious to have fully subsidized personnel. Another factor that simplified the public sector placement was that the certification and payroll processing were handled by a

department within the LEA that was very familiar with YETP procedures.

Originally the project planned to place two-thirds of the 90 students in private sector placements. The project planned to reimburse the employer for one-half of the wages paid to the youth participants. As it developed, the project placed but four students in private sector slots. The on-site observer reported that the placement process was slow, due to a slow certification procedure at CETA, to difficulty in locating employers to pay 50 percent of student's salary, and to private-sector employers being more selective than those in the public sector. The final straw came when the LEA had difficulty budgeting sufficient funds to reimburse the employers. The LEA coordinator reported this became a persistent and time-consuming problem.

> The coordinator indicated that the funds had not yet been made available for payment to the private sector employers and he hears from them often (March 1980). He indicates that a great deal of his time is consumed in responding to their inquiries and complaints. It is not anticipated that additional private sector work assignments will be made [March 1980].

Linkages established between the LEA coordinator and another CETA funded project made it possible for the high school work experience students to be placed in subsidized summer employment in the second CETA project. The on-site observer reported that most, if not all, of the school-year project students were working. The LEA coordinator had facilitated the placements by submitting the student applications prior to the end of the school year.

SUMMARY

This project depended upon the cooperation of three large bureaucracies for implementation. The peer counselor component, for example, of the project depended upon schedule coordination of staff and students within the three

bureaucracies as well as input into the role definitions of the peer counselors. The result of the lengthy negotiations was delayed implementation and a limited use of the peer counselors. The failure of the peer counselor component becomes more understandable when viewing this component as an *ex post facto* feature tacked to two proposals submitted independently by two institutions. It was a contrived means to demonstrate CETA-LEA collaboration.

Failure of the peer counselor component also affected plans for the work experience component targeted toward high school students. The career awareness sessions for the work experience students as originally planned were never held. However, interview and observation data indicated that the interactions between the work site supervisors and the students served this function to some extent. It is ironic that this linkage between the public sector employers and the students proved to be the most successful linkage, as it did not depend upon "institutional linking," but rather upon one-on-one relationships. On the one hand, the LEA did facilitate this relationship, simply by its noninterference. That is, the LEA allowed students to be contacted through the schools, but students worked after school and did not receive any academic credit. On the other hand, the LEA had a separate department that was attuned to processing youth credentials for YETP grants, and this department serviced the exemplary project in an expeditious manner. The private sector linkage failed because of CETA's slow credentialing process, and because of the LEA's problem with reimbursing the employers.

Institutional Linkages: Variations and Consequences

Case studies from three of the exemplary in-school career awareness projects demonstrated that the project operators each assumed quite distinct roles vis-à-vis the LEA, CETA, the public sector, and the other human service agencies. These roles affected implementation, the types of

services delivered, and consequent institutionalization of the project ideas and programs.

OPERATOR ROLES IN THE LINKAGES

Project 1 was operated by an LEA and was closely linked to multiple administrative and delivery levels of the LEA. The relationship to the LEA, CETA, and the human service agencies had been characterized as cooperative, in that these organizations were all supportive of the project. The operator served as an *engineer*, designing plans for implementation of a project deemed worthwhile by CETA and the LEA.

Project 2 was operated by a nonprofit organization that had a history of good working relationships implementing career awareness projects in LEAs. The project operator's linkages with CETA and the public employment sector commenced with the in-school project and grew quickly. The relationships with these organizations resulted from the operator's ability as an *entrepreneur*, that is, its ability to adapt services and administration to a changing marketplace for career awareness activities.

An LEA and a community college came together under the mandate of the funding agency to function as a consortium to operate project 3. Project implementation depended upon shared decision-making. That the three bureaucracies could only agree on schedules and roles of peer counselors after protracted negotiation resulted in the range of services being decreased and a very slow pace of implementation. All bureaucracies were in a sense *gatekeepers* of their institutional norms and culture.

The various roles that the operators filled each affected (1) the project's ability to be implemented, and (2) the types of services delivered.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The LEA's role in project 1 helped gain acceptance for the project from the start. The project idea had been with the

communityfor several years, but without funding until the Exemplary In-School opportunity. The LEA designed plans for the alternative school and provided supports at multiple levels of the schools to staff the project, provide students, and maintain services. In addition, the operator had a history of healthy working relationships with CETA. By supplying the project with access to these supports, the implementation of the project for the targeted number of students with services as planned was achieved.

The nonprofit operator's role in project 2 also enhanced project implementation. The CETA grant formed a new link for this operator. The operator's capacity to deal with paperwork, changing regulations, and slow funding showed a great ability to absorb pressures and be flexible. The project's alteration of former services to meet the needs of a new clientele — the CETA certified as low income — demonstrated a willingness to meet new demands.

The consortium members each had institutional norms and a culture that impeded collaboration on their project. It has been noted that the idea of collaboration appeared *ex post facto* in the proposals from both institutions. One may speculate that the idea of collaboration was incompatible with counseling standards of the LEA and was impractical given the age and physical location of the community college. The most successful link of the project was between the individual students and their worksite supervisors in the public sector — in effect, a noninstitutional linkage. The activities of the students at the worksites and their interactions with the supervisors were not planned or monitored by the operators and did not happen during school time.

TYPES OF SERVICE DELIVERY

Project 1 created an intensive service, an alternative school, closely linked to the traditional public schools. This

close coordination and supervision of the school may be anticipated with the role of the LEA as engineer, taking care to design the services as part of the total system.

Project 2 offered several components. Among them were the work experience, the career awareness sessions for students, training sessions for teachers, and career centers. The entrepreneur was able to tailor some services they had previously delivered to the new project, as well as create new ones. The services took place in the high schools during and after regular class time.

Project 3 was successful in placing students in work experience sites after school time. This did not interfere with the gatekeeping functions of the operators, but, in fact, worked around them. Unsuccessful components fell victim to institutional norms and the cultures of both institutions.

NOTE

1. All names of people and places are pseudonyms.

CHAPTER SIX

STRATEGY FOUR: JOB CREATION THROUGH YOUTH-OPERATED PROJECTS

Introduction

The concept or strategy of job creation through youth-operated projects raises important issues in national policy toward youth. Youth are normally the consumers of employment/training services and are not involved in the decision-making arenas. As consumers only, youth have been denied important experiences and skills that could be gained from being actively involved from the planning stage through the creation, implementation, and completion of the project effort. The Department of Labor (DOL Application Guidelines — Exemplary Program, 1978) considered this involvement of youth the primary distinction between exemplary programs chosen for support in this area and programs supported under the other focal areas.

In its design of a pilot Youth Enterprises Development Corporation, the Work Institute of America cited the "need to find ways to create youth-operated enterprises to: (1) increase opportunities, (2) provide outlets for youth leadership abilities, and (3) provide training in management and entrepreneurship." Youth-operated projects were

established to give youth a chance to manage their own affairs. In clarifying its aims, the Institute stated (1979: 31):

> The solution of the youth employment problem has become synonymous with the development of programs to prepare youth for employment in institutional settings and in activities planned and operated by adults. In most respects, this is as it should be because (1) large numbers of youth will be helped in this fashion, and (2) most will eventually have to work in large institutional settings.
>
> But not all are best helped by "enrollment" in such organized activities, and not all have to work for large organizations. An unknown but significant number of youth in the inner city have leadership ability and no way in which to exercise it. It is a mistaken assumption that all youth who live in the inner city and are without jobs are unpracticed in organizing, persuading, identifying opportunity, and taken advantage of it. Street life and a wide range of economic activities that, if not extralegal, are not advertised in the Yellow Pages, have given some youth in slums opportunities to develop these talents. They are a base on which to build.

Youth-operated projects are an example of an education and employment/training program seeking to capitalize on skills youth have already developed (Holloway, 1980). Using skilled community persons as advisers, youth are allowed to participate in the ongoing economic life of the community in a meaningful way. The goal of this effort is thus to enable increasing numbers of poor youth to successfully participate in the labor market.

Program Characteristics

The four sites reported on here were both rural and urban and served anywhere from 30 to 300 economically disadvantaged youth. As noted in Table 6.1, one project was

located in a major city with a population exceeding one million people; two in cities with populations between 100,000 and 500,000 people; and one in a remote rural area. Each of the four youth-operated projects is described below:

Site 1: This project proposed to create fourteen youth-run committees to broker youth services to the community. Youth were to be encouraged to contact the local agency, business, or individual that could most effectively assist them in the development of individual projects.

Site 2: The goal of this project was to establish a solar energy cooperative with youth providing the skilled manpower for the effort. A nonprofit organization with a strong technical background in solar energy conversion acted as sponsor for the project.

Site 3: This project created a personnel office run by secondary school students to receive real work, jobs for pay requests for in-school tasks. The four program components were: (1) a graphic arts media production studio, (2) a student food service which operated an alternative lunch program, (3) a consumer action service, and (4) a maintenance and repair shop.

Site 4: This project taught agriculture, construction, and day-care skills to CETA eligible youth in a rural community. The idea for the project was developed from a local needs assessment which pinpointed service inadequacies within the county.

Linking Youth to Jobs

CASE STUDY 1

This project proposed to create fourteen youth-run Youth-Site committees to "broker" youth services to the community. In all, 90 youth were to be hired and were to

TABLE 6.1 Youth-Operated Program Characteristics

Program	*Operator*	*Area Population Range (in thousands)*	*Where Conducted*	*Actual/Planned No. of Students to be Served*	*Program Status*
Site 1	CETA Prime Sponsor	25+	CETA office	73/82 (89.0%)	Expansion
Site 2	PNP	50+	Alternative School	50/99 (50.5%)	New
Site 3	LEA	100+	Public School	60/69 (87.0%)	Expansion
Site 4	LEA	under 10	Public School	84/130 (64.6%)	New

NOTE: PNP = Private Nonprofit Organization; LEA = Local Education Authority

work a maximum of 15 hours per week over a 78-week period. An additional 60 youth were to participate, allowing for turnover. A central youth committee was to be created to oversee the work of the fourteen site committees. Through this model, youth were to be encouraged to contact the agency, business, or individual that could most effectively assist them in the development of individual projects.

The internal linkages at this project were primarily among the various service efforts, advisers, and agencies. Interinstitutional linkages were limited to those with the larger CETA network. The lack of interinstitutional linkages at this project was all the more interesting in that the project was developed as a result of linkages among several youth-serving agencies in the community. This group of agencies together was called the youth consortium.

The Consortium

The consortium wrote and sponsored the proposal. It was organized as a response to a federal dictum that agencies could not submit another Title VI (CETA/PSE) proposal in the same form as the previous proposal. The consortium was

organized to write a joint proposal. As this effort was coming to an end, the application guidelines for the Exemplary In-School programs were published. The members felt that the consortium would be a good vehicle for coordinating a project such as that outlined in the application guidelines.

The original intent of the program was that the consortium would be the program operator. However, once funded, it soon became evident that this was not feasible as the consortium lacked the administrative and technical facilities to take on such a task. A CETA employee was hired to head the project, and control was shifted from the consortium to CETA. Various interpretations have been suggested for this shift of responsibility. One former Youth Consortium official felt

> it was always assumed that CETA would administer the project since the youth consortium was not a legally incorporated body and none of the individual agencies had the facilities to run a large county-wide rather than city-wide program [January 1980].

Another participant suggested

> one reason was that the director chosen for the program happened to be a CETA employee. She pointed out that any other agency could have suggested an employee for the director position and thus retained control over the project [January 1980].

The major linkage between the consortium and the project was through the "advisory committee" set up by the consortium to oversee the project. This committee helped the project director over some early rough spots and provided technical expertise to the various individual projects by screening preliminary proposals of the youth. In this manner, the committee could exercise veto power over the project's activities. However, the observer noted that on closer scrutiny

> it seems apparent that the members of the committee were not representatives of the youth consortium as much as they were representatives of their specific agencies. This was obvious during committee meetings when one committee member clearly demonstrated in his questioning of youth who had written the proposal that he had loyalties to other "competing" sites [May 1980].

The Youth Consortium ceased to operate as of the spring of 1979 for reasons that were not connected with the exemplary project. A major reason was that CETA monitors found serious problems with the personnel practices of the Title VI project. People were not doing what their job descriptions required, and there was a lack of an administrative structure which precluded an effective response. These problems soon monopolized the monthly meetings, which led in turn to organizations (which did not have Title VI project) losing interest in the consortium.

The demise of the consortium dashed any hope that the project would be able to become linked with the wider community. When the consortium folded, agencies lost interest in the exemplary project. Instead of being actively involved with the youth project at their site as was proposed, their only role was that of landlord.

Selection of an Adviser

Each agency in which youth were involved in a service effort was originally to provide an adviser from its own professional staff. This person would serve as a link between the service effort and the organization and facilitate the sharing of services both with the host agency and other agencies. The motivation for the adviser was to have been concern for the welfare of youth plus an interest in participating in an exciting, experimental program. It was assumed that a person of some responsibility at the agency would choose to serve as group adviser. This assumption

was unrealistic. Agency staff were simply not willing to undertake another demanding commitment.

As a result of the failure to recruit professional staff from the agencies, all of the service efforts were headed either by persons who had no formal affiliation with the host agency or else by persons of fairly low rank in the organization. This resulted in the planned host/exemplary relationship becoming a "landlord/tenant relationship," where the host agency had little interaction with the youth project. A second consequence was the diminished ability of the youth project to draw on services from other agencies in the community, as the network among the professional staff never materialized.

The isolation evolved still further in later stages of the project as the students began to choose their own advisers. This resulted in an additional limiting of the contact between the youth and the host agency. Supposedly, this lack of contact between the adviser and the service agencies was to be balanced by the new adviser's experience in an area related to the kind of work in which the youth project was involved. This too did not emerge as anticipated. For example, the adviser to the new restaurant was hired because he supposedly had business and bookkeeping experience. As far as the observer could determine

> his only related experience was a bookkeeping course in high school and art experience which helped considerably in the decoration of the new store. He had no restaurant experience.

The Prime Sponsor

The CETA prime sponsor adopted the project after it became apparent that the youth consortium could not operate it. The observer posited that CETA was given control for the following reasons: (1) the ability to handle the massive amounts of paperwork, (2) the presence of an employee who

was suitable for the position of project director, and (3) the ability and authority to request additional federal funds. Its exercise of control over the program, however, fluctuated. The assistant director of CETA had veto power and used it. The observer provided an example:

> The assistant director visited one project, a novelty shop, and was not pleased by either the goods or the services. He saw the project as selling materials that were offensive to the community and he ordered the store closed [March 1980].

CETA's internal problems also affected the project. Political problems in CETA led at one time or another to a demand for increased publicity, accountability, and paperwork. One member of the advisory committee felt that the internal needs of CETA affected the project in a deeper, more lasting way. The project had had minimal links with the local educational establishment. This informant thought that one reason for this was what he saw as the major goal of CETA — to put as many people to work as possible. In his opinion, the project sacrificed quality for quantity, dealing with many youth superficially rather than giving fewer youth a more intensive educational experience. This informant summarized his feelings as follows: "The learning process was secondary to getting people jobs."

Synopsis

The earliest linkage established at this project was the one that eventually led to the creation of the project itself. The youth consortium was made up of a group of agencies that served youth in the local community. According to the on-site observer:

> The youth consortium was to provide many of the ties between the exemplary program and other non-profit agencies in the local community [May 1980].

The consortium had not functioned since June 1979, and with its demise came the severing of most of the linkages that had been originally established through this group. One reason for the demise of the youth consortium was its failure to become institutionalized. When individual members changed jobs or lost interest in the affairs of the group, the agency that had originally appointed this person did not bring someone else in as a replacement.

The consortium was originally created in order to apply for Title VI (CETA) funds. The individual agencies had been told by the federal government that they could not apply for these funds with the same proposal as the previous year. The agencies came together and wrote a joint proposal, which was subsequently accepted. At about the same time as this acceptance, the announcement for the Exemplary In-School Demonstration Project had become public, and members of the consortium saw this as an opportunity to bring additional money into their agencies to serve needy youth. The exemplary project stressed linkages and coordination among the various groups, and the youth consortium proved to be an ideal vehicle through which to submit a grant application. Once the grant was accepted, it became immediately apparent that the consortium did not have the administrative means or know-how to run the program. It was subsequently decided that the prime sponsor would act as operator and that each of the local agencies would have its own project to conduct under the auspices of the CETA-operated project.

The major linkage between the project and the host agency involved the selection of an adviser for each group. Theoretically, the adviser was to be a professional staff person of the agency and was to act as adviser because of an active interest in having youth involved in community affairs. However, the idea never became reality. Many of the advisers turned out to be college students or other people in the community who had little or no relationship to the organization which was to be sponsoring the project. The

failure to link with the proposed sponsoring agency through the adviser position posed problems for the various youth service efforts. The extra effort that was required of the inexperienced advisers to create relationships with other agencies took both time and energy away from the primary task of developing youth-operated businesses.

Incentives for Linkage: The incentives evolved over time. In the proposal, professional people and experts were expected to become involved as advisers because of the experimental nature of the program and their interest in seeing youth involved. This did not work. Subsequently, monetary incentives had to be devised to attract advisers. Because of the low wages eventually offered, the persons attracted were not of the background that the original proposal had envisioned. Further complications arose when certain landlords insisted upon greater financial incentives to allow the youth to rent their property.

There was very little organized private sector involvement at this project. In spring 1980, the project attempted to link with the local Private Industry Council (PIC) to garner more private sector participation and expertise. This effort had no results as it was made at the very end of the project.

CASE STUDY 2

This project sought to establish a solar energy cooperative with eighty youth learning skills related to solar technology and providing the skilled labor for the cooperative. A nonprofit organization with a strong background in solar energy was to act as sponsor for the project. As the project achieved its goal of becoming a profit-making business, it was to spin off from its nonprofit sponsor and incorporate into a separate entity. The project was adult operated but had youth who were to be trained in the various jobs that the business required. What follows is

one of the success stories from the Exemplary In-School effort.

Specific Linkages

This project developed from a relationship between two nonprofit organizations interested in supporting the development of higher technology in energy fields. A Washington-based group was instrumental in writing the initial proposal and in selecting an on-site group to parent and organize the project. Once underway, the Washington group had only peripheral contact with the ongoing project.

The project director was hired by the on-site organization in June 1979. Subsequent communications between the organization staff and the new director were strained. The observer saw the director as "not communicating well with the organization staff." The observer felt that this feeling was related to how the project had been presented to the staff in the beginning and to their inexperience with business and educational jargon. For example, they were not familiar with "product contracts" which were to be the new director's primary mode of task completion.

Aside from the initial reaction by the on-site organization staff, the observer described the director as having "done a fantastic job getting refunding and perhaps even starting a new school which will be related to the project." The observer also noted that the director had good relations with many community groups and that she (the observer) had no problem communicating with the director. By the end of the project, the Washington-based group was so pleased that there was talk of replicating this project nationwide.

The on-site organization was of little help to the project director. When the director asked for feedback on specific proposals, he received little help. According to the observer, the director's attitude was that he was hired to do a job and he would do it with or without their help.

There was one point, though, where the organization was valuable. After the students joined the program in November 1979, the organization provided its technicians as instructors for the student on-the-job training. The support of the organization was brief since a special OJT instructor was hired soon afterward.

By March 1980, the board of directors of the organization had decided to let the project spin off. This was not a major shift since the organization had had little interaction with the project since its inception. As the observer noted:

> The linkage between the parent organization and the project has been severed almost completely. The break will be complete when the project moves to new quarters soon [March 1980].

Further examples of the nature of the split illustrate the overt reason for the decision. The observer noted:

> On March 31st the director of the parent organization told me that he did not want his group to be connected with the project in any publicity. I [the observer] was astonished [March 1980].

Subsequent investigation by the observer discovered that one of the reasons for this decision was to protect the nonprofit status of the parent organization. Since the project had been envisioned as profit-making from the beginning, it was natural for the project to become independent of the nonprofit organization. The project director provided a concise description of the decision to split and its effect on the linkage between the two groups. The director of the project explained:

> This would probably happen to any project which became self-sustaining in a profit-making form [April 1980].

The observer noted that, according to the director,

> There had not been much of a linkage anyway because the decision-making had been all his from the beginning. He simply gave a report of what had been done either to the board of the project or to the director of the organization [April 1980].

The project moved to new quarters on June 1, 1980, and officially ended the linkage between the project and the on-site group. The new quarters were more spacious and included classrooms, workshops, and offices. This move coincided with the refunding grant from Washington which provided the initial stability as the project became independent of the parent organization.

Foremost among efforts to develop other linkages for the project was the local vocational high school. The initiative began in the spring of 1979 when the director of the parent organization had a meeting with the principal of the high school about the new project. The principal was interested and decided to include the project on the school's schedule for the following fall. The principal was subsequently disappointed when the project was not ready to begin in tandem with the fall opening of school. After the failure of the project to begin on time, he was no longer cooperative. The project had used a classroom in his school and made contracts with the drafting, carpentry, and marketing instructors to teach students in the project after school. The incentive for the instructors to become involved was that they were paid over and above their high school salaries.

The observer described the linkage with the vocational high school as "not great — but okay." The project, as a result of the condition of the linkage, began to plan the starting of its own school for the 1980-1981 year. A person was hired to do the feasibility study for the school, which had to be able to give academic credit for the training. A meeting

was to be held with the city zoning authority to see if a school could be located near the new headquarters. The answer was in the affirmative and planning continued. The observer cited this effort as but another example of the project director's ability "to get things done."

There was one example of linking project activity directly to the vocational high school. One student's English teacher said that she would give the student extra credit in her course for work he did for the project. No other teacher did this. As a rule, students did not get academic credit for their project training, although they did a great deal of reading and some writing as a result of the project.

An alternative high school (different from the vocational high school) did grant credit for work done by their students at the project, though there were but two students from this school working at the project. The observer, in describing this linkage suggested:

> The linkage at the alternative high school should have been built up. I guess it was not built because of the lack of time on the part of the instructors and the director. Also, the fact that the alternative school is brand new this year may have had an effect [April 1980].

At the end of the school year (May 1980), the linkage with the vocational high school was terminated. The feeling by the observer was that the project "may not have made much of an impression on the principal, but there was interest in the project from students and at least two instructors."

Other Linkages

In July 1980, the project was incorporated with its own board of directors. This advisory board was a good linkage to the private sector both in the surrounding community and nationally. The board was appointed by the project director and included representatives from Youthwork, Inc., the Washington-based nonprofit group which was originally

instrumental in proposing the project, the State Housing Authority, a contractor, and several representatives from other interest groups. The participation of these people was seen to be valuable and instrumental in the efforts to secure contracts and become a successful profit-making business. Several members of the board soon after incorporation included the project in their own proposals for funding and other members began to help publicize the project's work.

All other linkages of the project were made through formal contracts with individuals or organizations to produce specific products. An example of this was a contract with a documentary film maker who taught students how to make photos and process black and white pictures as well as make movies. Two other examples included: (1) an artist who was commissioned to design a logo for the project and then taught the students how to silkscreen the logo on tee-shirts, and (2) a contract with a publicity firm that was directed toward the new company providing energy audits on single-family dwellings. This gave students additional on-the-job training in broader business activity.

Synopsis

The linkages for this project were initiated by the project director. His method of creating these links was through a system of formal contracts for specified products. This approach was also instituted as a way to gauge student performance. However, it immediately created problems for the project with the on-site organization. The observer characterized the organization's modus operandi:

> In the past, the parent organization functioned on an informal, casual manner (leading, perhaps to disorganization . . .). When the project director appeared with contracts which had to be signed before anyone could give technical assistance, the staff of the parent organization was incensed. They did not see the need for anything of this sort [January 1980].

This method of operation reflected the project director's background as a contractor and systems analyst. His experience had taught him "when what was expected of a person and what his remuneration would be for that task were spelled out, confusion did not result" (January 1980). The relationship between the parent organization and the project was cool almost from the beginning. One of the persons involved in the initial development of the project placed the blame on the way the project had been presented to the organization at the first meeting. There were no available data to confirm this report or provide more specificity as to the initial incident. By January 1980, relations were less than cooperative.

A short-term linkage for the project had been with the local vocational technical high school. The project had initially made contact with the school in the spring of 1979. At this time, the project had expected to be operational by September 1979 and had hoped to include both students and staff of the school in the project. Initially, the principal of the school had shown enthusiasm for the project and was encouraging as to the possibility of a linkage with the school. A stumbling block occurred when the project was not ready to begin in September. As it took longer and longer to get started, enthusiasm for the project dwindled. The principal of the high school was moved to suggest that it (the project) was only a passing fad. When the on-site observer was introduced to the principal, the first comment was "What are you watching? A snail?"

The vocational high school remained linked for one academic year to the project through use of some school staff to teach classes for project youth and through the use of some classroom facilities at the school. As a result of the late start by the project (November 1979), a more complete linkage to the school was impossible. Because of the failure of this link to develop more fully, the project began looking into the possibility of opening its own school.

Several other linkages were initiated to help promote the project. The state housing authority certified the project to do certain kinds of work on housing problems. The project hoped in this way to improve low-income housing and to also develop a linkage to state officials to draw upon when making additional monies available for housing improvements. A local neighborhood organization was also involved as a means to assist low-income people to make improvements on their homes. Members of the organization were the first to have work done on their homes with the state funding. In this way, the project sought to build community credibility and to reciprocate for the help the organization was giving through community entree and cooperation.

There were few incentives for the parent organization to become involved in the new project. The goal of the project from the beginning was to become independent of the sponsoring organization. This, coupled with the administrative style of the project director, seemed to preclude close relations. There was also little incentive for the prime sponsor to become involved, since the method used to fund this project bypassed the prime sponsor.

With the other linkages, different factors provided incentives for cooperation. For example, the state housing authority saw an opportunity to utilize the expertise developed at the project to further some of its own goals. A ranking member of the housing authority was chosen to serve on the board of directors of the project. The local neighborhood organization received special housing services in return for their support of the project. The project students gained valuable on-the-job training experience as a result of the work provided by the organization and funded by the state.

CASE STUDY 3

This project created a personnel office run by secondary school students to receive jobs-for-pay requests for in-school

tasks. The four program components were (1) a graphic arts/media production studio that would produce recruiting materials and training aids and disseminate them, (2) a student food service that would plan and operate an alternative lunch program, (3) a consumer action service to assist consumers, and (4) a maintenance and repair service for school repair tasks. Students who met income guidelines, handicapped students, and educationally disadvantaged students were eligible to participate in the program, but only income-eligible students were trained on the in-school jobs and helped on the basic skills by a specially trained project staff. The project functioned as a semiautonomous alternative high school, drawing approximately 250 students citywide for half- or full-day semesters.

Public and Private Sector Linkages

The most important aspect of the process of establishing linkages at this project, according to the observer, was the project director's approach to representatives of business, government, and industry. This approach is illustrated from a talk by the project director to some potential linkers.

> First and foremost, we are very appreciative that you are willing to consider helping out a student by adding a very important educational experience to her/his high school program. We think that the student will be able to make a contribution to your organization as well, but we very strongly feel that you people should get a lot of credit for your willingness to participate in the educational process. We are going to be very available to you for consultation, and we are going to make it easy for you to assume this additional responsibility by making the paperwork easy and as hassle free as possible [January 1980].

In the opinion of the observer, the extensive network of linkages to various businesses, agencies, and cultural organizations came about largely as a result of the energy and

persistance of the project director and her staff members. An abbreviated list of project-affiliated groups is provided below.

Public Interest Research Group	House of Representatives
Art Gallery	Telephone Company
Children's Theatre	The Urban League
Upward Bound Program	Better Business Bureau
Mayor's Office	Chamber of Commerce
Museum of Arts	Law Firms

Public relations for the project was always viewed as important by the director. Building linkages required that the project become known. According to the observer, subsidies did not serve as an incentive in the process. The appeal to civic pride was enough to encourage sponsors to volunteer.

Money was an issue only in that fewer of the linkages could have been built without the availability of CETA funds to pay eligible students for their work time. In this program, there was a mix of CETA-eligible and noneligible students. The internship sites, as a rule, were not concerned about paying the interns for their work. The mix of CETA-eligible and noneligible students diminished this as an issue for sponsors. Furthermore, the city in which the project is located considers itself very civic minded. The opportunity to participate in ongoing educational programs had important public relations value in and of itself for many businesses, whether or not there was money coming in to support the process.

The process for creating the linkages between the project and government and business groups was quite specific at this project. It is outlined below, as provided by the project director.

(1) The director makes a telephone call to the potential internship site.

(2) Specific preparation is made with the student prior to the initial meeting at the internship site. The student's goals for working at the site are discussed, and the interview situation is then role-played with the student.

(3) The director attends the first meeting with the potential internship supervisor and the student and specifically asks the student in front of potential supervisor what the student's goals are. This provides a basis for the supervisor to respond quite directly about whether or not this internship site can in fact provide the kind of experience that the student is seeking [May 1980].

The phrase "enlightened self-interest" seems appropriate as a description of the linkages at this project. It was in the best interests of the project to establish as wide a variety of contacts as possible in the community to provide a choice of internships for their students. These internships were then matched up with the students' personal interests and capabilities. It was also in the best interest of the government and business community to provide opportunities for youth in keeping with their strong service ethic.

There was no coordination, as such, of these linkages among the various public agencies and no attempt to tap the agencies for other resources, such as money or manpower. Such an effort might have had positive implications for the project through combining resources and ideas to combat the basic survival issues with which the project was confronted. In the longer term, a linking of the various public agencies and their resources could have provided a solid political base upon which to facilitate the growth and development of the project.

There were several minor and loosely held links between the project and the private sector. The linkages primarily involved either field trips to various businesses where the youth were exposed to certain activities, or internships for youth to work one-on-one with people in certain jobs. An

example of the former linkage was when a company's personnel department gave the youth a closeup look at the job application and hiring process by having the youth go through the process of applying for a full-time job. A few of the youth carefully completed resumes and applications for specific positions and went through the entire screening procedure for that position. People from the company then selected only one person for the mock job and then conducted a seminar for the youth illustrating the kinds of things that led them to choose that one particular student over all the other applicants. One of the teachers in the project is quoted by the observer as having said:

> The students in the class are taking this seriously and are looking forward to learning about what it is like to get a job in the real world [February 1980].

The Prime Sponsor: The primary linkage of the project was with the local prime sponsor, though the link was weak in terms of support and encouragement. The prime sponsor had the power and resources to nurture, extend, and continue the project after the initial period of the contract. However, according to the observer, the prime sponsor "viewed the program as something to be tolerated, as a nuisance which would eventually go away."

Several issues are indicative of the project's relationship with the prime sponsor. The first and most longstanding of these issues was the fact that the project director had no formal status within the school system and thus no power base from which to operate. The director was neither faculty nor administration and was seen by the CETA bureaucracy "as a kind of little old lady in tennis shoes" (her own description).

The director had written the proposal for the project, but the liaison person in charge of CETA programs in the school system had assumed all along that he was going to be in

charge of the budget for the project. This did not happen. The project director retained complete control of the budget. The prime sponsor for the city formed a united front with the school liaison person against the director on all issues. This led to a feeling of "them against us." The observer described the relationship between the prime sponsor and the director:

> The words that were used to describe their trying to get control of the budget were usually something like "your program is part of a more comprehensive system of programs and the best aspects of your program should be incorporated into this system. To be able to do this, we need to have a good idea of what is going on in the budget, and to do that we need to control it." All that sounds very reasonable but my [observer] view of this was that it was simply an effort to control and that as long as the director was not "under control" she could not be trusted or counted upon [February 1980].

The lack of a working relationship with the prime sponsor hindered the project in at least two ways: (1) constant haggling about the budget, and (2) an endless stream of changed, cancelled, or postponed meetings, and a basic unpredictability about scheduled commitments on the part of the prime sponsor. The prime sponsor described his differences with the project director as basically philosophical. The observer agreed with that explanation but went on to note:

> I do believe that it is an accurate assessment, but I also believe that the "forgotten" meetings and battles over the budget did not follow automatically from having philosophical differences [May 1980].

The effect of the problems with the prime sponsor on the project was that the project director and staff found

themselves isolated throughout the project's tenure. The observer noted:

> Their thoughtful and effective work with adolescents was done in spite of, rather than with the help and support of, the prime sponsor, who supposedly was in business to help the project [May 1980].

The observer suggested that the stance of the prime sponsor was one of biding its time while the project ran itself through to the conclusion of its funding. They felt it was a hassle to deal with the director, but they knew they certainly would not have to deal with her forever.

The prime sponsor proposed to integrate the Exemplary program with other CETA youth programs under its jurisdiction. The project operator felt that if this were to occur, the project would lose many of its innovative features, which she had worked hard to create. The struggle over control of the project went on from the begihning. The project operator won the battle (that is, keeping control of the project) but lost the war. The prime refused to fund the program after the demonstration funds were expended.

The battle over the project took a toll on the emotions of the project director. The on-site observer reported that the director "had been very excited about all of the good innovative things going on in the project. That excitement had carried through a lot of the resistance from the CETA people in the first year. But during the second year, it feels more like a battle to her" (May 1980). Although these circumstances had obvious implications for the survival of the project, the service and training for the youth did not seem to suffer as a result of the confrontation.

A last note should be made regarding the relationship between the prime sponsor and the project operator. The

on-site observer attended several of the regularly scheduled meetings between the prime sponsor and the project operator. After one particularly perplexing meeting, the observer notes:

> My sense from this meeting was that it was a kind of necessary annoying obligation for all three of the people involved [prime, project operator, and school-CETA liaison person]. In no real sense was it a cooperative effort for them [January 1980].

Supportive Linkages: The other links, the positive links, were most typified by the project director's long-term relationship with a local university. In particular, two staff members at the university were very supportive of the director's efforts. The relationships remained constant throughout the project and proved to be a source of strength and ideas for the project director. Two other examples on how these same relationships helped the project can be cited: (1) one of the university staff lent her support in creating opportunities for the students to take on responsibilities in highly visible and responsible settings, and (2) other staff members conducted portions of the research or found qualified persons to do the research. The project director was highly respected by the university and state government officials. These persons supported the implementation of the project and lessened the eroding impact of the prime's opposition.

CASE STUDY 4

This project was designed to: (1) provide training and employment for fifty marginally employable youth; (2) stress basic learning skills for those who revealed a need for special help; (3) involve youth in planning, operation, and evaluation of the project; (4) become a self-supporting and ongoing project at the end of the project funding; (5) establish

linkages with agencies with similar goals that may provide additional services and resources for the youth in the project; and (6) provide youth with an opportunity to enhance their employment opportunities through training and future contacts established while in the project.

The idea for the project developed out of a needs assessment conducted by the county community education office and the state college. Four components were pinpointed as areas that needed the most concentration. The local high school seemed the most logical institution in which to place the program and there was already a linkage between both the community education office and the county board of education.

The Prime Sponsor

There was a prior linkage between the school and the prime sponsor as the school had some YETP students. But the exemplary program itself promoted a solid linkage between the project and local CETA officials. There was, however, little progress so far as developing assistance, services, or resources with other CETA programs. The linkages were mostly informational in nature, but were helpful because other institutional contacts were made through these informal linkages. A close relationship developed with the Employment Service Office, which conducted all CETA certification for the project including income certification and obtaining any information needed from the welfare office.

There was a concerted effort on the part of the program director to develop a linkage with the Office of Economic Opportunity for the purpose of obtaining information, services, and additional CETA slots. However, the director of OEO felt they were in direct competition with the project and a linkage was not established.

U.S. Department of Agriculture

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was helpful in providing information and services both to the project staff and participants. USDA was instrumental in securing funds to provide food for one of the project components. There was considerable linkage with the county extension agent who helped in setting up various plans for one of the businesses. The agent also helped establish linkages with the soils people and county health department. The soils people tested, designed, and laid out the physical plant and consulted on the location and placement of the wells. The county health department certified the physical plant and also assisted the project in preparing inoculation certificates, birth certificates, and health examinations for the clients.

Generally, the interinstitutional linkages not only provided information, but also shared services, resources, and assistance. Since all the agencies shared a common goal (service), these linkages became a means to facilitate the meeting of this goal. The end result was that they expanded and strengthened over time.

One important example was that the project began to provide services for an autistic child who was ready to be mainstreamed into a local school. The Comprehensive Psycho-Educational Service, which had provided assistance for the project, had asked to place this child in the project. The parents of the child could not afford to pay so arrangements were made with the Department of Human Resources to help these parents. The project received payment in kind as opposed to straight cash. This situation not only helped the child, parents, and the other agencies involved, but it allowed the students to be introduced to a situation they previously had not confronted. In a situation like this where services, decision-making, and authority were shared, the program and students themselves received positive and enlightening benefits.

The participants of the program were the major benefactors of the successful interinstitutional linkages. Some of the benefits students received from these linkages were financial assistance, academic and work experience, contact with future workers and employers, and exposure to new job fields.

Public and Private Sector Linkages

There was little private sector linkage owing to a lack of awareness of the project by this sector. In the beginning, there were problems with community acceptance of certain components. Prior racial problems impaired support of one unit. Misunderstanding and political barriers hindered the support of another. These differences were resolved mostly due to the expanding linkage with the local community education office. During the summer of 1979, the students participated in a community education office project. This exposure "broke the ice" with the community, and commitment toward the goal of gaining community and private sector involvement began to show promise. Several experts provided advice and support in hiring future project graduates. Contact was also made with several construction companies who were interested in hiring future graduates. Some local businesses expressed a need for computer programmers and the school moved to consider adopting this program into their curriculum for the 1981-1982 academic year.

Synopsis

A key concept for this project would be "common goals." In its attempt to create linkages to other institutions, the project tried to contact agencies that were in the business of providing resources for education and employment programs. A few examples of the institutions with which the project had linkages would include Family and Children's

Services, Employment Service Office, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The linkages, as a rule, were to provide specific services to the project. The Department of Agriculture provided food for breakfast and lunch at one of the project components and provided some technical assistance on agriculture-related matters. Such groups as construction companies and service centers provided instruction in particular skill areas.

The project did refer some students to local social service agencies or mental health counselors. "Problem" students were sent to the school guidance counselor. There was a genuine reluctance on the part of the students to consult with the guidance counselor. Many students felt (according to the observer) that the guidance counselor did not help with their problems. In this situation, a linkage with another institution, perhaps social services, would have seemed in order.

The linkage to the local Department of Labor office was loose and was based on the department's function of finding employment for those seeking it. The staff at the local office gave technical assistance to the project. A local official described the exemplary project as

> a good one because it provides work experience and training for the students and it makes it easier to place them in jobs. Employers like their prospective employees to have prior training and experience and to have the exposure to basic working skills such as being familiar with working protocol, rules, regulations, etc. Employees that have had prior training, experience and knowledge of working rules save the employer [both] time and money [March 1980].

This official also made suggestions on what kinds of skills would be most marketable in the near future for the project area: (1) small engine repair, (2) tractor repair, (3) secretarial/clerical, (4) business skills, and (5) technological

skills (data processing). The project adopted several of these occupations into its training component to meet upcoming projected needs.

Another linkage the site developed was the result of attempts to give the students some exposure to jobs they might otherwise not have known existed. The students took approximately two field trips a quarter to actual work sites in thier fields of interest. The purpose of the trips, according to the project director, was to "acquaint the participants with actual work sites, let them observe the site in several work stages, and provide them with an opportunity to talk with employees and employers about their specific skill areas, availability of jobs, and income opportunities." This was the only career exposure the youth received, since no job seeking skills class was offered at the school. Limited job placement and career information were available from the guidance counseling office.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF LINKAGES

One working hypothesis in this analysis has been that better linkage and integration yields better service delivery. Two of the four projects detailed here had few meaningful interinstitutional linkages (Cases 1 and 2). One case (Case 3) had many linkages with agencies that provided internship slots for its students, but because of its relationship with the local prime sponsor, it was all but isolated as a program within the school system. Only Case 4 clearly indicated a broad number of positive linkages to other agencies and organizations. The results of this instance indicated enhanced service delivery by the project.

From these case studies, there is the question as to the desirability of integration of youth-operated projects with other CETA youth programs. Evidence from the field (Cases 1 and 2) suggests that if a project is to be true to its mandate of youth involvement, it must avoid the constraints that adult-run agencies would place on it. Several examples in Case 1

illustrated that the youth operated approach required an exception to the normal operating rules of CETA. The types of project that youth decided to operate and, sometimes, their mode of operating these projects, made universal standards impossible. Integration of such projects with other more stringently controlled programs posed a problem for local decision makers.

The failure to develop a viable linkage with the prime sponsor presented survival difficulties for at least one project (Case 3). The nature of the original funding, as a demonstration project, made this project dependent on the prime. The prime had every intention of "integrating" this program with the other youth programs in the city. The project director fought to retain control of the project. In this instance, the failure to allow integration insured the program's demise. The project director responded by trying to create linkages to other more sympathetic institutions. These included a local college, an agency of the state government, and a national advocacy group. The hoped-for result from these linkages was to force the prime to "pick up" the program after demonstration funding ceased or to find another grant to support the project. Neither occurred and the project ended in June 1980.

Case 4 is a good example of a project using links with other institutions to further the development of its own project. The project tapped the expertise of several agencies to help accomplish specific tasks. The agencies' incentive for participation was an acceptance of the goals of the program and generally good rapport between the various agency staff members. This project and Case 2 were the ones in which linkages were strengthened over time.

Linkages and Program Implementation

Linkages (or the lack thereof) had a definite impact on the implementation of the four projects. In Case 1, the inability to find/create a support system where adequate expertise was available to the youth led to long delays and the ultimate

failure of some projects. The failure to create linkages in Case 3 was discussed in some detail earlier. While this did not affect the program implementation, it certainly did affect the chances for continuation of the project. For Case 2 certain linkages failed to develop (with the parent organization, for example). The absence of these linkages did not seem to have impeded implementation efforts. The explanation in this instance lies with the dynamic leadership of the project director. His personal "will to succeed" pushed the project to succeed in spite of the failure to create a meaningful linkage to what one would have thought was an important group for the project's survival. Case 4 was an example where linkages played a positive role in the implementation of the project. The efforts of various private and public agencies were instrumental in helping the project implement its programs.

In at least two examples, exemplary projects had effects on the institutions to which they were linked. The first occurred in Case 1 when the project illustrated to a settlement house what an infusion of federal monies could accomplish. The project also affected programs at the settlement house by drawing staff time and energy away from other programs. The second example was in Case 4 where the project was able to reciprocate the help it had received from an organization by accepting an autistic child into its own program. This proved to be a milestone in institutional relations for the project and opened up new areas of job exploration for the students involved.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LINKING EARNING AND LEARNING

We began this study with a quote from Breneman and Nelson (1980) to the effect that implementing youth employment and education programs is difficult and complex. The political rivalries, the protection of program turf, the weak influence of moral persuasion, and the conflicting self-interests of the various groups all make it exceedingly difficult to achieve the cooperation necessary for program implementation. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1979: 109) have reminded us:

> Our normal expectation should be that new programs will fail to get off the ground and that, at best, they will take considerable time to get started. The cards in the world are stacked against things happening, as so much effort is required to make them move. The remarkable thing is that new programs work at all.

The loophole, as it were, in the Pressman and Wildavsky analysis is in the definition of when a program "works." Their model of implementation is one of goals and initiatives being developed at the center (the federal level), and then implemented on the periphery, (the local site). Within this framework, the evaluative choices become "either-or." Either the local site is faithful to the goals of the federal initiative or it is not. When one examines their several case studies from Oakland, California, the data would bear out such a line of analysis. The several sites had widely differing interpretations of the federal initiative and, to complicate

things further, the interpretations changed over time. The end result is reflected in the subtitle of their book, "How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland, or Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All."

This present study would suggest a different framework for the study of implementation and the assessment of when it is that a program "works." The Exemplary In-School Demonstration effort was one with multiple dimensions and criteria. Success (or failure) could be found in each of the programs, but it depended upon what criterion one used. For those who would emphasize the achieving of target quotas of youth to participate in the programs, then there were both successes and failures. But the same variations are evident when the criteria become the creation and stabilization of interinstitutional linkages, the willingness to continue financial support beyond the two years of the federal grant, the number of youth placed in nonsubsidized employment slots, and on and on. The point to all this is that categorical judgments about program success are very risky. Such judgments are also as likely to obscure as they are to illuminate.

A fundamental problem with the categorical evaluation is that it presumes a logical and linear mode of program implementation. The studies presented here would suggest that implementation and the development of interinstitutional linkages which were so critical to that implementation were ad hoc, situational, and not always rational. Instead, the studies indicate that decisions about program objectives and goals were often disjointed, based on personality conflicts or compatibilities, and made in an environment where there was frequently a low level of interdependence among the several organizational units. The programs took on different meanings to different persons and were thus responded to in quite dissimilar ways. There was, in fact, no central policy. What existed, in the words of Weick (1976), was a group of "loosely coupled" programs around a common funding source.

Farrar, Desanctis, and Cohen (1980: 81) have stated much the same with regard to the implementation process:

> Federal programs are thus occasions for temporary conventions around common concerns, but different local groups perceive and seek to use the interventions differently. The so-called implementation process is thus not one of federal managers and district managers struggling to reconcile two views of a program, but one in which various local individuals and groups bargain among each other as much as with external agencies — or each do as they like without much bargaining.

Shortly thereafter, they note (1980: 83):

> Federal intervention, rather than encouraging consensus around formal goals, tends to exacerbate differences, as teachers, administrators, and specialists interpret the program in terms of varied work realities and role requirements. The difference between federal hopes and local actions is not simply or necessarily the result of federal mismanagement or local obstinacy; it is due to divergent and often contradictory local perceptions of a program and its purpose. Federal solutions are something viewed as obstacles to local problems; and often central goals are invisible to local actors.

The difficulty in extending this line of analysis too far is that the requirement of the federal sponsor for accountability becomes more and more difficult to sustain when each program is to be viewed only as the local implementation of local concerns, but with federal support. In a period when the politics of scarcity will prevail, the idea of providing federal funds to local recipients with no or few means of measuring performance or outcomes is an extremely unlikely one.

The compromise suggested from the present analysis is that there be several criteria for evaluation and that any assessment of program effectiveness be both

multidimensional and longitudinal. These programs were not the same at twenty months of operation as they were after four or six months. The implementation process was evolutionary. Through time, some evolved into effective and efficient programs according to a number of criteria and others went in the opposite direction. But to treat either group in an ahistorical context and measure "outcomes" at only one time is a fundamental distortion of their effort and impact.

Further, and this is more germane, it is our contention that the evaluation of a program should be conducted in such a manner that different criteria are applicable at different times in the cycle of the program. For example, the ability of programs to recruit youth varied considerably by projects and at different times within the time frame of any one project. For those projects in which there were few preexisting linkages, this ability to come on line and provide services to their full quota of students was slow in comparison to those projects which were preexisting or were generated by the schools themselves where there was a comparative population to fill the slots.

In refining the concept of a "successful" program to one that met the goals and objectives of any one of the four strategies reported in this study, the difficulties are not diminished. In fact, one might argue the opposite. The implementation of the individual projects at individual sites essentially blurred the parameters of each strategy, thus making it difficult to know precisely when the strategy was or was not successfully implemented. The strategies ought not, in this context, to be thought of as "models," but rather as umbrellas under which clustered different service packages for youth. The clusters were not mutually exclusive. The end result was that among the clusters there existed opportunities to emphasize one or another key service to youth.

The four strategies are variations on a theme — the need to bring the classroom closer to the workplace for low-

income and minority youth. The need is to explore the variety of ways in which to develop collaboration to enhance service delivery to youth. The task here has not been one of saying that one strategy is good and another bad. There are, so far as we are aware, no inherently good or bad strategies; there are only more or less appropriate ones. The appropriateness, as we have suggested, should be dictated by client needs, school and employment sector resources, and staff interests and competencies. Federal goals should be deemphasized, but the accountability of the local program to deliver what it promised to deliver also should be consistently and rigorously enforced. Funds for youth programs ought not to be diverted, with no threat of accountability, to building swimming pools, buying fire engines, or landscaping school gymnasiums, as we know happened with other federal educational programs that poured large sums of federal money into the hands of local officials.

Though we believe there are considerable insights to be gained in the previous four chapters from an analysis of the respective linkage strategies employed in the Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, they are not exhaustive. If the theme across the four strategies has been a common one — bridging the gap between learning and earning — then it is appropriate to pose the question of which cross-strategy analyses are apparent and informative. It is in this last section of the book that we will attempt to cut across the four strategies and nearly a score of projects to emphasize those findings that we believe to be particularly informative and applicable whenever it is that an effort is made to bridge the gap.

Cross-Strategy Analysis

A consistent finding across all four approaches is that linkages worked best in those settings where enlightened self-interest and reciprocity were evident. We state this as our first general finding because it appeared to be such a

critical determinant of whether linkages could first be created and then sustained between two or more organizations. Further, given that a number of forces were grouped against any such successful linkage, those factors that did enhance collaboration must be clearly articulated. In noting how current institutional arrangements make for difficulty in establishing new relations, Wurzburg (1980: x) has written:

> There is one important problem with federal policy encouraging institutional collaboration under CETA as YEDPA does: In the prime sponsor-education relationship, only the CETA prime sponsor is accountable to Washington. Even the most forceful federal policy makers cannot convert reluctant unions, schools, local government agencies, or private employers to the CETA religion. Furthermore, uncertainties about the level and availability of funding force local programming decisions to be delayed to the last moment. These conditions make it extremely difficult for CETA sponsors to develop working partnerships.

Data from the sites exploring means of "Expanded Private Sector Involvement" lend particular weight in support of this conclusion. The incentives for the private sector to become involved with in-school programs were basically few and far between. When they did work, the involvement was frequently because the private sector employer recognized certain benefits, particularly the ability to screen for potential long-term employees and to be relieved of a significant portion of the early wage costs through a wage subsidy. Though aspects of the reciprocity may have changed when one moved from private to public sector employment, data from other projects also suggested that linkages were not as likely to be initiated or sustained when no exchange of benefits occurred.

Greater attention should necessarily be paid to the various obstacles that stand in the path of collaboration — whether overly restrictive regulations and guidelines, continually changing policy signals which result in local programs doing less and less as they wait for the inevitable memo dictating new modifications, insufficient program money to allow efforts to be done as they ought, or insufficient wage subsidies for both private and public sector employers to compensate them for their involvement. It should be stressed that time and again in interviews with potential private and public sector employers, the statement was made that involvement with CETA programs was simply "not worth the hassle." So long as that continues to be a general perception and little is done concretely to change it, the disincentives for both public and private sector participation and collaboration will remain (Johnson, 1980a).

A second general finding of our study of collaboration is that the greater the number of organizations involved, the greater the complexity of the linkage system and the greater the amount of time invested in maintaining these linkages. Stated alternatively, there was a point (range?) of diminishing returns for projects as they linked themselves to other organizations and agencies. A third of our sample (six sites) gave evidence of having been overextended through the number of liaison groups, organizations, agencies, and advisory committees with which they had one or more collaborative relations.

What further exacerbated this situation for many sites was that beyond the linkages that were collaborative, there were those which necessitated participation, but seemingly had little relevance or utility to the project itself. The countless hours spent on boards, committees, or citywide coordinating councils of all types took up a large proportion of the working hours of the top administrators. This is not to say that such participation should not have occurred, but

only that with a scarce commodity like time, allocation to such activities meant that other more program-specific activities were left unattended and unaccomplished (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979: 121). We see this overextension of senior staff as having had a direct impact upon the long time lag that many projects experienced in becoming operational.

An additional factor related to the matter of complexity in linkages was that more than half of the programs found themselves in a network in which the number of decisions to be made and the number of participants involved meant an increasing accumulation of delays in implementation. Again, to state it differently, the more decisions to be made, the less the likelihood of program success. Many of the Exemplary In-School programs required dozens of clearance actions by a wide range of organizations and agencies, ranging from the Department of Labor at the federal level through the decisions of local school boards in rural communities. Pressman and Wildavsky (1979: 107) calculated that when multiple actors are involved, each with the right and obligation to participate in a decision-making process, an agreement level of 80 percent among these actors means that with just four decision points, the likelihood of successful implementation drops to less than 50 percent.

Linkages that were generated as a result of a "crisis atmosphere" or because of the sudden availability of resources were not initially stable. They were not likely to endure unless modified to reflect long-term benefits for the organizations involved. Such were the origins of many of the Exemplary projects. Only some successfully transformed their linkages into more permanent and beneficial patterns of collaboration, a finding compatible with conclusions from other youth employment programs (General Accounting Office, 1980). In several programs, a slow (or not so slow) dissolution of agreement occurred. Delay accelerated the loss of momentum, the loss of consensus, and the increased

likelihood of competing perspectives gaining in adherents and intensity.

As Wurzburg (1980), Taggart and Ganzglass (1980), and others have all noted, the YEDPA legislation was not intended to reinforce the status quo, but to promote change in the manner in which the education and employment/training systems related to each other, *specifically at the local level*. The carrot of federal dollars was to induce local change. However, moving the policy down through the various levels of government invariably transforms and mutates the initial design and intention. Tracing down just one of the various channels of decision-making, specifically between the federal CETA system and the local prime sponsor office, Wurzburg (1980: ix) has written:

> Uncertainty about funding levels, regulations and the law itself is a distinguishing characteristic of the entire CETA federal/prime sponsor partnership. Habitual as such uncertainties are, and continue to be under YEDPA, they still exact an enormous toll. Changing signals regarding funding levels caused sponsors to accelerate enrollments and then back-off; some were forced to lay off enrollees and staff. Doubts about what Congress would do with CETA reauthorization in the Fall of 1978 strained relations sponsors had newly established with local schools. These factors have reduced the planning and development time for new programs, and hurt the credibility of sponsors with other local agencies. They have also created a difficult work climate and seriously undermined prime sponsor staff stability. In the end, they have almost certainly lessened the effectiveness of the programs.

The very manner in which the federal government planned through YEDPA to influence local behavior gives every indication in some instances of having produced nearly the opposite. Local programs and organizational boundaries became more defined and less permeable as a reaction against confusion, conflicting guidelines, and mixed

messages as to the goals of the federal initiatives. The federal government was relying on the creation of linkages through fiscal incentives as the means to generate the necessary change. The funds, in and of themselves, did not put this infrastructure in place. This point should not be missed: The infrastructure occurred when there were viable local reasons for having it so.

A fourth general finding to emerge from this study is that there was an essential need for technical assistance to local projects; technical assistance that not only addressed the problems of program implementation, but that also equipped local programs to ascertain just what precisely it was that they had implemented. While all the projects in one manner or another implemented a school-to-work transition effort, it was also the case that, almost without exception, what was in place after eighteen or twenty months of program implementation was not what was anticipated nor promised when the grant application was made. The process of improvisation and of continually readjusting the goals of the program to changing political, economic, and social conditions resulted in efforts quite dissimilar to those initially envisioned.

The work of Goldberg and Prager (1979), as well as of Hall and Loucks (1977), suggests that technical assistance is absolutely essential to successful program implementation. This is so, not only for sharing experiences and procedures that might not be known, particularly at a new project, but also as an incentive to push the local project to clarify its objectives, goals, and assumptions on the translation of policy into program. Technical assistance necessitates a concern with methodology, thus moving beyond the bureaucratic "brush fire" mentality that sees each decision as discrete and disconnected from others. Technical assistance is necessary for local program personnel to sharpen their understanding of the consequences of accumulated decisions. The paucity of "history" at the Exemplary proj-

ects resulted in successive waves of staff repeating the same behaviors that had been done earlier — often to little avail.

There is another dimension to the provision of technical assistance, which concerns equipping local projects to sort out what organization system they are employing for their own project and what systems are in place for the organization and agencies around them. Such understanding has important and concrete implications for the form and content of linkages that can or cannot be developed. As discussed in Chapter I, the work of Elmore (1978) has been particularly instructive in this regard, as he detailed not one model, but rather four organization models, each of which had a distinctive approach to implementation. Our data suggest that building linkages and collaborative relations across organizational types was difficult and wrought with complexities. Equipping projects for a better understanding of the ecology of their organizational network could have had considerable impact upon their ability to effect the linkages that would be both reciprocal and sustaining.

The Exemplary projects sought to operationalize their commitment and find continuity in their efforts. That it was so difficult for the majority of projects to achieve these goals suggests that new and vigorous strategies of technical assistance were necessary. But perhaps this overstates the case. What may have been necessary was not "new and vigorous," but consistent and informed assistance. The latter was surely missing from the projects, particularly in the realm of creating and sustaining viable linkages. Many of the projects throughout their existence remained marginal to the service delivery network for youth in transition. This status was attributable, in part, to the fact that few successful linkages were generated. The evidence suggests the need to have provided to local projects not only "how to" information, but "when to" as well.

A fifth theme across all four approaches was that none was "actor proof." We wish to emphasize here our

conviction that the pursuit of actor proof programs in the area of youth education and employment/training programs is futile. Besides being a poor use of time and resources, such an approach ignores the key strength of the projects we studied — a strength based on the inspired and competent efforts of staff. To look elsewhere than to the people who organized and implemented the programs would be to miss the central point: the projects only worked when people involved successfully made them work. The contrary tendency, as Mangum and Walsh (1978: 14-15 have noted, is

> to be searching for the "actor proof" program, or programs, that were so well conceived and constructed that their effectiveness does not depend upon the competence of the human beings who either operate them or participate in them. . . . Evaluations may be correct when they blame the failures of programs or program components on the weaknesses of program personnel, but such criticism sheds very little light on the potential effectiveness of the programs or the components themselves.

To wait for the actor proof program is to wait for Godot.

In assessing these five summary statements from the cross-strategy analysis, what is apparent is that the traditional schism between earning and learning for those youth eager to make the transition into the adult world of work is counterproductive. Neither education nor employment training can go it alone, presuming to adequately address what is an interdependent and interlocked process. Basic skills *sans* career exploration and employment opportunities is just as incomplete as is the reverse. The challenge, then, is to develop the strategies not only to create the linkage, but to institutionalize these same linkages in communities across the nation. It is in the implementation that the theoretical becomes applied and the potential the experienced.

We might wonder if "enlightened self-interest" will be sufficient to generate and then sustain the linkages necessary

to address the continuing crisis of youth unemployment. But should we presume it is not, then we ought only to ponder our current condition. That we are on a downward spiral which more and more gathers up the lives of young persons should give us sufficient pause to reconsider.

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community Based Organization
CETA	Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
DOL	Department of Labor
ETA	Employment and Training Administration
GED	General Education Diploma
LEA	Local Education Authority
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
MDTA	Manpower Development and Training Act
MIS	Management Information System
NCRY	National Commission on Resources for Youth
NYC	Neighborhood Youth Corps
OJT	On-The-Job Training
OYP	Office of Youth Programs
PNP	Public Nonprofit
PSE	Public Service Employment
RFP	Request for Proposal
ROP	Regional Occupational Program
SEP	Student Employment Program
SPEDY	Summer Program for Economically Disadvantaged Youth
VEP	Vocational Exploration Program
YCCIP	Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects
YEDPA	Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act
YES	Youth Employment Services
YETP	Youth Employment and Training Program
YNPS	Youthwork National Policy Study

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS PACKET: INTERINSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES

Introduction

The concern of this analysis packet is to learn what we can of how to enhance the implementation and operation of the Youthwork Exemplary In-School Projects. More specifically, we are interested in the form and consequences of linkages that were created between the project and other organizations/institutions. Our research effort will examine the proposition that interinstitutional linkages are a critical component for successful program implementation. We are interested in both the breadth and depth of those linkages and the impact they have had upon the various projects.

To focus our efforts on this topic is to follow-up on several key policy questions raised by the U.S. Department of Labor in their 1979 *Knowledge Development Plan for Youth Initiatives*. The DOL has stated in this document that the following questions are among those they are seeking to answer based on such efforts as the Youthwork Exemplary

In-School Demonstration Projects. Three key questions posed by DOL are:

(1) What approaches and procedures can be used to involve the private sector in employment and training efforts and to increase the placement of participants in private sector jobs?

(2) To what extent are the programs integrated at the local level?

(3) How can youth programs be better integrated to improve their administration and to provide more comprehensive services to youth?

By focusing on interinstitutional linkages, we seek to address the questions posed by the DOL. As in the past, the emphasis will be upon the gathering of qualitative data by means of observations, interviews, and the appropriate use of documents.

The Research Agenda

The research task is one of explicating the various patterns, forms, incentives, and consequences of *establishing* interinstitutional linkages. It will not be enough to simply state that a linkage was created. The more critical questions we are after are those related to whether and how the linkage was *maintained* and what were the consequences of the linkage for the project.

A note here on the concept of linkages. Linkages can be either formal or informal. *Formal linkages* might include contractual obligations, participation on advisory panels, shared decision-making authority, the sharing of information and data. *Informal linkages* are those which might be built on things such as friendship, mutual interest in youth problems, sharing the same office, informally passing on referrals, providing leads on possible work site placements.

In either instance, *we are interested in those linkages which affect the ability of the program to achieve its goals.* There may be many other linkages between the program and different institutional actors. Our concerns are those which count in terms of affecting program implementation and operation.

What gives us a particularly strong position from which to undertake such an analysis is that we have been able to observe *the evolution of these linkages over time.* Because of this advantage, a number of questions can be explored. What has happened to the linkages during the course of the program? Have some grown stronger? Why? If not, why not? Have different linkages seemed more important at different times in the life of the program, for instance, school-program linkages appearing important early in the effort, but program-private sector linkages becoming more critical at a later stage. If projects evolve and change over time, this information will help program operators and policy makers to understand the kinds of linkages occurring at projects and their impacts. Did projects appear to become more sophisticated about creating linkages, or are the linkages to be created so different that at each stage project staff essentially had to start from the beginning? Finally, when during the life-cycle of the project did linkages become evident?

As will be apparent to those of you who have been in the field for us since the beginning of our study, several of the broad issues raised here are similar to those we first raised in the analysis packet on CETA/school relations. If the findings we reported in Interim Report 1 provided us with a glimpse of the forms of the linkages during the first months of the projects, we now have the advantage of an additional nine to twelve months of field work to further refine our analysis. In the first report, we mentioned some factors that inhibited linkage, such as programs not starting in sync with the school calendar, lack of clear decision-making authority

in programs, vague understandings by both the CETA and LEA systems as to the expectations and roles for each. We now want to further clarify these factors and to study in more depth what linkages the projects have made and with what organizations. *We are interested in strategies, alternatives, and consequences for program implementation and operation.*

Specific Areas of Inquiry

(1) *What are the incentives to intra- and interinstitutional linkage?* This is an especially germane question in light of the first of the DOL questions posed at the beginning of the packet.

(a) What appear to be the incentives that encourage the participation of various institutions and organizations? For the private sector in particular, what has it taken to bring about participation and are these incentives the same ones as envisioned when the program began? Is technical assistance necessary?

(b) Have linkages come about as a result of the presence of increased fiscal resources (that is, the funds to support the Youthwork project) or as a result of increased community influence and power?

(c) Have there been patterns of "enlightened self-interest" which have brought about the linkages? That is, do linkages occur in those instances where everyone has a chance to gain something as a result of their participation? As one example: Many of the projects did not expend their funds in the allotted time. Did the surplus funds have an impact on the linkages? How were decisions made about the use of these funds? Did "surplus" funds bring renewed interest?

(d) What are the barriers to successful cooperation among these agencies and what strategies are utilized by these agencies to overcome them?

(e) Under what conditions would an agency or a collaboration of agencies commit itself to supporting the project beyond Youthwork funding?

(2) *With which organizations, institutions, and agencies does the project have linkages?* The concern here is to define in precise terms the various forms and styles of linkages that have been created between the project and other relevant organizations. The task is not simply to list what organizations are involved, but how the linkage was created, what it has accomplished, and what were the key ingredients in the development of the linkage. Do not simply give descriptions of the linkages based on interviews, but provide detailed observations of the linkages at work, as in meetings, classroom activities, or work experiences. We need to get at the actual content of that linkage, not simply its formal institutional framework. (What looks good on paper might not work, and vice versa.) In addressing this question, the on-site observers must direct their attention to the following:

(a) Specifically, who is linked with whom and how does that linkage function? What are the roles of each agency in the linkage? How were these roles developed?

(b) Which linkages were in existence prior to the program?

(c) Providing an understanding of whether the linkages improved or disintegrated over time and why.

(d) There is the question of whether the linkages have had any impact upon the institutions themselves. Are they more willing to share information, to share decision-making, to share work on other tasks? Are the relationships likely to continue, or be limited to the current project?

(e) How do the various agencies in a collaborative relationship perceive each other?

(3) *Among the institutions, agencies, and organizations involved, who has the authority to decide what?* The issue is one of who has operational authority for the project and whether linkages have been created to share this authority. One of the primary goals of the YEDPA legislation has been to create incentives for collaboration and linkage between CETA and LEAs. (Witness the 22 percent set aside for YETP monies for LEAs to use for in-school youth.) The concern is with the impact of authority and decision — making structures of the LEAs and the CETA systems on the operations of the Exemplary In-School projects. We had examples in Interim Report I of blockages to collaboration: unwillingness to share decisions on curriculum, the content of the student's daily schedule, or the form and content of new courses. Likewise, there were disputes over monitoring the project, on DOL budgeting procedures, and over the types and sites for on-the-job training. Are these disagreements still occurring? If so, why? If not, what happened to break the logjam? To address this area, on-site observers should:

(a) Provide descriptions of specific decisions made by the interested parties on specific issues (such as academic credit, budget).

(b) Provide your informed judgment on whether the linkages that have been formed have had any impact upon the services and experiences provided to youth. Benefits for them, after all, is what these programs are about. Are youth better off as a result? In other words, what is the product of the relationship among the involved agencies?

(c) Focus on the programmatic consequences of decision-making and authority structures in terms of the operation and implementation of programs.

Synopsis by On-Site Observer

In addition to the field work which each of the on-site observers will undertake, each observer will provide to the YNPS a personal response for each of the questions posed under the three topics listed earlier. That is, we expect from each observer a document where you answer the questions that have guided your data collection efforts. You may well see trends, contradictions, insights and so on that were not evident in the protocols themselves. We are after a synthesis that would come into focus as you think about each of the questions and provide an answer, much as if we were interviewing each of you individually. Indeed, this is how you can consider this portion of the effort — an in-depth interview with specific questions and open probes. Please be both specific and comprehensive. It is most important that we learn as much as possible from all of you who are in such close and continuous contact with your respective sites.

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INDEX

Academic credit. See School-to-work transition services
Adams, A., 14
Advisory boards and committees, 72, 87, 113, 125, 159-160, 162, 168, 193
Agriculture, Department of, 179
Alkin, M. C., 38, 39
Analysis packet, 37, 203

Basic skills training. See School-to-work transition services
Berg, I., 24
Berman, P., 30
Bogdan, R., 41
Byrne, J. S., 29

Career planning. See School-to-work transition services
Career specialist teams, 137, 141
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies, 24
Center for Career and Occupational Education (CCOE), 108-110
CETA. See Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Cohen, D. K., 66, 189
Community Based Organizations (CBOs). See Linkages
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), 8-10, 13, 60ff., 96, 113; CETA-LEA linkage, 23-24, 29, 31-33, 117, 118, 120-121, 124, 131, 134, 142ff., 150, 208; Delays in release of funds, 84, 145; Prime sponsors, 9, 10, 13, 15, 24, 29, 32, 60, 62-65, 71, 81-85, 93, 95-98, 101-102, 109-110, 116, 134, 137, 140, 161, 175ff., 183, 192; Politics of the CETA system, 85, 87, 162; Regulations, 81-85, 87, 96, 193; Title IV, 29; Title VI, 158, 160, 163
Cornell University, College of Human Ecology, 17. See also Youthwork National Policy Study
Counseling. See School-to-work transition services

Daillak, R. H., 38, 39
Delays in release of funds. See Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Denzin, N., 42, 43
Dewey, John, 25
Disparities between white middle-class youth and poor minority youth, 14, 25
Disparities in federal spending on education of poor youth, 27

Education, Department of, 29
Education, State Departments of, 71, 73, 76-77
Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, 16
Elmore, R. E., 31, 32, 197

Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, 15-16, 30-32, 37, 46, 103, 124, 163-164, 188-191, 194, 197, 203. See also Comprehensive Employment and Training Act prime sponsors, Exemplary In-School Grant Program, Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act, Youthwork, Inc.
Exemplary In-School Grant Program, 9, 10, 159, 177. See also Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act, Youthwork, Inc.

Farrar, E., 66, 189
Field Foundation, 16
Funding source compliance. See Linkages

Ganzglass, E., 24, 195
General Accounting Office, 194
Goffman, E., 40
Goldberg, J. E., 196
Goodman, M., 41
Gouldner, A., 40
Guidance counselors. See Local Education Agencies

Hall, G. E., 196
Hamilton, M. A., 123
Hargrove, E. C., 30
Hatch, D., 40
Henslin, J., 41
Holloway, W. B., 156
Hufstedler, S. M., 27

Identification and enrollment. See Linkages
Incentives for cooperation. See Linkages and Local Education Agencies
Intervention strategies. See School-to-work transition services

Johnson, S. D., 72, 90, 193

Knowledge development, 64-65. See also Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act

Labor, Department of, 14-17, 29, 35-37, 46, 54, 60-61, 81-83, 140, 142-143, 155, 204
Labor market entry. See School-to-work transition services
Law Enforcement Administration Agency (LEAA), 116
LEAs. See Local Education Agencies
Linkages: CBOs, 93, 98-99, 101, 105ff., 118, 140, 193; Community visibility, 70, 75, 181; Consolidation, 27; Funding source compliance, 54-55, 59, 88; Identification and enrollment, 66, 71, 102, 114, 118, 136-137, 132; Incentives for cooperation (Fiscal, 29, 148, 164, 173; Reciprocal benefits, 101, 118, 133-134, 164, 171-174, 192; LEA, 103); Patterns of collaboration, 24, 89ff.; Program operation, 54-55, 88, 95ff., 195-196; Social service agencies, 91, 99-101, 106, 118, 132-135, 151, 181, 193. See also Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, Local Education Agencies, School-to-work transition services, Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act
Local Education Agencies (LEAs): Guidance counselors, 76, 78-80, 87, 114ff., 128, 181; Identification of academic credit needs, 76; Incentives, 103; Principals, support from, 80, 87, 108, 125-126, 128, 167, 170; Program success, 70, 97; Teacher program involvement, 79-80, 108, 120, 126, 130, 136, 153, 168. See also Linkages, incentive
Loucks, S. F., 196
Lynd, H., 40

Lynd, R., 40

Malinowski, B., 39
Mangum, G., 14, 34, 198
McLaughlin, M. W., 30
Mentor corps, 92, 112-113, 121
MIS systems, 16, 46

National Alliance of Business, 108
National Commission for Manpower Policy, 17-18, 86
National Commission on Employment Policy, 11
National Institute of Education, 41
National Manpower Institute, 89
National Youth Advocacy Coalition, 105

Occupational skills training. See School-to-work transition services
Organizational models, 31-33

Paperwork flow problems, 61ff., 74, 86, 140
Patte[illegible], M. Q., 43
Peer counselors, 142ff., 149-150
Politics of the CETA system. See Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
Polsky, N., 41
Prager, A., 196
Pressman, J. L., 24, 30-31, 48, 123, 187, 194, 203
Prime sponsors. See Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
Principals, support from. See Local Education Agencies
Private sector work experiences. See School-to-work transition services
Program implementation factors, 103
Program longevity, 101, 103-104, 106, 117-119, 122, 125-126, 135, 194
Program operation linkages. See Linkages
Public sector work experiences. See School-to-work transition services
Public Welfare Foundation, 16

Rand Corporation study of implementation of federal programs, 30
Rist, R. C., 11, 18, 39, 41-42, 90, 103, 120
Rossi, P., 48

Satellite programs, 96-98
School-to-work projects, 9-10, 14; Local delivery agents, 9; Separation between classrooms and workplaces, 7; Start-up processes, 10-11, 17, 101, 104, 114, 122. See also CETA prime sponsors, Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, Linkages, School-to-work transition services, Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act, Youthwork, Inc., Youthwork National Policy Study
School-to-work transition services, 7-10; Academic credit, 57-59, 91, 97, 104; Basic skills training, 7, 59, 92, 178; Career planning, 7, 16, 34, 58, 123-124, 146, 150; Counseling, 7, 34, 58-59, 123, 146-147; Labor market entry, 7, 58, 74-75, 87, 97, 174; Occupational skills training, 8, 15-16, 34, 58, 92, 102, 109, 112, 123, 126, 148, 153, 169, 172, 178, 182; Supportive services and follow-up, 8, 34, 75-76, 87; Vocational exploration, 7-8, 58-59, 91-92, 110; Wage incentives, 57-59; Work experiences, 7, 10, 13, 16, 24, 102, 124, 153; (private sector, 8, 10, 35, 59, 75, 84, 149; public sector, 8, 58, 72-75, 141); See also Disparities, Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, Linkages
Social service agencies. See Linkages
Solar energy cooperative, 164ff.
Southern Education Foundation, 16

Supportive services and follow-up. See School-to-work transition services

Taconic Foundation, 16
Taggart, R., 11, 24, 195
Teacher program involvement. See Local Education Agencies

Valentine, C., 40
Vocational exploration. See School-to-work transition services

Wage incentives. See School-to-work transition services
Walsh, J. 34, 198
War on Poverty, 9
Warner, W. L., 40
Weic[illegible], K. E., 188
Weiss, C. H., 38
Whyte, W., 41
Wildavsky, A., 24, 30-31, 48, 123, 187, 194, 203
Wiltberger, H. E., 55
Work experiences. See School-to-work transition services
Work Institute of America, The, 41, 155-156
Wright, S. R., 48
Wurzburg, G., 23-24, 41, 90, 192, 195

YEDPA. See Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act
YETP. See Youth Employment and Training Program

Youth Act of 1980, 28
Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Project (YCCIP), 41
Youth Consortium, 158, 160, 162
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA), 9, 13-15, 17, 23-25; and knowledge development, 33-36; Youth policies for the 1980s, 9, 17, 23-25, 33. See also Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, Exemplary In-School Grant Program, Youthwork, Inc.
Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP), 13, 24, 36, 41, 49, 53, 60, 86-87, 108-110, 131, 149, 179
Youth Enterprises Development Corporation, 155
Youth unemployment, 13-14, 25, 34
Youthwork, Inc., 9-10, 15-17, 37, 53, 57-58, 60-63, 66, 81-82, 84, 89-90, 106-108, 110-111, 124, 137, 168, 192, 195, 208; Areas of funded programs, 16 (see also Chapters 3-6); Demographic characteristics of projects, 10. See also Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, Exemplary In-School Grant Program, Exemplary In-School Demonstration Projects, YEDPA
Youthwork National Policy Study, 17, 41, 46-47; Data transmission, 46; Interviews, 44; MIS data, 46; Written documents, 45

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